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Abstract  
 This thesis examines the role of the Iranian cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Hussaini Al 
Sistani in politics in Iraq, from the time of the invasion/occupation of Iraq by the United 
States in 2003 until the present day. The purpose of this study is to investigate the complex 
issues surrounding the political interventions of Al Sistani and to explore a range of 
perspectives held by Iraqi people about his role as a cleric with political influence. The study 
contributes significantly to the shedding of new light on the impact of clerics on Iraqi society 
and an initial hypothesis for the study was to discover whether Al Sistani might be the first of 
a new mould of Islamic clerics who believe in pursuing peaceful and democratic solutions to 
political problems.  
 An interpretivist, epistemological approach has been adopted as the theoretical basis 
for achievement of the qualitative aims of the study. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with volunteer Iraqi diaspora participants in order to discover their views 
regarding Al Sistani’s interventions. It was initially considered that interviewing Al Sistani 
himself would provide the most direct qualitative data. However, as access to Al Sistani 
proved logistically impossible, it was decided that textual analysis of authentic documents 
representing him would be fruitful. 
 Thematic analysis of interview and textual data was used in the development of new 
understanding and meanings. The analysis involved immersion in the data - a process 
undertaken by reading and re-reading transcripts and texts in order to become more and more 
familiar with them.  
 The findings of the study reveal detail about three significant political interventions 
that Al Sistani had taken. The first is in countering the plan by the United States to choose a 
US controlled committee to write a new constitution. Al Sistani intervened by insisting that 
the US organise the election and the Iraqis then elected to office would be responsible for the 
constitution. Respecting Al Sistani’s influence, the US complied. Secondly, detail is explored 
in Al Sistani’s part in forming the Iraqi government in 2014. His contribution was in breaking 
an eight-month deadlock where politicians could not agree on the formation of the 
government. The third intervention occurred just a month later when Al Sistani issued a 
Fatwa to encourage Iraqis to take up arms against Islamic State (ISIS) in both Iraq and Syria. 
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 Significantly, the study also illuminates detail about essential differences between the 
views of Shia and Sunni Iraqis. However, while differences occur the results indicate a 
general respect and approval of Al Sistani’s political interventions, influence and decisions. 
There is a broad, positive sentiment that Al Sistani’s promotion of democracy holds special 
hope for the nation’s problems and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world. 
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Keywords and their definitions 
AH: This refers to ‘after the Hijra’ (622 AD in the Western calendar). The Hijra is the 
name given to the event where Muhammad and his followers migrated from Mecca to 
Yathrib (now Medina) to found the first Muslim community. 
Ayatollah: An ayatollah is a high-ranking title given to Usuli Twelver Shia clerics. 
These clerics are experts in Islamic studies including jurisprudence and the Quran. 
Usulis number the majority in the Twelver Shia Muslim group. They favour the use of 
ijtihad (reason and independent interpretation) in matters of law. The much smaller 
group, the Akhbari, reject the use of reasoning in deriving verdicts, believing that the 
Quran and hadith are the only source of law. An ayatollah is a religious leader among 
Shia Muslims, with the title being used especially for one who is not an imam. An 
ayatollah can be translated literally to mean ‘sign of God’. 
Election: Elections are the decision-making processes through which people choose 
their officials. The usual method of modern democracy is to hold an election for people 
to vote to fill the seats in a legislative council. Importantly, for the Iraqis the 2005 
election signalled the end of a dictatorship and the beginning of a new democratic 
system of government.  
Fatwa: A fatwa is any religious decision made by a mufti (Islamic scholar who is an 
interpreter or expounder of Islamic law) and this decision must be followed by the 
Muslims it is given to. The most infamous fatwas in Iraqi history are the jihad fatwa by 
Sayyid Kadhim Al-Yazdi to resist the British invasion of Iraq in 1914, and Al Sistani’s 
fatwa in 2014 against ISIS.    
Hadith: A hadith is one of many reports describing the words, actions, or habits of the 
Islamic prophet Muhammad.  
Hawza:  The term 'Hawza' refers to the seminary in which Shia jurisprudence is taught. 
Along with this function, it represents the spiritual and religious leadership of Shia 
communities. The Najaf Hawza is considered to be the oldest Hawza in the history of Shia 
Islam, having been established in about 448 A. H (1056 A.D.).  
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Ijtihad: Ijtihad is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a 
legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Quran and the 
Sunnah. It basically describes the use of reason. 
Imam: An imam is an Islamic leadership position, or a person in that position. It is 
most commonly used as the title of a worship leader of a mosque and Muslim 
community among Sunni Muslims. In this context, imams may lead Islamic worship 
services, serve as community leaders, and provide religious guidance. An imam is also 
the term given to the highest religious authority in Shia Islam – usually Grand 
Ayatollahs. 
Jihad: A Jihad is the process of “exerting best efforts,” in resisting or struggling to 
achieve a particular goal. 
Marja: Marja is the title given to the highest level of Shia authority, a group of Grand 
Ayatollahs with the authority to make legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law 
for followers and less-credentialed clerics. After the Quran and the prophets, the marja 
(a collective term for the group) are the highest authority on religious laws in Usuli 
Shia Islam. Al Sistani is one of a group of 4 to 5 Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf, the centre 
of clerics. This is the only location for ayatollahs in Iraq, and therefore the only location 
for a Marja in Iraq. Other ayatollahs live in other places such as Iran and Bahrain, for 
example. 
Najaf: The city of Najaf lies about 160 kilometres to the south of Baghdad. Its 
existence dates back to the era of Harun al-Rashid, the famous Abbasid Caliph, who 
ordered a dome to be built over Imam Ali's grave in about 170 A.H (786-87 AD). This 
encouraged Shi'is to come and settle in the area to study the ‘Islamic sciences’. 
Qom: is located in a desert about 130 km south of Iran’s capital Tehran. Qom is 
considered one of the most important Shia centres in Iran a city in which more than 
70,000 Shia students from around the world study and research about Islam at hundreds 
of madrasas, libraries and research institutions spread over it. Qom has a historical 
relationship with Najaf Hawza and sometimes there is competition for the leadership of 
the Shia in the world. 
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Shia: The word Shia in Arabic means "followers". The followers of Imam Ali, the 
Prophet Muhammed’s son-in-law and cousin, who the prophet declared as his 
successor, are known as the Shia.  The Shia are the second largest Islamic group in the 
Muslim world and the largest Islamic group in Iraq. They live primarily in central and 
southern Iraq. 
Sunni: The Sunni are the largest branch of Islam. A Sunni is a Muslim who believes 
that the caliph Abu Bakr was the rightful successor to Muhammad after his death as 
opposed to Imam Ali. There are several different traditions within the Sunni branch of 
Islam. They are second largest group in Iraq .They live in the middle and west of the 
country. 
Taqleed: The conformity of one person to the teachings of another. 
Wilayat al-faqih: Wilayat al-Faqih is the mandate of the Islamic jurist or guardianship 
of the jurist. Wilayat means government or legal authority. Combined with faqih, which 
is the standard Islamic term for someone who interprets the law, “the doctrine of 
Wilayat al-Faqih currently forms the central axis of contemporary Shia political thought 
in Iran now. It advocates a guardianship-based political system, which relies upon a just 
and capable jurist (faqih) – who is like both a cleric and a politician – to actively 
assume the leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible Imam” 
(Amanat, 2003). However, the guardianship of a high-ranking religious scholar is not 
universally accepted amongst all Shia theories of governance. Some Iraqis connect this 
theory with Al Sistani’s role in Iraq. Most of the Sunnis consider Al Sistani’s 
intervention in politics as a part of Wilayat al-Faqih (Rahimi, 2007).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1. BACKGROUND  
Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani (full name: Al-Sayyid Ali al-Husseini Al Sistani) has been an 
influential Shia Muslim cleric in Iraq since 2003. His authority and stature are widely felt 
even though Iraq is a multi-sectarian country with a diversity of perspectives and views 
regarding religion and politics. Al Sistani suffered from house arrest under Saddam's regime 
and was subjected to more than one assassination attempt, but he did not leave Iraq and 
preferred to stay there in order to provide leadership (Kadhim, 2012a). 
Al Sistani is a religious figure, a high cleric without a formal position, yet widely 
accepted as an authority. While an Iranian by birth, he has resided in Iraq for 50 years and 
prior to 2003, he did not intervene politically in any way (Nasr, 2007). Yet now he has also 
gradually become a political figure with influence. While assembling historical details from a 
variety of sources, the purpose of this study is to investigate a range of perspectives about his 
political role and the extent to which Iraqi people have accepted or regarded his role as a 
cleric with political influence. As preliminary background and for an understanding of who 
Al Sistani is, the following questions are discussed: 
What is his background? 
What is the influence he has had on the world around him? 
What motivates him? What are his beliefs, his thoughts, his aims, his motivations? 
These questions are dealt with in this introduction and they are discussed further also in 
the Literature Review as well as in later chapters. 
The thesis examines Al Sistani’s role in Iraq since 2003, the year Iraq was invaded by 
the United States of America. This invasion caused the collapse of the existing Iraqi 
government and the dissolution of the army, which in turn led to the emergence of many new 
leaders, both religious and political from all Iraqi sects, and Al Sistani was one of them 
(Noorbaksh, 2008). 
It has since become evident that the government of the United States of America –while 
having specific aims and missions to achieve – did not have a clear plan for Iraq and its 
people beyond 2003 (Allawi, 2007). An interim government was installed, but much 
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negotiation was needed – mediation, discussion, diplomacy – within an environment where 
there was much resistance from many Iraqis.  
The occupiers faced their first objection from Al Sistani when they wanted to impose a 
new constitution on the Iraqi people. Through mediators, Al Sistani sent a letter to Paul 
Bremer, the US Ambassador in Iraq, asking him to hold elections and then choose a 
committee to write a constitution for the Iraqis (Allawi, 2008). Not all Iraqis supported this 
objective because Iraq was unstable and delicate, and security was lacking. Any election 
could potentially have led to the domination of a particular sect in running the country, and 
therefore deprive other Iraqis of a democratic voice.   
1.1.1 The Sunni and the Shia and Wilayat al-Faqih 
Estimates of the population ratio between the Shia, the Sunni and other sects vary and a lack 
of census data from Thirty years ago is not helpful. However, it would be reasonable to 
estimate Shia to comprise about 55% of the population and Sunni 15-20%, with the 
remainder being comprised of other minority sects. Shia are mostly located in the middle and 
south of Iraq, and the Kurds in the north. Of the 18 Iraqi provinces, 3 are Kurd, 3 are Sunni, 
and the remaining 12 are Shia (Wimmer, 2003). 
The Shia believe that before Muhammad died it was to his brother-in-law Imam Ali 
that he entrusted his authority for the responsibility of governing the Islamic world. Therefore 
they look to the legacy of Ali for teaching and guidance (Nasr, 2007). The Sunni, on the other 
hand, say that they defer to Abobaker as the elected leader after Mohammad died. All this 
took place the year 623.  
There are many other differences of course, with one of the most significant being that 
there are more fundamental beliefs and perceptions among the Sunni who assume a more 
literal interpretation of the Quran.  
Wilayat al-Faqih is an important Shia political doctrine that is followed in Iran, but also 
supported by some Iraqi clerics. It refers to a political system based on a guardian (a jurist or 
Faqih) assuming the leadership of the government in the absence of an ‘infallible Imam’. 
‘Imam’ is a title (Kadivar, 2011) that is assigned to a respected leader in the Muslim 
community, usually a religious leader. The concepts of Faqih and Imam are accepted among 
all Shia and Sunni, although the details (such as the role of the jurist and the scope of his 
authority) are contested.  
Islamic theories regarding leadership and intervention in politics are ambiguous 
because there are different groups and individuals who have a range of ideas and Al Sistani’s 
20 
 
theories offer a further set of interpretations. The  Shia position assumes that clerics should 
have a role in politics (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003). A second theory states that clerics should not 
have any influence in politics but should be confined to teaching, religious education, and 
related matters (al-Kifaee, 2010). A third theory states that in the absence of an ‘infallible 
Imam’, a guardian or a faqih can assume political leadership. This is the Wilayat al-Faqih 
doctrine that considers itself progressive and dynamic (Amanat, 2003).  
As none of these theories fit Al Sistani’s current role and ideas, it could be assumed that 
he promotes a new theory of leadership and political intervention by clerics. This theory 
suggests that clerics intervene in difficult situations but they do not automatically take on 
roles of political leadership (Al Sistani gives his advice and intervenes only if he believes he 
should, or if it is necessary) (Maynard, 2005).  
1.1.2 After the 2005 elections 
Important elections took place on January 30th, 2005. There was much debate at this time, 
and debate continued after the elections. People (as reflected in the world media) wondered if 
Iraq had become a democratic experiment. Iraq remained the focus of regional and global 
attention (Ono, 2005). What was happening in Iraq with its new government, and the 
continuing resistance of many Iraqi people, would have far-reaching consequences for the 
spread of democracy in the Middle East. Not all Iraqis expected democracy to succeed in the 
country due to the varied perspectives of the many different sects. Moreover, there were 
doubts by the Americans as to whether Al Sistani believed in democratic values, or if his 
request for an election was a singular and isolated intervention. They also wondered if his 
motivation was part of an agenda that sought power for the Shia (Feldman, 2005). 
Throughout the many years he had spent in Iraq up until 2003, Al Sistani had never 
intervened in politics, but this changed after the occupation. Although Al Sistani is an Iranian 
citizen, this thesis will investigate perceptions about his encouragement of the system of 
Wilayat al-Faqih (the current political system in Iran). 
The 2014 elections 
Ten years later on April 30
th
, 2014, elections were held after a time when Iraq had been 
without a government for eight months. Even combining their efforts, the parties did not have 
a solution for the question of how to form a new government. But then a message was sent to 
Al Sistani, requesting his help. Al Sistani agreed and his advice was taken, and the elections 
took place (Hadad, 2016). 
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Soon after this, on June 13, 2014, Al Sistani issued a Jihad Kefaya Fatwa against ISIS. 
This was soon after the Iraqi army lost three provinces and some parts of the north of Iraq to 
ISIS (Pelham, 2015). The announcement was made during a Friday prayer. All Iraqi citizens 
were called to defend the country, its people, their honour, and the country’s sacred sites. In 
response, tens of thousands of volunteers were mobilised to join the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF), the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and other groups (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
The Kefaya element of this fatwa means that if you do not have significant 
responsibilities – if you are not working or you are not a student for example – then you are 
compelled to stop what you are doing and carry out the fatwa (al-Libi, 2010). This fatwa was 
controversial because it had been criticised by Sunnis who considered it as an invitation to 
kill them, while on the other hand many Shia believed it would save Iraq from the danger of 
ISIS, which had announced that they came to apply Islamic law and kill anyone who opposed 
their ideas.  
In light of these details, this thesis will explore perspectives about Al Sistani’s 
interventions and discuss whether they fall in line with the system of Wilayat al-Faqih. The 
thesis will also explore how Iraqis regarded Al Sistani and his interventions through the 
fatwas and via other means. It will discuss matters such as why a number of the Iraqi 
parliamentarians followed this message and chose a new prime minister in accordance with 
further recommendations of Al Sistani’s. The response of others, such as these 
parliamentarians, sheds insight on how the Iraqi population viewed Al Sistani and his ways. 
1.1.3 Biographical details on Al-Sayyid Ali al-Husseini Al Sistani  
In understanding Al Sistani and his views and actions, it is important to understand 
something about his background. The following is historical detail from the website of 
Sistani.  
His early years 
Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Husaini Al Sistani was born on 4th of August 1930 in the holy 
city of Mashhad in Iran. He was raised in a religious family. At the age of five Al Sistani 
commenced learning the Quran, and soon after entered the Madresa ‘school’ of the late 
Mohammad Baqir Sabsavari where he continued religious studies (from various notable 
religious scholars) until he migrated to the holy city of Najaf for higher studies. From the 
beginning of 1941, he began basic Hawza lessons, which is the beginning of training to be a 
Muslim Cleric (Al Sistani’s website: https://www.Al Sistani .org/english/data/2/). 
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In late 1948, he migrated to Qum city in Iran to continue his studies in Fiqh and Usul – 
the ‘Divine Law as revealed through the Prophet Muhammad’. He was helped in his studies 
by several well-known scholars (Al Sistani’s website: https://www.Al Sistani 
.org/english/data/2/). 
After three years in Qum, Al Sistani migrated back to Najaf in 1951 where he attended 
the lectures of Ayatollah Abol-Qasim el-Khoi (1899-1992), who was considered “a 
prominent religious scholar and mujtahid, [and] one of the highest-ranking religious 
authorities in the world of Shiite Islam” (Noorbaksh, 2008). A decade later, he was certified 
as mujtahid by Ayatollah Khoi and Ayatollah Hussein Al-Hilli, another leading Marja (Al 
Sistani’s website: https://www.Al Sistani .org/english/data/2/). 
In the same year 1960 he left Najaf and returned to his hometown of Mashhad in Iran, 
and upon return was awarded certain permits, with the expectation he would stay in Iran. 
These permits certified that he had attained the level of ijtihad and was therefore able to pass 
legal judgments in matters of religion. He also received a diploma in rijal the study of the 
words of Muhammad. However, he returned to Najaf in Iraq in 1961 for unknown reasons 
after only one year in Mashhad (Iran). Some argue that this return was in response to an order 
from Al Sistani’s mentor, Ayatollah el-Khoi (Noorbaksh, 2008; Khalaji, 2006; www.Al 
Sistani .org). 
Upon returning to Najaf he taught jurisprudence and started lectures (externals) in 
jurisprudence in 1964 (Al Sistani’s website: https://www.Al Sistani .org/english/data/2/). 
At this point reading further may be difficult for non-Muslim readers without a brief 
reminder of the meaning of some terminology. This can be found at the beginning of the 
thesis. 
Upon his return to Najaf, Ayatollah Al Sistani began researching and teaching Islamic 
jurisprudence, and has taught jurisprudence for more than five decades. Throughout recent 
years many commentators have suggested he was being groomed to succeed Khoi as the 
spiritual leader of much of the Shia Islamic world (Noorbaksh, 2008, p. 59). 
Post war Iraq 
After the toppling of the regime in 2003, Ayatollah Al Sistani emerged as a central 
figure in the new Iraq. His religious legitimacy in Shi'ite communities, along with his 
sophisticated network, has given him an exceptional capability to mobilize Shiite 
communities. His transnational religious website represents an independent and integrated 
governance system that not only administers the clergy-related affairs but extends to provide 
services that the state usually performs. 
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Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Al Sistani network has emerged as the most 
organized transnational civic institution in Iraq, with offices not only throughout Iraq, but 
also in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Britain, Georgia, India, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United States, with the seminary students [in 
Iran] supported by Al Sistani’s centre being ‘well paid and even offered a health insurance 
plan that covers their families during the period of their studies’ (Rahimi, 2007, p. 7). 
In 2008, the notable author on Iraqi politics, Dr Mehdi Noorbaksh made the striking 
statement that it was Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani who was capable of uniting all Iraqis. He could 
deliver for a community [of Shia] that had been under-represented, isolated and discriminated 
against in the government and politics of Iraq from the time of the British occupation of the 
country (Noorbaksh, 2008, p. 58)  
When the US-led coalition overthrew the Saddam regime, most Iraqi Shia were "facing 
a historical opportunity, and challenge, to transform Iraqi history in their own favour." 
(Noorbaksh, 2008, p. 60). They saw in Al Sistani their wise leader who would guide them 
through this critical stage. 
While this is a brief background of Al Sistani, what happened in his life after the fall of 
Saddam’s regime will be detailed in the coming pages where it is explained how he has 
intervened on several occasions in the politics of Iraq, and done so with influence and 
success. 
Throughout the following years Al Sistani has risen to the position of Grand Ayatollah, 
which places him in higher authority than others. He is also called an imam and is part of the 
marja, but also as a grand Ayatollah he is above it, and he is one of only a few who have the 
degree of Ijtihad. However he has also studied widely in numerous areas, including scientific 
studies for which he has a particular interest.  
1.1.4 My interest in this topic 
The following biographical material is presented in order to reveal my background and the 
social and cultural context in which I have been placed. This may allow the reader to make 
judgment about the lens with which I view this topic.  Importantly, it offers insight into 
revealing my interest in conducting such a project and how decisions evolved. 
I was born in 1976 in Nasiriyah, a major city in southern Iraq situated on the Euphrates 
River. With a population of more than two million (mostly Shia), and being the site of many 
Shi’ite shrines, the city is well protected by security forces. But bad things do happen there. 
Militant groups do sometimes get in past the blockades at the entry points to the town. For 
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example, in September 2017 eighty people were killed by ISIS and more than 90 injured 
during joint attacks at a restaurant and a security checkpoint. 
Although it is one of the safest places, Nasiriyah is still a part of the Iraqi conflict, and 
so it has its issues.  Born into a family with three brothers and three sisters, life was easy 
enough, but there was always conflict and wars. When I was five Iraq went to war in Iran 
(1980.) That war continued for 8 years. In 1991 we had the Kuwaiti war. In 2003 I was doing 
my Bachelor’s Degree in Baghdad when the Americans and their allies occupied the country. 
Yet I was fortunate. Life was good and easy, despite the wars. I was never detained by 
security forces and receiving a bachelor of Education meant I could find work.  
The ancient city of Ur is only 5 kilometres from my home. Some say this is the place 
where civilization began. It has holy significance for Christians, as there are claims that 
Abraham’s house still lies there. It has become a popular tourist attraction for both Christians 
and Muslims. 
My family worried about Saddam’s regime, especially knowing that other parts of Iraq 
were not doing as well as us and my tribe – Hajam – was one of the tribes that led the 
revolution against the Saddam regime in 1991.  
When I returned from Baghdad to Nasiriyah to teach, I also married, and soon we had 
children (We had two children before leaving for Australia, and then a third in Australia.)  
During the occupation after 2003, everything changed in Iraq. It was questionable 
whether we were becoming a democratic nation and this was a time of great insecurity. But 
there were many opinions. The Americans, the Australians and others needed good 
communications with the locals, both in the workplace and in the area of political discussions 
at all levels. There was a great need for translators, and with my background in education and 
teaching I managed to secure employment as one. 
As events unfolded I found myself in a position where I could move with my family to 
Australia to live or to study, and this is what we did in 2008. In Australia, we found 
everything was different – different in the sense of moving to a culture alien to us and vastly 
different from what we were led to expect. Although experiencing some racial prejudice, we 
found the country of Australia to be warm and welcoming and very much a mix of many 
different cultures and backgrounds, all generally living together with respect, tolerance, and 
in friendship. 
After the move to Australia, while making many new friends, but still keeping my 
beliefs and cultural habits, there was one particular visit that I remember. My visitor was a 
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Sunni man. We chatted about politics and through the events of our conversation he started to 
criticize Al Sistani.  
‘Why?’ I said. ‘He is a good man. Isn’t he?’  
‘No, no,’ the man replied. ‘The elections! He wanted the elections when our city was 
not secured, and now it is all Shia!’ 
This comment tested my current understanding and assumption that Ayatollah Al 
Sistani was unquestionably righteous and with a holy nature and I had believed that he was 
working positively on behalf of all Iraqis. 
From this point my curiosity was roused and I was not sure what to believe or what I 
thought about Al Sistani. Everything new I learned about him raised more questions and I 
needed evidence. It was not satisfactory to just read the written words and comments of 
others. 
As the years passed and I continued to live in Australia, I became more and more 
interested in Al Sistani and his role and how he adapted from being an Imam from Iran, to an 
Imam in Iraq and how he cared for the people of Iraq – not just Shia but all Iraqis. I watched 
how he changed from being an Imam to being a man of political influence. And then the 
greatest change in my thinking occurred, and I wondered if it might be Al Sistani who would 
become a great leader who would save Iraq from inner breakdown and raise the country to a 
respectful place in the world’s eyes. However, with the range of different opinions both in 
Australia where I was living as well as back home (and around the world) I knew I had to do 
research if my opinion and hypothesis could become more informed and evaluated.  
I found, at first, that almost no one had written about Al Sistani, or placed him at the 
centre of their research. Life was comfortable for my family and myself in Australia but we 
were still Muslims, still Shia, and we cared for our cultural and religious background as well 
as the image of Islam in the eyes of others. So during the time of my master’s degree I started 
to try to learn more about Al Sistani. 
I recognised that most Iraqis, when writing about Al Sistani, retain levels of personal 
bias. I understood the inevitability of bias therefore believed it important to take an academic 
approach to the subject where effort could be made to ensure that personal bias could be 
brought to the fore and not remain unexamined. Seeking to present openness about my 
background and perspectives, it is intended that readers of this project are able to make their 
own personal judgments about my position in relation to the points of dialogue and 
discussion raised by this research.  
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In light of these matters, I decided to conduct an investigation that would include the 
perceptions of a variety of Iraqis about Al Sistani and include critical analyses and 
interpretations to develop further understandings. I formulated hypotheses and developed 
research questions, then I explored how the research might be conducted. In exploring the 
perceptions of others I could shed more light on the hypothesis that Al Sistani may be a 
significant hope in Iraq coming together again as a nation that can change and grow – and 
overcome opposing forces – in a non-violent way. I felt that there might not be a definite 
conclusion to a question like, “Is Al Sistani a good spokesperson for Iraq, and is his political 
intervention appropriate?” However, the research could be useful in illuminating a range of 
perceptions and understandings and generating new knowledge about the topic.  
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Since the invasion of Iraq by the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” in 2003, and his first 
fatwa requesting the Iraqi election, Al Sistani’s role in Iraq has become controversial, both 
among Iraqis and within the international community. Iraq is a country of different religions, 
sects, and nationalities. For this reason not all those who are Muslims or of Iraqi origin have 
supported Al Sistani’s role in initiating new Iraqi political processes. Most Iraqi people 
realise he belongs to the Shia sect and that he is of Iranian origin. However, many are unsure 
of his motivation behind his interventions in politics.   
The first interventions were when Al Sistani issued a fatwa to encourage the Iraqi 
people to take part in the first Iraqi elections which were conducted in 2005 after the fall of 
Saddam. Many Shia’s participated, while Sunnis boycotted the election. They did this for 
many reasons (to be detailed later), but primarily the Sunnis considered the election (and Al 
Sistani’s Fatwa) to be a means by which the Shia would acquire power. Braam mentions that 
‘the Sunnis Arab felt marginalized and had refrained en masse from voting in 2005’ (Braam, 
2010, p. 9). The Sunni criticised the timing of the Fatwa, while they suffered due to a number 
of fundamental decisions by the US, such as the de-Ba’athification (removal of the Sunni 
sympathetic Ba’ath Party’s influence) of all government agencies and the disbanding of the 
Iraqi army – both perceived as anti-Sunni measures (Ono, 2005). 
The possibility of Iraq becoming a democratic country, especially after the election and 
the Fatwa of "Shia cleric" Al Sistani, was in doubt because most Islamic clerics tended to 
favour countries that adopted Islamic law and limited the exercise of democratic values. 
Some sects of the Iraqi people assumed that Al Sistani believed in the holding of democratic 
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elections, but not in all democratic values. Hawazi mentioned that, ‘Democracy in Iraq is 
more context-based and affected by Iraqi realities. One major reality about the Iraqi 
environment is the supremacy of religion in Iraqi society. Therefore it should be noted that Al 
Sistani’s support for democracy in Iraq does not mean he accepts total separation of religion 
and state’(Al Hawazi, 2008, p. 57).  
As stated earlier in Section 1.1.2, there was no agreement on the intervention of Shia 
clerics in politics. Some suggested the clerics should have a role in politics and that they 
might obtain a high rank, others believed it more appropriate for clerics to stay far away from 
any political action and simply provide advice and guidance.  
However, Al Sistani believed that his role and ideas were extremely necessary because 
the tenets of Islam were at risk. The situation in Iraq is different from most other cultures due 
to the diversity of the society and it has rejected the concept of clerics being leaders or having 
roles in politics. Braam mentioned that ‘despite his insistence that he is not a political leader, 
Al Sistani continues to demonstrate clear political involvement when he considers it critical 
to do so’ (Braam, 2010, p. 9).  
The Iraqi elections conducted in 2014 were more controversial because the politicians 
stalled for eight months without forming a government. This led to Al Sistani answering 
questions from politicians and advising them in matters relating to choosing a new prime 
minister. Some of the Shia and Sunni sect considered that the Wilayat al-Faqih would be a 
clear interference in Iraqi political affairs. They did not support political influence or 
intervention by clerics. Leaving politics to the politicians was their choice. However, in the 
meantime there was a political stalemate. Al-Qarawee (2016) mentions that:  
The most powerful Shia cleric in Iraq, Ali Al Sistani, also favoured removing 
Maliki.  (Al Maliki was the Iraqi Prime Minister from 2006 to 2014 – a period 
of many significant events for Iraq.) Additionally, several senior Da’wa 
members, including Abadi, thought that Maliki’s insistence on staying in office 
for a third term would jeopardize the party’s chances of maintaining the prime 
ministership (p.3).  
On a different political front, Al Sistani’s fatwa against ISIS, issued in 2014, 
encouraged people to take up arms in defence. However, this created controversy because the 
area in which the insurgency took place was predominantly Sunni and it was therefore 
assumed to also be a fatwa of revenge against the Sunni. Political comment in the media has 
mentioned that, ‘Some Sunni Arab countries have unjustly attacked the fatwa as an 
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irresponsible move that may exacerbate sectarian violence and other Sunni scholars went as 
far as calling it a war declaration against the Sunnis’ (al-Khatteeb & Kadhim, 2014).   
All these events have motivated the researcher to conduct an investigation into whether 
the Iraqi people agreed with the Al Sistani interventions in politics and to what extent they 
believe he understood the nature of the Iraqi people and the regional conflicts. As long as Iraq 
has many religious groups and sects, as well as nationalities, I feel it is worth considering the 
role of any person – whether Muslim cleric or not – who may be able to ensure the rights of 
both the  Shia and the Sunni’s, as well as the rights of other minorities. 
1.3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the political role of Al Sistani in sectarian Iraq and 
to investigate the extent to which Iraqi people accept his role as a cleric with political 
influence. This research will identify and analyse the distinction between Al Sistani’s 
approach and Wilayat al-Faqih regarding clerical interventions in Iraqi politics, and try to 
determine if Al Sistani applies Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq or to what extent.  
This thesis also explores perspectives about the role of Al Sistani from the Iraqi 
community in Australia – the country where I now live. What do they think of Al Sistani and 
his political influence? Do they see Al Sistani as an influential figure who will help change 
the widely held perception that links Muslims to violence and terrorism? Thus, this thesis 
explores the opinions of Iraqi residents in Australia (the Iraqi diaspora and international 
students) regarding clerical interventions in politics, and investigates the how they have 
responded to Al Sistani’s ideas. 
Furthermore, this research will evaluate the role of the clerics generally in politics from 
the point of view of members of the Iraqi community in Australia. Although much has been 
written about Iraq as it was before 2003 and then since the US-led invasion, the importance 
of this project is to present and analyse the points of view of many different stakeholders 
from Al Sistani himself, via three books issued by representatives of Al Sistani on the Iraq 
issue after 2003, to those who felt compelled to leave Iraq. Taking into consideration the 
sectarian composition of the Iraqi people and the existence of occupying forces, further 
political conflicts are beginning to emerge. An exploration of the aims of this research may 
help in shedding insight on these matters in relation to whether Al Sistani may be able to 
improve this situation.  
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1.4. RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the political role of Al Sistani and to investigate the 
extent to which Iraqi people accept his role as a cleric with political influence. The three 
research questions explored in this study are:   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? Do they approve of his approach to his own political influence? 
2. Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s 
problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
3. How does Al Sistani see his role? 
To gather information on the three research questions the following ‘sub-questions’ will be 
considered: 
1. Why did Al Sistani issue an election Fatwa in 2004 while most of the Sunni areas 
were suffering from terrorism and therefore could not participate in elections?  
2. Why did Al Sistani issue a Jihad Fatwa against ISIS but not against American 
occupation forces when they invaded Iraq?  
3. Does Al Sistani support democracy? 
4. What is the attitude of the Iraqi diaspora in Australia to Al Sistani, and to what extent 
do they follow his leadership? 
HYPOTHESES 
1. Iraqi people generally accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political influence and 
approve of his approach. 
2. Iraqis do see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s 
problems, and also see him as someone who can improve the light in which the rest of 
the world view Iraqis.  Iraqis typically see Al Sistani as the leader they need, even 
though he does not always take on that role.  
These questions will be explored among Iraqi participants residing in Australia at the time of 
this research. It will also be explored among participants living in England. Thus the data 
gathered may not reflect the attitudes of Iraqis still living in Iraq. 
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1.5. METHODOLOGY  
The present study uses an interpretivist, epistemological methodology. Qualitative research is 
used because of its appropriateness within this research paradigm. 
The research participants are fourteen people, 10 men and 4 women (Iraqi international 
students who came recently to Australia, and Iraqi politicians and clerics from Britain). The 
main data collection method employed was in-depth interviews with participants, alongside 
other sources of information such as books and texts issued by Al Sistani, and press 
interviews. Other sources included websites of the Najaf school and Al Sistani’s official 
website run from his offices in London and Najaf.   
While the individual interviews provided insight about Al Sistani from the perspectives 
of others (all Iraqi’s) the textual analysis of books and texts issued by Al Sistani provided 
important data. As described elsewhere, matters of bias were considered as a vital academic 
responsibility during the process of analysis. 
1.6. THESIS OUTLINE   
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter one begins with a general introduction to the 
research, background material, and then statements in regard to the purpose of this research, 
research aims and methodology. The chapter concludes with this thesis outline.  
Chapter Two – the Literature Review – details historical background material regarding 
the relationship of clerics to successive Iraqi governments, from the 1914 occupation of Iraq 
by British forces, to Al Sistani’s time. Furthermore, it presents a literature review on topics 
related to Al Sistani’s role in Iraq under headings such as: Al Sistani and the 2005 Elections, 
Al Sistani and Politics, Al Sistani and Democracy, through to Al Sistani’s message to the 
Politicians. 
Chapter Three explains the research methodology, methods and design of the present 
study. The present study uses qualitative research. And Chapter Four details the findings, 
typically in tabulated form, with samples of texts analysed and profiles of all participants.  
Chapters Five to Nine are the analysis chapters. These chapters each look at one aspect 
of Al Sistani’s involvement in politics, detailing the relevant findings, and discussing all in 
relation to the research questions.  
Finally, Chapter Ten provides a conclusion to the thesis. In this chapter all data is 
discussed as a whole and the overall findings are summarised. The significance of the 
research is discussed and recommendations for further research are outlined.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THIS REVIEW 
This literature review provides a background for the research and a justification for the 
methodology used for the data collection and analysis. The review also provides a theoretical 
framework for this study, as well as identifying gaps in the current literature.  
The chapter surveys various topics, and it should be noted that one of its specific 
purposes is to show how Al Sistani’s role in Iraq differs from that of other clerics, both 
currently and in the past.  
The review covers a number of areas but begins with a historical overview of the 
background of clerics’ involvement in Iraqi politics. 
2.2 BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 A brief history of modern Iraqi  
In 1914 British forces invaded Iraq. This prompted the first intervention of Shia clerics in 
politics at that time and, ‘the Shia clerics of Najaf and Karbala (Shia holy cities) declared a 
jihad against the British invasion’(Berridge & al-Aboody, 2017, p. 632) . Thereafter, for 
many years the relationship between the clergy and successive governments has been marked 
by the determination of these governments to limit the political roles of Shia clerics. The Shia 
clerics did not have a clear plan how to participate in politics; therefore, some governments 
marginalised them, even to the extent of executing some (Amanat, 2003). But in 2005 Al 
Sistani was able to present an alternative to the Shia clerics, as he did not openly promote a 
political stance. 
Some scholars agree that the  Shia clerics have played an important role in Iraq since 
1914 when the British forces invaded the country and overthrew the Ottoman rule in 1917 
(Litvak, 2002). This era brought division among the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish sectors of Iraqi 
society as each took a different stand on this invasion (Ismael & Ismael, 2005). The Shia 
clerics aimed to establish an Islamic government, free of any foreign control and 
subsequently called for a revolt against the British forces in 1920. However, this revolt was 
unsuccessful (Nakash, 2003). Following this, in 1922 a section of the Sunni community 
assisted the British forces in conducting elections when the first government was established. 
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These elections were boycotted by the Shia, and it was the Sunnis and British who 
subsequently wrote the new constitution (Noorbaksh, 2008). The resulting disagreement, 
division, infraction and military crackdowns have resulted in the loss of Shia lives over 
subsequent generations. Kadhim (2012b) suggests that some of the Shia clerics who advised 
people not to participate in the elections have contributed in part to the sectarian isolation of 
members of the community. This isolation could have been mitigated if they had not adopted 
a tough opposition to the British and to King Faisal I. Berridge and al-Aboody (2017) 
comment that ‘since establishing the Iraq state the Shi`a educational opportunities were 
restricted [and] such institutions of public education that existed at the time were inevitably 
perceived as channels of Sunni propaganda unpalatable to the majority of Shi`a’. 
2.2.2 The 1920 revolution 
Following the 1920 revolution against the British occupation, the Cairo Conference was held 
in 1920 in the presence of Winston Churchill (the British Colonial Secretary) to consider the 
situation in Iraq (Vinogradov, 1972b). Stemming from this ‘Churchill announced the change 
of the British government’s policy of converting from direct colonization to the government 
of the National Administration under the mandate’ (Vinogradov, 1972b, p. 139). Because of 
the violent resistance and the outbreak of a number of revolts against British forces, these 
forces accepted the inauguration of King Faisal I of Iraq (1921-1935) (Abd al-Jabbar, 2010). 
Armed revolt broke out in late June 1920.  
Simon and Tejirian (2004) mention that one of the reasons the Revolution broke out 
was because of the exposure of the Iraqi people under the Ottoman rule to pressure, tyranny, 
ignorance, disease and poverty. Ayatollah al-Shirazi, the leading cleric at the time, issued 
another fatwa that seemed to encourage armed revolt (Vinogradov, 1972a). Moreover, the ‘ 
Shia mujtahid, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi, issued a fatwa declaring that service in 
the British administration was unlawful. Subsequently, meetings between  Shia clerics and 
tribal leaders discussed strategies for peaceful protests but they did consider violent action if 
the peaceful demonstrations failed to get results’ (Tripp, 2007, p. 41). Kadhim (2012b) added 
that for the first time in the history of Iraq, the role of clerics in jihadist activity has been 
prominent as in the battles of Basra, and the mobilization of revolutionaries. The importance 
of the clerics lay with their ability to influence the elders and members of the tribes, and to 
enable them to unite their words and reunite them on certain demands.  
After the revolution of 1920, Iraq officially came under British occupation. At that time 
British troops wanted to install a new king for Iraq. There were two main candidates Sayyid 
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Talib al-Naqib and Faisal bin Ali Al Hussein (Tripp, 2002). The Shia clerics refused both of 
them because they demanded the immediate independence of Iraq first. Then a parliamentary 
council of Iraqis could be elected where council discussion would decide who would hold the 
throne of Iraq and who would form a government (Aimami, 2011). After the failure of the 
revolution, Shia clerics began to encourage all people to become politically aware and 
‘practice politics’. In response to this, new parties and movements were formed such as the 
National Independence Movement (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 2001).  
In 1921 a referendum was held and King Faisal won with a 97% majority and from 
1921-1933 became the first King of Iraq. His rule was distinguished among the Iraqi people 
by disagreements regarding matters of ethnicity and sectarianism. Tarbush (2015) mentions 
that the election of King Faisal I introduced issues of proportional representation. The 
sectarian distinction was notable by the awarding of vital positions within the defence forces 
and police to Sunnis despite being a minority. The new Iraqi Army leaders were also almost 
exclusively made up of former officers of the Ottoman Army, the majority of whom were 
Sunni. Sunni dominance in the Iraqi government was a fact established from the earliest days 
of its existence (Porter, 2010, pp. 527-529). Roberts (2004) mentioned that:  
In Faisal I’s ruling time, Shia, who made up more than half of Iraq's 
population, and the Kurds, who made up approximately twenty percent of the 
population, were almost completely excluded from roles of authority under the 
Mandate. Despite the fact that Sunni Arabs made up less than twenty percent of 
the population, their ranks dominated the various government ministries as well 
as the officer corps of the armed forces (p.374). 
Faisal I’s government tried to cause sedition between clerics and tribal sheikhs when 
the British empowered the tribal sheikhs to collect taxes, ‘thereby establishing a form of 
indirect, but powerful, rule over Iraq's tribal communities’ (Roberts, 2004). This led the Shia 
clerics to issue a number of fatwas against the British occupation and the government of King 
Faisal I because of the arbitrary measures taken by the authority of the mandate against 
clerics and Iraqi people (Aimami, 2011).   
In 1933 Ghazi succeeded his father, King Faisal I as King of Iraq (Tripp, 2007). Yasin 
al-Hashimi then become Iraqi prime minister from 1935-1936 (Bellini, 2012) . This 
government conducted elections in 1935 that again were not accepted by the Shia, who 
deemed them fraudulent, as they were not given enough seats in the parliament. Roberts 
provides comment by describing King Ghazi as ‘the product of a system which exacerbated 
Shia resentment of the Sunni-dominated state during the next few years. He goes on to add 
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how King Ghazai was to play a very small role in how the country was to develop. It was 
under his rule that regime changes originating from schisms within the government and the 
military were to become the norm’ (Roberts, 2004, p. 379). Al-Marashi mentioned that ‘the 
military and government during Ghazi's reign were divided between pan-Arab nationalists 
(qawmiyyun) and the “Iraq-firsters” (wataniyyun), who realized that Iraq was part of the 
Arab world but were more concerned with domestic affairs rather than entangling Iraq with 
events in other Arab states. A large number of tribal chiefs and Shia clerics, religious scholars 
and intellectuals, met in Najaf, agreeing on a public reform program to confront the problem 
of tyranny and sectarian discrimination against Shia by the Hashimi government’ (Al-
Marashi, 2009, p. 541). Kashif al-Ghita, a prominent  Shia cleric at the time, issued a fatwa 
calling on the government to begin negotiations with the  Shia and to listen to their demands. 
The government, however, ignored his demands, forcing him to call on the tribes in the south 
and middle of Iraq to revolt against the government, which in turn led to the government’s 
collapse (Nakash, 2003; Tripp, 2007). 
2.2.3 The second British occupation (1941) 
After the second British occupation of Iraq in 1941, the Shia from the south of Iraq and 
Baghdad expressed their desire to increase their representation in the government as the 
Sunni minority held the majority of government positions. These demands were brought 
forward to the British adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, C.J. Edmonds, by Sayyid 
Muhammad Al-Sadr in a meeting where he expressed  Shia dissatisfaction (Abd al-Jabbar, 
2003; Nakash, 2003). The Shia continued to protest against government policies. During 
World War II in particular they protested against government discriminated in employment, 
mainly in the police and military forces (Aimami, 2011).  
There was a subsequent turnaround when Salih Jabir, a Shia from the southern city of 
Nassiriya, became Prime Minister. He took office in 1947 but he faced opposition, this time 
from the Sunnis who accused him of pandering to British directives by hiring too many 
foreign experts and by handing most government positions to the  Shia(Nakash, 2003). At 
this time the  Shia clerics did not interfere as they felt well-represented by Jabir’s government 
(Abd al-Jabbar, 2003; Tripp, 2007). A conflict then arose between Jabir and Nuri Sa’id, a 
prime ministerial candidate, who demanded further open elections that would be free of 
government interference and held in a way that would improve the political democratic life of 
Iraq. These demands were not accepted and subsequently Sa’id met the Regent, and they 
decided to call the army and impose martial law and dissolve all political parties. This 
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resulted in elections in 1953 and Sa’id won, causing disagreement among  Shia politicians 
(Abd al-Jabbar, 2003; Nakash, 2003). Throughout these events,  Shia clerics decided to 
remain in the role of observers without interference as earlier revolutions in 1920 and 1934 
had been politically ineffective and with the result of the loss of many lives (Abd al-Jabbar, 
2003; Nakash, 2003).  
2.2.4 The 1958 military coup and a new era of co-operation. 
On the 14th of July 1958, Abd al-karim Qasim, an officer in the army, took power through a 
military coup, abolished the monarchy, and transformed Iraq into a Republic (Tripp, 2007). 
Qasim, who supported the rise of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), faced strong opposition 
from the clerics who were led by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, the most eminent cleric 
at that time. Opposition also came from the Iraqi Ba'ath party which was socialist. Opposition 
also came from the Ba’ath party in Syria, and from Gamal Abdel Nasser who was president 
of Egypt at the time (al-Kifaee, 2010).   
In December of 1959, Qasim's government introduced equal rights laws for women. 
These included inheritance equity and other personal freedoms. These changes caused 
tensions as they were not in accord with Islamic Sharia law (Aimami, 2011). Muhsin Al-
Hakim issued a fatwa attacking both the new laws and communism. Terrill (2004) argues 
that: 
Grand Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, committed only two major political 
actions in his lifetime. These were to issue a Fatwa in 1960 forbidding Shias to 
join the Communist Party due to its official atheism and to support the Da’wa 
Islamiya Islamic political party openly before this group was outlawed (p.7). 
This point reveals the influence held by the cleric at that time (It is notable that, 
throughout his life in Iraq, Al Sistani did not issue such a fatwa but left the people free with 
regard to political party choice). Kadhim (2012b) argues that when a cleric issues a fatwa in a 
political case, it is not issued solely after careful study, but also on the basis of 
recommendations and advice from those around him. Thus this fatwa might be eventuate as 
being a mistake – not the best choice – and if it is then it would be as a consequence of cleric, 
the people and advisers – who might all be justly criticised. 
This time heralded the beginning of a new era where the  Shia sought a political 
framework that would enable them to face communism and also the socioeconomic gap that 
was growing in Iraqi society (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003). This led to the establishment of a new 
political party: Jama’ at al-Ulama’ fi al- Najaf al Ashraf, in 1960. The purpose of this group 
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whose members were Shia theologians was to warn people against communist beliefs. Many 
of them went on to join the Al-Da’wa Islamiyya party for the same purpose (Abd al-Jabbar, 
2003; Nakash, 2003; Schmidt, 2009a; Tripp, 2007). 
At this time in the 1960s people took to the streets, demonstrating against the state’s 
support for communism, and demonstrations were supported by some clerics and sanctioned 
by others. One of them was Mohammed Baqir Al-Sadr, a young Shia cleric who became the 
face of the anti-communist movement in the Hawza of Najaf. He argued that Islam brings 
forward a third alternative to capitalism and communism, when he published two prominent 
books: Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) and Iqtisadona (Our economic system). These addressed 
‘the philosophical, economic, and political dilemmas of human societies’ (al-Kifaee, 2010). 
Additionally, Muhsin al-Hakim forbade communism when he issued a Fatwa to prevent 
anyone from joining the Communist party and he embarrassed Qasim's government by 
refusing to meet him until the civil rights law was cancelled (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003). 
The 1960s eventually brought what is known for both Sunni and Shia, as the ‘golden 
era’, because it was a time when the  Shia supported and were in accord with Sunni rule (Abd 
al-Jabbar, 2003). Initially, the Shia clerics were content to be supportive as the communist 
focus of Qasim’s government intellectually and religiously contradicted their views (Abd al-
Jabbar, 2003; al-Kifaee, 2010; Nakash, 2003). And Aziz (1993a) that:  
The period of 1964-1968 was considered as the "golden era" for the Shi'ite 
politics for several reasons: First because the Ba'thist-Arif regime felt indebted 
to the Shi'i religious establishment for its help in discrediting and ousting 
Qasim's regime, and second, because the new regime gained legitimacy from 
the Shi'i leaders who supported their crackdown on Communist forces in the 
country (p.211).  
However, this accord did not last long as Abed al-Salam Arif (the Ba'ath party leader 
and president of Iraq) died in a plane crash in 1966 in the south of Iraq. His brother, Abed al 
Rahman became president but the Ba'ath party were waiting for the opportunity to replace 
him as he was considered a weak leader. The situation resulted in a military coup led by the 
Ba'ath party and Abdul Rahman was subsequently banished to Turkey (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003; 
Tripp, 2007). In 1968 a dark, tumultuous era commenced in Iraq as the new government 
began assassinating opponents and repressive security forces sought to eliminate all political 
opponents, particularly from the Communist and the Islamic Dawa'a parties (Abd al-Jabbar, 
2003). The Shia religious leaders were not consulted regarding policy decision-making and 
Ba'ath party era actions influenced Al Sistani to stay away from politics. They prevented any 
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political action by clerics to the extent of imposing house arrest on many, including Al Sistani 
(Anderson & Stansfield, 2005a).    
2.2.5 1968: the beginning of a dark era 
Once the new regime established its dominance, it began to undermine the authority of the 
Najaf Hawaza. The authoritarian practices and persecution of the Ba’ath party included the 
closing of Al-Jawadayn elementary school and other high schools including the Usul Al-Din 
Islamic College in Baghdad (Abd al-Jabbar, 2010). These actions were considered by some 
as the beginning of a dark era for Shia (Maynard, 2005). The Ba’ath party confiscated 
property and funds set aside for building Al-Kufa university and shut down Risalat Al-Islam, 
the only religious journal allowed by the government at the time (al-Kifaee, 2010). These 
events led to increased tensions between the Shia clerics and the Ba'ath regime. This led 
Muhsin al-Hakim to call on the people to take to the streets in demonstration and the result 
was a direct clash with the army where many civilians were arrested and later executed (Abd 
al-Jabbar, 2003).  Al-Hakim then encouraged the young Shia to participate in the political 
process where possible. This call brought the socio-political discourse of the marji'iya (the 
highest level of the  Shia religious authority, organisation and hierarchy) to a new level which 
was to be highly politically active and engaged (Allawi, 2008). 
The Ba’ath regime began personal attacks on Al-Hakim’s family by accusing his son, 
Mahdi, of conspiring against the government, and arrested him along with many Al-Da’awa 
party members (Uloom, 2009). With the death of Muhsin Al-Hakim in 1970, the hopes of 
many that someone would stand against the regime and prevent their control died (Allawi, 
2008). Nevertheless, opposition from the Mujtahids continued as Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, 
the prominent young cleric previously mentioned, became more active in educating and 
sensitising the people against the government (Aziz, 1993b). It was also notable that he 
embraced the system of Wilayat-al-faqih, like Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. ‘Ayatollah Sadr 
was much more politically active than  most Iraqi clerics, and Iranian radio broadcasts in 
Arabic referred to him warmly as the Khomeini of Iraq’ (Terrill, 2004, pp. 8-9). The success 
of the Iranian revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Shah gave him hope for a similar event in 
Iraq (Aziz, 1993a). The foundation of the new system in Iran marked important events such 
as the approval of the highest Shia religious authority for the validity of a political system and 
political actions taken by dedicated and religious Shia individuals through an organised 
political party: and the direct participation of young religious figures in the political process 
(Abd al-Jabbar, 2003; Allawi, 2008; Schmidt, 2009b; Tripp, 2007). 
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2.2.6 1979: Saddam Hussein’s regime 
In 1979 Saddam Hussein became Iraq's president after the stepping down of Ahmed Hassan 
al-Bakr for health reasons (Bengio, 2000). Early in 1980 the Ba'ath party executed 
Mohammed Baqir Al-Sadr, along with his sister, because he supported the new Iranian 
regime lead by Ayatollah Khomeini (Aziz, 1993a). Baqir Al-Sadr was active in politics and 
he had openly supported the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime and Wilayat al-faqih principle in 
Iran. Aziz mentions that ‘Sadr's support of the Khomeini crusade against the Ba'athists was 
considered a threat to the Iraqi regime and dealt with swiftly. Thousands were arrested, and 
hundreds were executed without trial. As the head of a movement that had gained popular 
support from the success of the Iranian revolution, Sadr emerged as an anti-government 
leader and a catalyst for anti-Ba'athist activity, and was regarded by his followers as the 
‘future Khomeini’ of Iraq’(Aziz, 1993b, p. 207). Visser (2006) argues that the danger of 
cleric interference in politics is that when the cleric issues an opinion or a fatwa, it becomes 
religiously enforceable by the imitators (his followers). Whoever refrains from carrying out 
the fatwa is considered an infidel, and an apostate, and the punishment for apostasy is 
execution. Then Saddam initiated the war against Iran, which continued for eight years 
causing a lot of economic and social damage to Iraq, and leading to broken relations between 
the Iraq and Iran Shia societies (Bellini, 2012; Noorbaksh, 2008; Schmidt, 2009a). 
After his war with Iran, Saddam Hussein and his regime invaded Kuwait in 1991, 
leading to the first Gulf War, and Iraq being placed under international sanctions, which 
worsened the social and economic situation (Bellini, 2012; Tripp, 2007). Then the revolution 
broke out in southern Iraq. Bellini (2012) mentions that,  
In March 1991, the Iraqi population in Basra and all the cities in the south of 
Iraq which [had a] Shia majority, then later in Mosul, rose up against Hussein’s 
forces, shouting anti-regime slogans and attacking members of the Ba’ath Party 
in protest. Within days, the revolts had spread to nearly every major city in 
Iraq, including Karbala, Najaf, Hilla and Kut (p.63).  
While Terrill (2004) says:  
Some of rebels claimed that [there was] a fatwa from al-Khoei calling them to 
fight against Saddam's government, therefore Saddam's government viewed the 
clergy as at least partially responsible for instigating the uprising and, 
thousands of clerics were arrested, and hundreds were executed (p.10). 
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Then Hussein’s regime attacked protestors in the cities of Najaf, Karbala and south of 
Iraq and eliminated them (Abdullah, 2006). 
Al-Khoei had died in 1992 but Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, another 
preeminent  cleric, took the lead and played an important role in Iraq’s history and its politics 
as he advised people to attend Friday prayers which he used as a means to take a stand 
against the government through criticising it (Cockburn, 2008). Raphaeli (2004) points out 
that: 
Under Saddam Hussein's rule, no religious leader could operate free from the 
dictator. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr's relations with the Iraqi president were 
complex. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr incorporated the slogan, ‘No, No, to 
America; No, No, to Israel, No, No to devil’ into his Friday sermons.  
However, Saddam assumed the slogan of "No, No to devil" was a reference to himself 
(Raphaeli, 2004, p. 33). At that time the other clerics such as Al Sistani did not intervene in 
politics, therefore Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr distinguishes between the vocal 
hawza (an-natiqa) and the silent hawza (as-samita). The vocal hawza represents clerics like 
himself, who seek an active political role and advocate an Islamic republic in Iraq.  
However the silent Hawza has historically rejected the involvement of the Shi'ite clerics 
in the political life of the country (Raphaeli, 2004). Consequently, Saddam's regime saw 
Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr as a threat and assassinated him as well as two of his 
sons in 1998 in Najaf (Kadhim, 2012a).  
From 1998 the Shia political field remained without a clear religious clerical leader as 
the Ba'ath regime insisted on preventing their political involvements in every way possible 
until their overthrow in 2003 (Aimami, 2011). That year was an important year in Iraq's 
history, not only because of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, but also because the 
clerics had a chance to take on a political role and to make their ideas on building the new 
state known. With those emerging clerics came Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Al Sistani (Abd al-
Jabbar, 2003; al-Kifaee, 2010; Allawi, 2008). 
2.2.7 2003 and the emergence of Al Sistani  
Having been present and living through a great range of events, and being a cleric, Al Sistani 
understood Iraq’s history. After the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 Al Sistani kept an 
equal distance from both the Iraqis and the western occupiers. Even though he did not meet 
anyone from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), he was the first to request that the 
CPA would organise the elections and let the Iraqis choose their own government (Braam et 
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al., 2010). Al Sistani insisted that Iraqis themselves, without any external interference, should 
write the Iraqi constitution. It is notable that Al Sistani did not issue a Fatwa ordering reprisal 
or action against the Ba'ath party (Allawi, 2008; Bremer, 2006). 
After 2003 when the American forces invaded Iraq, Al Sistani was a prominent cleric in 
Iraq, and his emergence from isolation in spring 2003 was a striking introduction to the 
political world (Arato, 2004; Fuller, 2009; Terrill, 2004).  
Some clerics in Najaf relate that, after the demise of Ayatullah Sayyid Nasrullah 
Mustanbit (one of the clerics in Najaf), many clerics had suggested to Ayatullah Al-Khoei 
that he should prepare an appropriate successor by choosing a cleric from the Hawzah of 
Najaf so that the religious authority would remain alive and effective. al-Kifaee (2010) 
indicates that: 
The process of becoming a Grand Ayatollah, depends on many academic and 
non-academic factors. Academically, Al Sistani has to prove his excellence in 
essential religious topics, which can be demonstrated via three indicators: the 
number of Ijtihad certificates he has earned and the rank of those who licensed 
him; the number of students he teaches and the academic value of his writings 
(pp. 23-24).  
Kadhim (2012a) states that:  
Al Sistani is the supreme figure among his peers, the three other major clerics 
in the country, each of whom also carried the title Grand Ayatollah. Al Sistani 
came to the fore of the religious scene in Najaf after the death of his mentor 
and predecessor, Grand Ayatollah Abu al Qasim al Khoei, in 1992, being the 
most prominent scholar among al Khoei’s students (p.10).  
There is another sign that Al-Khoei left in his will as a sign of who follow him to lead 
the Hawza. He wrote: "Ayatullah Al Sistani is performing the prayers on my body" (Abd al-
Jabbar, 2003; al-Kifaee, 2010). Kadhim (2012a) indicates that:  
Grand Ayatullah al-Khoei decided in his late years to prepare a successor for 
the position of the supreme religious authority and the leadership of the Najaf 
Seminary. The choice fell on Ayatollah Al Sistani for his merits, eligibility, 
knowledge, and character (p.4).  
After that, Al Sistani became marjia and he began to send duties and salaries to the 
believers, salaries to students of religious sciences, and he taught in the same classroom as 
Ayatollah Al-Khoei. Owing to his reputation his followers increased rapidly, especially in 
Iraq, the Persian Gulf region, and India (Uloom, 2009). Then, Ayatollah Al Sistani become 
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the highest ranking among the mujtahids and scholars throughout the Islamic World, 
especially in the hawzas of Najaf and Qom (Allawi, 2008).  
With this choice Al Sistani became the highest clerics for Shia in the entire world 
according to the al taqleed principle, especially in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Maynard, 2005). Therefore Saddam attempted to assassinate Al 
Sistani and his bodyguard was killed in one of the attempts in 1996 (Allawi, 2008).   
Al Sistani represented the “quietest school” as he was cautious in dealing with Saddam, 
did not call others to violence or to rebel against authority and did not argue with other clergy 
(Diamond, 2006; El Horr, 2012). Instead his focus at that time was just on science, religious 
teaching and his students. al-Kifaee (2010) mentioned that when Mohammed Reda, Al 
Sistani’s son, had been asked how Al Sistani had practised his work during Saddam's regime, 
he answered that: 
It was a very scary situation and Al Sistani remained under house arrest for a 
long time and did not give any excuse to Saddam's government to suppress the 
Hawza, and he was succeeded in preserving the hawza in a very serious and 
complicated situation (p.51). 
After the coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003, the country was without a 
prominent leader. This led to the rise of many religious and political figures attempting to 
seize control (Abdullah, 2006; El Horr, 2012; Noorbaksh, 2008). However, it quickly became 
clear to Iraqis that a prominent religious leader would occupy the role. Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Al Sistani began his role in the post-Saddam Iraq by insisting that elections had to be held as 
soon as possible (Braam et al., 2010).  
Initially, the Coalition forces, led by the United States of America, were not fond of Al 
Sistani as they expected him to be an advocate of religious extremism (Uloom, 2009). He did 
not deal directly with the coalition forces but rather met, on many occasions, with 
representatives from the United Nations (Cole, 2006; Ono, 2005; Rahimi, 2007). 
Al Sistani tended to be one of the moderate figures in the region. Many of the clerics in 
Saudi Arabia were calling for a jihad against the USA in Iraq (Abdullah, 2006) while he as a 
cleric indicated that he intended to use peaceful means to protect the rights of Iraqi people. 
This was clear when he dealt with occupation forces, thus promoting a different image of 
Islam (Al-Rahim, 2005; Braam et al., 2010). This was clear from the recommendations he 
gave to politicians, implying that democracy and freedom is a top priority. And even though 
he is Iranian, he explicitly rejected the doctrine of Wilayat-al-faqih (al-Kifaee, 2010). 
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When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 it formed an Iraqi Governing Council 
(IGC) with the sectarian composition of Iraq consisting of Sunni,  Shia and Kurds in addition 
to some other minorities (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007). This approach was intended to 
promote sectarian unity, and it led to all sectors demanding their sectarian rights (Allawi, 
2008). Franzén (2012) argues that the religious landscape of Iraq has changed markedly post 
2003 and the fact that the society was divided according to sectarian identity was clear in 
Iraq, particularly when some clerics demanded sectarian rights.  
Years have passed now, and much violent sectarian conflict and widespread sectarian 
hate has filled Iraq, and continues to do so. This is the major reason why some Sunni 
politicians have criticized Al Sistani’s interventions in politics (Cordesman, Davies, & 
Detwiler, 2007).  
The following sections will provide a more detailed examination and synthesis of the 
literature in seven specific areas, all relevant to the research aims of this thesis.  
2.3 SISTANI AND THE 2005 ELECTIONS  
This section will shed light on the 2005 Iraqi elections and how they were significant in the 
Iraqi modern era. It focuses on Al Sistani’s call for an election and how the Iraqi people 
interacted with the idea after decades of dictatorship. It will reveal how Al Sistani’s 
suggestions about the Iraqi constitution were welcomed by some sectors of Iraqi society and 
reference will be given to the fact that he is Iranian by birth but residing in Iraq.   
Elections are a decision-making process, in which the people choose representatives for 
office. This is the usual method of a modern democracy to fill the seats in the legislative 
council (Katz, 1997). However, for Iraqis 2005 was not just a time for elections but the end of 
the dictatorship and the beginning of a new provision to end the factional fighting and start 
rebuilding Iraq (Feldman, 2005).   
There were three elections after the collapse of Saddam’s regime. The first election 
held on the 30th January 2005 was a turning point in Iraqis modern history as it was the first 
democratic election in 50 years, and showed Iraq desire and self-determination for democracy 
(Ono, 2005). The second poll was on October 15th 2005. This was a referendum on the Iraqi 
constitution (Allawi, 2008). The third election was held on the 15th December 2005 to 
establish a permanent governing body to last for four years.  
These elections were a crossroads for Iraqis, Arabs and Americans (Katzman, 2009a). 
The Iraqi people would prove they believe in the new democratic process. Grand Ayatollah 
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Al Sistani was the first one who requested the elections, while Sunnis boycotted it (Diamond, 
2005; Rahimi, 2004). The participation in these elections has led to a lower level of violence 
in the past few years, and significant evidence of the faith of the participants in the 
democratic process in the new Iraq (Gause III, 2005). These elections have also had an 
impact on the US administration in that their success was considered a major victory for 
America throughout the world (Visser, 2006). The Arab world viewed the elections with 
concern, wondering if the hopes and aspirations of the Iraqi people could possibly be 
reflected throughout the Middle East (Raphaeli, 2005) so that other countries may even move 
toward democracy.   
2.3.1 A history of Iraqi elections 
The monarchy formed the first parliament after the completion of the constitutional monarchy 
in Iraq when it held its first parliamentary election on the 17th of January, 1953 (Abd al-
Jabbar, 2010). Nuri al-Said dissolved this parliament as a result of the chaos and controversy 
resulting from the controversial decision of Iraq to join the Baghdad Pact (Elliot, 1996) which 
was seen as ‘ a defensive organization for promoting shared political, military and economic 
goals founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran’ (Sanjian, 1997). 
Parliamentary elections were held again in 1954, but they were false in the eyes of political 
observers in terms of preventing Prime Minister Nuri al-Said’s political opponents from 
participating (Simon, 1974). Dissolution of this parliament came with a coup by Abd al-
Karim Qasim in 1958, which overthrew the monarchy in Iraq (Grassmuck, 1960). 
Elections were held in Iraq after the establishment of the modern Iraqi state early last 
century, but were not administered correctly, but used to gain factional private power, and 
were suspended in some periods, as happened during the reign of the Ba’ath and the system 
of the former dictator (Walker & Clark, 2005).  
Then there was Saddam Hussein. He used the elections as a means of perpetuating his 
place at the helm of government. When voters went to the polls,  there was no other candidate 
and the voter had to vote for Saddam, because if the voter selected "No" then the security 
authorities would have become involved (Isakhan, 2016). 
Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani was the first to demand elections after 2003 (Al-Rahim, 
2005; Ono, 2005). Diamond (2006) states that Al Sistani indicated his support for the 
democratic process in Iraq when he announced that everyone should participate in the 
elections and considered doing so to be a “religious duty”. Shukla (2005) mentioned that: 
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Al Sistani’s call to the Shia community that voting was more important than 
even prayers and fasting, inspired a huge Shia turnout. The Shia community 
was also galvanised by the prospect of capturing power for the first time in 
modern Iraq (p.150). 
Al Sistani declared that the interim assembly delegates, who would shape the nation and form 
a constitution, ought to be chosen by means of direct election (Diamond (2005) The United 
States of America initially ignored his requests, stating that the Iraqi people were not ready 
for any elections after living 24 years under a dictatorship and that there was no true census 
of the population. Al Sistani suggested using “food cards” for the census to eliminate that 
problem. Al-Khairalla (2005), Bremer (2006), Cole (2006), Diamond (2006) and Braam et al. 
(2010) mentioned that after months of ignoring the advice there was a strong opinion from 
Najaf, voiced by Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani . There was a fatwa in a form of a question to Al 
Sistani about elections and constitutions. Ono (2005) mentions that this question – addressed 
to Grand Ayatollah Ali-Al Sistani by a group of his followers on 20th June 2003 – read as 
follows: 
The Occupation Authorities in Iraq have stated that they have decided to form a 
council that would write the new Iraqi constitutions; and that they will appoint 
members to this council in consultations with political and social groups in the 
country, after which the constitution that will be drafted by the council will be 
presented for approval by a referendum. Could you inform us of the religious 
ruling on this project and what believers ought to do regarding the manner in 
which the new Iraqi constitution is to be drawn (p.20). 
Allawi (2007) mention the official answer provided by Al Sistani on 26 June 2003 was: 
Those forces have no jurisdiction whatsoever to appoint members of the 
constitution preparation assembly. Also there is no guarantee either that this 
assembly will prepare a constitution that serves the best interests of the Iraqi 
people or that it expresses their national identity whose backbone is sound 
Islamic religious and noble social values. The said plan is unacceptable from 
the outset. First of all there must be a general election so that every Iraqi citizen 
who is eligible to vote can choose someone to represent [them] in a 
foundational constitution preparation assembly. Then the drafted constitution 
can be put to a referendum. All believers must insist on the accomplishment of 
this crucial matter and contribute to achieving it in the best way possible 
(p.204). 
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Al Sistani insisted that any constitution-making body for Iraq should be elected rather 
than appointed. Moreover, the fatwa signalled a new era of Shi'i religious influence in Iraqi 
traditional political processes (al-Kifaee, 2010; Feldman & Martinez, 2006; Hawazi, 2008). 
The United States later agreed and called for direct elections to a constitutional assembly by 
15 March 2005, and promised that a national election would be held for a new government by 
the end of that year (Braam et al., 2010). Al Sistani’s fatwa regarding the election had been 
criticized, because in the west of Iraq – particularly – in the provinces of Anbar, Nineveh, and 
Salahuddin prior to election day, insurgents repeatedly targeted polling stations and, in 
leaflets and graffiti, threatened to kill anyone who voted (Ono, 2005). In an effort to try to 
secure restive Sunni cities in time for the vote, US forces conducted numerous counter 
insurgency operations in the four months prior to the vote (Conetta, 2005). The US 
considered Al Sistani’s fatwa to vote to be a means of exploitation of these events in order to 
obtain a new  Shia government after Saddam's regime fall (Allawi, 2008). Predominant  Shia 
influence over the new government could further upset Sunni militias who have already 
vowed to disrupt the election (Duss & Juul, 2009).  Before the election four car bombs 
exploded in Baghdad killing at least 26 people, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of  the 
Al Qaeda branch in Iraq, claimed responsibility (Fishman, 2006; Katzman, 2009a; Murphy, 
2005).  
This fatwa was considered by Arab Gulf countries and some western governments as an 
attempt to make the Iraq regime similar to Iran’s. Diamond (2005) mentioned that:  
While it is hard to forecast much about Iraq's election and the country that will 
arise, the leading Shia cleric and the ayatollahs who follow him may be  … 
planning to remake Iraq in Iran's image, with direct clerical rule that … the 
USA fears (p. 36). 
Lynch (2006) supports the idea that Al Sistani demanded early elections and a more 
democratic mechanism for choosing Iraqi leaders. Bew (2006) agrees that it was important to 
get support and the declaration of an advisory opinion (a fatwa) from Al Sistani urging 
people to broad participation in the elections. Al Sistani’s name is linked to the stability of 
Iraq because he tried continuously to end America's occupation role, through the emphasis on 
participation in the elections (Jalal, 2014). Abdollahian et al. (2006) support this when they 
mention that Al Sistani played a big role in the stabilizing of Iraq, and that his absence could 
cause chaos in Iraq. In addition, an electoral process was announced by Al Sistani stating 
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explicitly that he had clearly declared his support for the US-led elections to rid Iraq of the 
occupation and urged Iraqis towards the democratic practice (Katzman, 2009b). 
McGarry and O’Leary (2007) argue that writing the Iraqi constitution by Iraqi people 
and their voting in the elections were the biggest evidence of the features of the democratic 
transition in Iraq and the Middle East. Katzman (2007) also argues that the increase in the 
proportion of participants in the democratic process has proved the Iraqi people’s desire to 
move to become a democratic country. From this time, the percentage of people attending 
elections increased; in January 2005 it was 58%, in December 2005 it was 75%, and for the 
referendum on the constitution it was 80%, which indicated that Iraqi people supported the 
democratic process (Katzman, 2007, p. 3). 
Al Sistani played a major role in the writing of the constitution. He has insisted that 
Iraq's new constitution must be in line with Islamic principles, and it should recognize Islam 
as the nation's religion (Allawi, 2008). This involved much discussion and many questions 
needed to be addressed, as explained by many authors including McGarry and O’Leary 
(2007) Walker and Clark (2005) who all stated that the drafting of the constitution was a huge 
task for the Iraqis who had to face many questions that had concerned Iraq for years. One of 
these questions which faced the committee writing the constitution is to the question of how 
to make Islam the single source of law (Brown & Brown, 2005; Rahimi, 2007). The US 
Government made public its strong concerns about this, implying that making Islam the 
single source of law might have led to a more strictly Islamic state that precluded secularism 
(Allawi, 2008; Deeks & Burton, 2007). Iraq has many religions so it is difficult to make 
Islam the single source. Bremer (2006) argues that whenever the complexity of the 
negotiation among the committee of the writing of the constitution went to Al Sistani , he had 
a satisfactory solution for all issues. And Al Sistani suggested that Islam should be only one 
of the sources of legislation in the new Iraqi state. 
Al Sistani is considered to have the largest following among the world’s more than 100 
million Shia (or Shi’ites). One may wonder why, and in partial answer to this Braam (2010, 
p. 2) states that Al Sistani is known not only for his immense religious knowledge, ‘but also 
for his influence in the political realm on a number of critical occasions in Iraq’s 
contemporary history’. When the US refused Al Sistani’s suggestions, he sometimes invited 
the people to peaceful demonstrations in order to bolster the significance of his point and to 
indicate its popularity among the Iraqi Shia majority. The cleric called for the Iraqi people to 
protest in mid-January 2004. More than 100,000 Shia marched through Baghdad while a 
further 30,000 took to the streets of Basra (Isakhan, 2013). 
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2.4 AL SISTANI AND POLITICS 
After 2003, Al Sistani’s role in the new Iraqi political process became controversial because 
of Shia theory towards participation in politics. The Shia believed that the “only legitimate 
states were those ruled by the Prophet Muhammad or one of the twelve infallible Imams. 
Therefore, all states that did not meet this requirement were considered, in theory, 
illegitimate” (al-Qarawee, 2017). Moreover, Sachedina (1981) claims that: 
The moderate Shia, who's imams had refrained from active participation in 
politics, continue to uphold the imamate of the descendants of al Hussain until 
the line reached to twelfth … (p. 8). 
During this time the Iraqi Shia awaited the twelve imam and they continued to hold this 
position to the present, so that clergy did not participate in any direct political action or hold 
any political positions of power. Some Iraqis, however adopted Khomeini’s model in Iran 
and worked directly in politics and took responsibility for the results, whether positive or 
negative (Sachedina, 1981).  
Ambassador Paul Bremer, the presidential envoy to Iraq and the senior coalition official 
overseeing the Coalition’s reconstruction efforts and the creation of new institutions and 
governing structures in Iraq, worked in Iraq for more than a year and faced many challenges 
during his time, including the struggle between the US’s ideas and plans and those of the 
religious establishment represented by Al Sistani. Bremer (2006) mentioned that transferring 
sovereignty to the Iraqis should not take place until candidate members wrote the 
constitution, and he said that Iraqis may not deal well with the democratic process as it is a 
new feature in their lives. In response to this Lynch (2006) argues that Al Sistani’s demands 
for an early election and the introduction of a more democratic mechanism for Iraqis to 
choose their leader encouraged them to become democratic. Rubin (2006) also agreed that it 
was important to use the support and declaration of an advisory fatwa from Al Sistani , which 
urged the people to participate in the elections. 
Ambassador Paul Bremer wrote a book entitled My Years in Iraq, in 2006, in which he 
discussed the problems he faced with the chaos, the emerging militant groups, the spread of 
terrorism and the disagreements among the different sects. Throughout the book, Bremer 
wrote about Al Sistani’s role and how he faced his objections (Bremer, 2006). Bremer 
thought that Al Sistani would take on a role in Iraq like that of Ali Khamenei in Iran, and was 
reluctant to deal with him. However, Al Sistani suggest that Bremer was wrong when he 
invited the United Nations to come to Iraq to witness and manage the elections, which 
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Bremer and the United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair welcomed because they wanted 
to get international legitimacy which they could not get otherwise (Allawi, 2008). Moreover 
Schmidt argues that a stable assessment of Al Sistani’s philosophy is that it was “quietest” 
but also stated that it was a “serious error of judgment” of the part of the US administration in 
Iraq to regard Al Sistani as being entirely apolitical (Braam et al., 2010). In fact, ‘Al Sistani 
had managed to formulate some of the more important parameters of the Iraqi democracy, 
built on an Islamic legitimacy (Schmidt, 2009b, p. 132). Visser argues the Shi’i clergy are not 
quietist, but rather, they simply do not prefer to take part in the institutions of the state and, as 
such, tend to remain outside the realm of politics except for the events in which they believe 
it is critical to interfere. And Al Sistani cannot be identified simply as either “quietist” or 
“activist” (Visser, 2006). 
Many Sunni politicians considered Al Sistani’s intervention in politics would make 
Shia stronger than them, because the new Iraq was a civil state, rather than an Islamic state 
(Nasr, 2007). This view is supported by some researchers such as Diamond who states that Al 
Sistani made the  Shia majority run the government through his intervention in politics and 
the Iraqi Sunni Arabs have good reason to fear democracy (Diamond, 2006). And Noorbaksh 
(2008) mentioned that it was a realistic view that the Sunnis would not only lose much of 
their political power but they will also become targets for the  Shia majority government that 
will exact official or sanctioned vengeance for the decades of violence done to the Iraqi Shia.  
2.5 AL SISTANI’S INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AFTER 2003 
This section explores the emergence of Al Sistani’s influence in Iraq after 2003 during the 
occupation. The review outlines how his influence may have altered western perceptions of 
the role of Muslim clerics, especially regarding the Shia.  
No one expected that the United States of America as a Western country would deal 
with a Muslim cleric and interact with him regarding the new Iraq after 2003. Therefore, 
expectations have varied since the first intervention of Al Sistani in the Iraqi case. The 
Westerners considered that the role of Al Sistani in the new Iraq was an enigma for them. 
Initially they were worried to deal with him as a "Muslim cleric" then they changed attitudes 
based on his political positions.  
Al Sistani’s political philosophy was an enigma to westerners for various reasons. 
Firstly, he refused to meet anyone from CPA, and in fact anyone else remotely connected 
with the occupation authority while he met many times with the UN representative in Iraq 
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(Allawi, 2008). Secondly, Al Sistani did not issue a jihad fatwa against the occupying forces, 
therefore when he was asked to comment on the coalition forces in Iraq, he answered that 
they were there according to a UN agreement, and he did not encourage Iraqis to use arms 
against them (Hawazi, 2008). Al Sistani proved to the USA that he could influence the course 
of the new Iraq, with Buruma (2004) being just one author supporting this: 
Al Sistani has proved in the past that he can muster tens of thousands of 
protesters to influence the course of the new Iraq. His impact on U.S. efforts to 
remake Iraq has been enormous. And yet he remains in many ways an enigma, 
an unseen hand and a powerful force guiding the country who knows where 
(p.1). 
In line with this, Dodge (2005) pointed out if the United States did not take Al Sistani’s 
objections seriously they would be faced with a dilemma. Yes, he was "quietist" but his has 
ability to influence events is significant.  
Al Sistani has forced the U.S. to abandon many of its plans for Iraq's future (Braam et 
al., 2010). When Washington laid out a lengthy timetable for returning Iraq to self-rule, Al 
Sistani’s objections forced the Bush Administration to deliver a more swift handover instead 
(Bremer, 2006). 
Al Sistani has been heavily criticized by some Sunni and Shia parties for not 
associating with resistance movements against the Americans when they were in Iraq and for 
not inflowing the sectarian war in favour of one side against another. But these criticisms 
were usually directed at him by Islamist parties or groups from outside the religious 
establishment (Mamouri, 2014 ).   
When US forces occupied Iraq, the Iraqis had just come from the experience of a harsh 
dictatorship which fought wars until Iraq was in heavy debt. Aimami (2011) mentioned that 
in many ways Iraqis did not care much about who would rule them next because they 
believed that any new ruler would be better than Saddam, and when America invaded Iraq 
they said that they came as liberators. The USA army was a superpower armed with the latest 
weapons and equipment while the Iraqi people were tired of the siege and injustice and wars, 
therefore Al Sistani wanted to avoid further bloodshed, murder and fatigue, and get rid of the 
American and allied occupying forces with negotiations instead of war (Aimami, 2011). The 
US was thinking that Al Sistani belonged to “quietist school” which does not play a 
formidable role in politics, but the period after 2003 forced the United States to rethink some 
of its policies (Braam et al., 2010). Allawi (2008) mentioned that:  
51 
 
Al Sistani muted acquiescence to the presence of foreign troops was not 
support for the occupation  but a pragmatic choice , based on his assessment 
that this was the Shia historic moment to redress the balance of power inside 
the country (p.206). 
Another aspect of Al Sistani’s approach to political issues was the inclusiveness of his 
actions and words, and this very much increased his credibility in the eyes of the world. An 
ambassador on behalf of the Catholic Pope mentioned that during his visit to Al Sistani, he 
thanked him for his protection of Christians in Iraq and for his role in unifying Iraq and its 
people. Al Sistani had always tried to help the displaced Christians and said throughout the 
visit that Christians were a part of the people of Iraq and ‘we feel pained by what is 
happening to them and you are in our hearts and not all politicians listen to our words so we 
urge everyone towards brotherhood and love’ (Mamouri, 2014b). 
Feldman (2005) agrees that Al Sistani did not order the  Shia to retaliate against Sunni 
Ba’athists or Jihadis who attempted to drag them into a civil war by attacking Shia mosques 
and massacring civilians. Mamouri (2014a) notes that it was not surprising to see Al Sistani’s 
name as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, given his prominent role in deterring religious 
extremism, promoting forgiveness and peace, and acting wisely during Iraq’s occupation and 
sectarian strife, making him Iraq’s ambassador for a safe haven. His absence in such times of 
distress would have led to far worse humanitarian catastrophes in Iraq. 
2.6 AL SISTANI AND DEMOCRACY 
While I have previously discussed the role of Al Sistani in broad political terms, in this 
section I specifically look at Al Sistani’s relationship to democracy and investigate the 
capacity of Iraqis to endorse democracy after Al Sistani had persuaded them that it was their 
religious duty to take part in the elections. Al Sistani’s ‘invitation’ to vote was an explicit call 
by him to urge people to exercise democratic values.  
Islam and democracy have an unclear relationship as the concept is viewed differently 
among different Islamic schools of thought, and democracy is thought of differently even 
between different clerics within each school. Conflicting views also arise from extremist 
groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS who operate under an Islamic cover, but whose actions in 
reality oppose the core fundamentals of Islam (Alissa J. Rubin, 2014; Nasr, 2005; Tessler, 
2002).  In terms of the relationship between Islam and democracy, Islam might be thought of 
as one barrier to the spread of democracy in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle 
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East. Although cases of a de facto separation between Islam and the state took place several 
times throughout history, Islam could not be ignored in Middle Eastern political decision-
making. Islam’s undetermined relation with the state is a main reason behind lack of 
democracy in the region, particularly as a lack of coherent theories regarding the relationship 
between Islam and democracy enables authoritarian Middle East leaders to manipulate their 
people (Hawazi, 2008). 
Post 2003 when Al Sistani issued a fatwa to convince people to take part in elections 
was when Al Sistani was first seen by the masses as believing in democracy, but the question 
was – which type of democracy did Al Sistani believe would be suitable for Iraq (Chaulia, 
2007; Rahimi, 2007). 
In spite of being inexperienced in the world of politics, Al Sistani proved that with 
intelligence and good judgement, one can get small things right that can count for a lot and 
have a major effect (Feldman, 2005).  
The democracy that Al Sistani called for has led to two problems arising in the new 
democratic system in Iraq. First, Iraq was under occupation and Shia were not inclined 
towards a secularised political system for historical reasons. The Iraqi people who had just 
lived under a dictator for decades would not accept American democracy and they would not 
be ready for it (Wimmer, 2003). Second, the political conflict between Sunni, Shia, and 
Kurdish leaders needed to be resolved to some extent (Wimmer, 2003).  
Feldman (2005) discusses the challenges that faced Al Sistani, in the form of people 
such as Muqtada Al-Sadr and Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakeem, who believe in Wilayat al-faqih 
and have their own perspective and vision for the new Iraq. Isakhan (2013) states that the 
strongest cries for democratic elections came from Al Sistani, while other hard-line Islamists 
like Sadr have utilized the power of mass demonstrations and petitions to frequently 
challenge the central government. The tension, caused by the different ideologies, escalated 
in 2004 when unknown forces surrounded Al Sistani’s home and demanded he leave Iraq. 
However, they were unsuccessful because of the speedy mobilisation of Al Sistani’s devotees 
saving the cleric (Chaulia, 2007; Isakhan, 2013).  
Feldman (2005) states how by inviting the United Nations to Iraq to witness the 
elections and the creation of the new government, Al Sistani added legitimacy to the 
democratic process that Tony Blair and George W Bush could not (Feldman, 2005). Feldman 
did not however indicate that some of the Iraqis did not participate in the elections because of 
the militants’ presence in their areas, which made Sunni Iraqis unable to participate to their 
full capacity making the election fatwa not a truly successful push to real democracy after all. 
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This brings back the question of the extent to which Al Sistani believes in democratic values, 
including a democracy where one is free to be without a religion and free to participate in 
activities prohibited by Islam such as drinking alcohol, and whether he would support 
elections even if they brought in a secular government.  
Rahimi wrote a report in 2004 about democracy in Iraq after the war and how Al 
Sistani collected the people around him and promoted democratic values in the new Iraq. The 
report described Al Sistani’s role as a stabilising pillar for democracy in Iraq and that his role 
contributed to the building of a new civil society and government (Rahimi, 2004). Friedman 
also mentioned that if a democracy would develop in the country it would be largely due to 
the directive of Al Sistani (Friedman, 2005).  
Rahimi (2007) indicates that Al Sistani’s role advanced the idea of Islam as a source of 
legal authority and a religion that supports a modern democratic government. He also posed 
the question of when Al Sistani’s political role would cease; whether it was a temporary 
interaction or whether it would continue and where it would lead the country in the future.  
Dawisha (2005) shows concerns when discussing the subject, as since the collapse of 
Saddam’s dictatorship, leading writers on democratic transformation, as well as observers of 
Arab and Middle East politics, have tended to belittle the chances for a democratic 
transformation in Iraq, dismissing these as wishful thinking. One main reason for the 
pessimism is the lack of liberal and democratic traditions in Iraq's political culture and 
historical experiences. On the other hand, Gerecht (2004) argues that  Shia clerics are more 
likely to spread an acceptable Islamic form of democracy than Muslim moderates or 
reformists from other sectors and therefore the United States exploited this in carrying out 
their mission in making Iraq an example in the region. 
2.7 AN EVALUATION OF AL SISTANI’S FATWAS 
This section outlines Al Sistani’s fatwa, which consensus of opinion seems to indicate was 
intended as a means to rescue Iraq from ISIS groups. This will be discussed from the point of 
view of various writers and analysts. After ISIS had invaded three Sunni provinces Al Sistani 
called for a jihad and thousands of people complied. However, this fatwa was criticized by 
some Sunni politicians who considered it as action that would contribute to or make complex, 
a sectarian war. 
Al Sistani’s jihad fatwa, which was issued in 13 June 2014, has been considered as the 
most important event in the new Iraqi era. The fatwa was heeded by millions of Iraqis, who 
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considered Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani a spiritual leader. This fatwa called on all Iraqi 
citizens to defend the country, its people, the honour of its citizens, and its sacred sites. This 
part of this chapter will shed light on the meaning of ‘fatwa’ for the Sunnis and Shia and 
when the Sunni and Shia clerics have a right to issue it. It will also discuss if this fatwa was 
meant to stir up sectarian strife or to eliminate the Sunnis influence.  
The Shia are generally very cautious when speaking about a jihad. The fundamental 
difference between them and the Sunnis on this subject is that the Shia considers that the call 
for an offensive jihad is the prerogative of the infallible Imam of the time (Bengio & Litvak, 
2014). In current times, the Imam is the Mahdi and the Shia believes that he disappeared in 
874 AD and will return at the end of time. In his absence, the religious scholars can only call 
for a defensive jihad when an aggressive enemy attacks their community or sacred places 
(Litvak, 2010). In contrast the Sunnis give the power to call for offensive or defensive jihads 
to the political ruler and the scholars of religion (Khatteeb, 2014). Being consistent with this 
doctrine, Shia religious scholars have rarely called for a jihad. The few previous calls for 
jihads were all calls for defence, as it was with the case with the call for a jihad to resist the 
British invasion of Iraq in 1914. The fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani was no different. It 
was clearly indicating that the call was to ’Citizens to defend the country, its people, the 
honour of its citizens, and its sacred places‘ (al-Kadhimi, 2015). 
Al Sistani had believed his role had to be minimised, but then suddenly ISIS occupied 
three cities – Anbar, Mosul and Takirit – and placed the government and people of Iraq in 
real danger. Dodge (2014) mentions that the Iraqi people had become divided regionally, 
ideologically and politically. Many groups began to raise their voice to criticise Al Sistani, 
who remained silent regarding the events unfolding in the country. Then Al Sistani issued 
one of the most important fatwas in the last 100 years, where he declared a jihad, which 
required anyone with any military training and who could hold a weapon to join the Iraqi 
army in their war against the terrorist groups (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
Isakhan (2015, p. 224) states that thousands of Iraqi Shia responded to Al Sistani’s call 
that was read by his representative during the Friday Prayer who said it was “the legal and 
national responsibility of whoever can hold a weapon to hold it to defend the country, the 
citizens and the holy sites”. On the other hand, Schiavenza (2014) argues that although Al 
Sistani called on all able-bodied Iraqi men, regardless of their religious affiliation, to join the 
fight against ISIS, his fatwa might actually exacerbate the sectarian tensions that have 
plagued the country. Brown (2014) explains that instead of defending the safety and security 
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of the nation, the militias, who were supported by the Government, used the fatwa to attack 
innocent people.  
Mulla (2014), a Sunni cleric, argued that half a million Shia had been killed and 
mosques and sacred shrines had been destroyed 2005-2008, as was the case with the 
explosion of the holy shrines in Samarra, and in response to this Al Sistani initially did not 
issue a fatwa to fight ISIS, but when a Sunni city (Al Mosul) was occupied, Al Sistani issued 
a Fatwa to fight ISIS according to the following stipulations: first, protect Iraq; second 
protect Iraqi people; third, defend of the honour of the Iraqi people; and fourth, defend the 
holy cities.  
When the war commenced between ISIS and popular mobilization forces, some Sunni 
politicians opposed and criticized it because they argued that these forces had in mind 
revenge against Sunni people. Aal-Kadhimi (2015) points out that there was talk of 
retaliatory actions by some members of the popular mobilization forces in certain areas, 
namely in Diyala. Shia residents took revenge on their Sunni neighbours, who had lived with 
them for years. But as soon as ISIS took control of the area, some Sunnis joined its ranks and 
confiscated their Shia neighbour’s properties. However, Shia volunteers liberated some Sunni 
areas, while many Sunnis from Salahuddin joined the popular mobilization forces. Iraq’s 
Sunni mufti Sheikh Rafeh al-Rifai, issued a statement calling for a general strike in the six 
Iraqi provinces with Sunni majorities, threatening dire consequences if such ISIS incursions 
were to re-occur (Brown, 2014).  
The strike did in fact take place on the 10
th
 of October 2014 and included the closure of 
schools, as well as government institutions and markets in the aforementioned provinces. 
Meanwhile, Facebook and other websites overflowed with violent and demeaning reactions 
similar to those that accompanied the instigating event. In contrast, the highest-ranking Shia 
authority in Iraq, Al Sistani, issued a fatwa condemning the abuse of Sunni sanctities, saying: 
‘this is to be condemned and denounced, and is contrary to the instructions of Shia Imams’. 
The Imam al-Khoei Foundation, which is influential among  Shia religious circles, issued a 
statement denouncing events and called for the respect of everyone’s sanctities (Mamouri, 
2014 ). Therefore Al Sistani issued recommendations that had the same impact as the fatwa. 
These recommendations required  Shia fighters not to seek revenge and to commit to 
humanitarian standards during war (al-Khafaf, 2015). This was adhered to, but it was also 
broken. 
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2.8 AL SISTANI’S RECOMMENDATIONS  
This section examines literature in regard to Al Sistani’s recommendations being considered 
as a humanitarian road map for fighters in how to deal with ISIS, especially in locations 
where many Iraqis have become victims of ISIS. The section discusses Al Sistani’s 
recommendations and how they reduced sectarian tensions, and contributed to uncovering 
those who wanted to stir up strife among Iraqis. 
Al Sistani’s recommendations were considered by some to be more important for Iraq 
than his fatwa because they provided essential guidelines for those implementing his fatwa – 
both the existing army and security forces, and for the volunteers – regarding how they 
should deal with citizens in fighting areas and behave in the battlefield (Al-Rikabi, 2014 ). 
Thus, al-Khafaf (2015, p. 405) mentioned that:  
Al Sistani said let the dear fighters know, the ones who have been given the 
honour to be present in the battlefield against the transgressors, that: 
1- It is necessary, then, to learn these conditions and etiquettes thoroughly and 
to follow them sincerely, for one who learns these conditions and follows them 
sincerely will receive his deserved reward and blessings from God, and one 
who neglects them will not receive [the blessings] he hoped for.  [Al Sistani 
called the believers to Jihad and placed certain conditions and etiquettes on the 
conduct of the Jihad]. (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
2- When the prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him and his progeny) wanted 
to send a fighting contingent, he would sit down with them and advise them to 
represent God justly and to follow the good example of the religion of the 
Messenger of God. He would further say, 'Do not indulge in acts of extremism, 
do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill an elder, do 
not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do no not cut down trees unless 
necessity dictates otherwise.’ (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
3- (They) should follow guidelines and etiquettes informed [from] the actions 
of the Imam Ali (d. 661), who, when confronted with such situations, 
admonished his followers [to follow him]. The Muslim world agreed in 
unanimity that the actions, guidelines, and etiquettes of the Imam are a worthy 
example to emulate (http://www.Al Sistani .org). 
4- [Al Sistani induced the fighters not to do what God has not deemed 
permissible.] What great travesty it is to kill innocent souls, and what great 
honour it is to safeguard innocent souls, just as God mentioned in His book [the 
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Qurʾan]: the killing of an innocent soul has dangerous consequences, both in 
this world and in the hereafter. (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
5- By the majesty of God! The lives of those who do not fight you are sacred, 
especially the weak among the elderly, the children, and the women, even if 
they were the families of those who fight you. (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
6- Never inflict harm on non-Muslims, regardless of their religion and sect. The 
non-Muslims [who live in predominately Muslim lands] are under the 
protection of the Muslims in those lands. Whosoever attacks non-Muslims is a 
betrayer and traitor. And rest assured that such an act of betrayal and treachery 
is one of the most repugnant actions … (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
7- By the majesty of God, do not steal the wealth of people. The wealth of a 
Muslim is forbidden [to you] unless he agrees to its procurement. Those who 
usurp from others, they have obtained a piece of fire from the fires of hell. God, 
exalted as He is, said, ‘Those who devour the property of orphans unjustly, 
devour fire in their bellies, and shall assuredly roast in a blaze.’ And in a 
tradition reported on by the authority of the Prophet, peace be upon him and his 
progeny, he said, ‘Whosoever steals and usurps the wealth of another, God will 
turn away from him and will not accept and reward him for his good deeds 
until he repents and returns the possession to their rightful owner.’ 
(http://www.Al Sistani .org)  
8- Do not violate the sanctity of any sacred thing. Do not violate or infringe on 
it with your tongue or action. Be cautious and do not target a person due to the 
mistakes of others. God, exalted is He, says, ‘And no bearer of burdens will 
bear the burden of another.’ Do not base [your actions] on suspicions, 
distorting the certainty. Certainty entails caution and suspicion entails attacking 
others without proof. Your hatred of someone does not justify that you violate 
his sanctity, for God says: ‘And do not let the hatred of people prevent you 
from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness.’ (http://www.Al Sistani 
.org) 
9- Do not deprive any people, who do not fight you, of their rights even if they 
anger you. It has been reported from stories about the life of the commander of 
the Faithful, Imam Ali (peace be upon him), that he afforded those of other 
religions the same [respect] he afforded to the Muslims as long as they did not 
wage war against him. And he would never launch a military assault unless he 
was attacked first. (http://www.Al Sistani .org). 
10- Know that most of those who fight you are victims who have been led 
astray by others. Do not let those who led others astray be better than you. Let 
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your righteous actions, your well-wishing nature, your just conduct, your 
forbearance, and your avoidance of extortion, sin and aggression serve as an 
example for them. Whosoever helps misguided souls find the path of 
righteousness is like the one who saves a soul from perdition. And whosoever 
misguides a person is as if he has killed him. (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
11- Be mentor to the people you meet in battle that they feel secure with you 
and support you against your enemies. Help the weak among them in whatever 
you can. They are your brothers and your family. Show compassion towards 
them just as you show compassion towards your own. Know that you are 
within God’s sight, and that He counts your actions, intents, and your inner 
dispositions. (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
12- Do not be hasty in situations where caution is required, otherwise you 
would cast yourself to destruction. Your enemies wish for you to act in haste 
and improperly in precarious situations and wish for you to rush without taking 
any precaution and professional advice. Organise yourselves and coordinate 
with one another. (http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
13- Those (civilians) among you should be the well-wishers of the militants, 
acknowledging their sacrifice and protecting them from evils. They should not 
be suspicious about them. God has not assigned any right upon others unless he 
has assigned the same for them. Each of them enjoys equal rights. 
(http://www.Al Sistani .org) 
All these points indicate that Al Sistani’s fatwa was to protect all Iraqis regardless of religion 
or sect.   
Iraq’s diaspora interacted with this fatwa because they considered it binding as 
thousands of Iraqis had already heeded Al Sistani’s request to fight ISIS forces, who openly 
declared their intention to massacre Shias and destroy their holy shrines in the cities of 
Karbala and Najaf (Al-Milani, 2014). Many of these fighters came from different countries to 
participate with ISIS because they considered it to be a sectarian war against Sunni.  Al-
Khalif argues that the fight was not a sectarian one between Shia and Sunni but a battle to 
defend the nation, and that the Shia would struggle and resist all of this until the last drop of 
blood in their veins (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
When Shia Muslims in London heard about Al Sistani’s fatwa to oppose ISIS, they 
prepared themselves to travel to Iraq and participate in the war against ISIS. Al-Milani (2014) 
claims that initial reporting of Al Sistani’s call to arms caused confusion among Muslims in 
north-west London as some began planning travel arrangements, believing that the 
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pronouncement was an order for all Shia Muslims around the world to fight. He also states 
that he called Al Sistani’s office in Najaf to enquire about the role of those living outside Iraq 
and the answer was, ‘There is no need for anyone from outside to come and help because the 
local volunteers were capable of defending the country themselves.’  
In Australia the situation was similar because Australia is a multicultural country. Some 
Australians went to fight with ISIS, while others volunteered against it. Black and Hosen 
(2009) claim that Australia’s Muslims come from over 70 countries, belong to 50 different 
ethnic or cultural groups, and speak a variety of different languages and dialects, and 48% of 
this truly multicultural Islamic community are linked by their shared belief in Islam and their 
adherence to Islamic laws. Brown (2015, p. 2) comments that the Australian Prime Minister, 
Tony Abbott, said, ‘We will do everything we humanly can to stop jihadist terrorists coming 
into this country and if they do return to this country; we will do everything we reasonably 
can to ensure that they are not moving amongst the Australian community”.  
Al-Milani (2014) states that overseas events have an impact on the community in 
Australia. As an example he said that some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, facilitate the 
dissemination of their conservative Wahhabi perspective through the financing of Islamic 
schools and mosques in Australia and invite extremist Muslims to go to Iraq and Syria to 
carry out clerics’ fatwas. Questions raised include whether Al Sistani’s fatwa or the reaction 
against it caused problems in Australia, and whether Muslims in Australia are ready to do 
everything to follow their clerics? These issues have not yet been addressed in the literature. 
After 2003, there was a conflict between Iran and the US about who would have the 
stronger political influence inside Iraq (Taremi, 2005). ISIS attacked and occupied three 
provinces and arrived at the border of Baghdad. That encouraged both Iran and the US to 
help the Iraqi government. Iran was suffering from economic sanctions because of their 
nuclear program, and their priority was to ensure that Iraq would never invade it again (Finn, 
2004). To that end, Iran has focused on establishing a Shia-dominated government in 
Baghdad that is friendly to Tehran. It has also cultivated Shia political networks in Iraq and 
created a number of powerful Shia militias. As a result, Iraq has become a clear Iranian ally 
and a major trading partner. This has tipped the strategic balance of power in the region in 
favour of Iran and against its rival, Saudi Arabia. Moreover, since the first day of the battle 
with ISIS, Iran has sent an army of experts to Iraq because of the collapse of the military 
establishment (Mamouri, 2014 ).  
The US helped the Iraq government by providing military assistance. However, the 
question is whether Al Sistani Fatwa has helped these two countries to work together for the 
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stability of Iraq (Al-Rikabi, 2014 ). The enormity and seriousness of the ISIS threat on Iraq 
has also brought the United States and Iran onto the same strategic side. Shared interests in 
the stability of Iraq and the need to eradicate terrorists created a significant opening for 
cooperation between the two countries. Al Sistani, by his fatwa, cut the connection with both 
Iran and America, and made Iraqis depend more on themselves. At the same time, this Fatwa 
was a clear political message to Iraqi’s neighbours, the Gulf countries and Turkey, that if they 
continued to fund and sponsor extremist Sunni militant groups, the leadership of the  Shia 
Muslim world would no longer stand idly by – that if a fight is inevitable, the  Shia are ready 
(Al-Rikabi, 2014 ).  
2.9 AL SISTANI’S MESSAGE TO THE POLITICIANS 
This part of the literature review explores Al Sistani’s message to the politicians after they 
disputed the validity of the form of the new government. His message may have solved 
problems, but at the same time it was subject to criticism because some Shia politicians 
considered it as applying the Wilayat al faqih principle in Iraq (Al-Qarawee, 2016).    
In April 2014 held elections to choose new Iraqi government. These elections resulted 
in the Dawlat Al-Qanoon political group (State of Law), an Iraqi party to whom Al Maliki 
belonged acquiring the largest number of seats in parliament. However, many politicians 
objected to allowing the incumbent prime minister, Nuri Al Maliki, to form the new 
government (Al-Qarawee, 2016) . Al Sistani then gave a message to the Iraqi people and it 
was this message that was very influential in causing Nuri Al Maliki to step down and not 
take office as the incumbent prime minister. 
External pressure from neighbouring Arab countries and the west also affected the 
appointing of Al Maliki and that led to unrest in the country. This unrest motivated Al 
Sistani’s representative, Sheikh Abdul Mahdi Al Karabali, to start hinting at the need for a 
change in the government through the Friday prayer sermons (Chivers, 2014 ). Consequently, 
Ban Ki Moon, the United Nations Secretary General, visited Iraq and met with Al Sistani in 
Najaf to discuss the situation (Al-Qarawee, 2016). It has also been revealed that members of 
Dawlat Al-Qanoon had previously sent a letter seeking Al Sistani’s opinion and guidance 
regarding the formation of the government. The letter was answered by Al Sistani with a 
suggestion to change their candidate for the prime ministerial position to decrease political 
conflicts as the country, particularly while Iraq was facing the danger from the ISIS (Chivers, 
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2014 ). Subsequently, Maliki stepped down as a result of actions taken by a number of the 
Dawlat Al-Qanoon party members, following Al Sistani’s opinion.    
Some of the Dawlat Al-Qanoon members criticized Al Sistani because of his message 
to politicians and they considered it as a type of the Wilayat al faqih that Al Sistani claimed 
he did not believe in it. Mamouri (2014b) mentions that Al Maliki said ‘no one had the right 
to make him step down from forming the new Iraqi government and he sent a message to Al 
Sistani asking him to take care of his followers instead of intervening in politics’. Al Maliki 
considered himself the winner because he had 105 seats from the 328 parliamentary seats. 
Another member of Dawlat Al-Qanoon, Hanan Al Fatlawi, declared that ‘our country since 
2003 followed the democratic process to build a democratic country depending on elections 
to form the government, the intervention of any cleric in politics is not acceptable because 
Iraq is not like Iran’.  
Mamouri (2014 ) argues that when it came to the recent crisis, it would have been easy 
for Al Sistani to call for Al Maliki to step down through the Shia the parties in the parliament 
that were affiliated with him, or by calling on civil disobedience which would have led to the 
toppling of Al Maliki within a few hours. Al Sistani, however, called on Al Maliki to step 
down and did not ask the Shia opposition to take a strong stance that would render the 
situation more tense than it already was. Moreover, Al Sistani did not intervene in the 
political agreements between the parties and coalitions. He did so to avoid contradicting his 
principles regarding intervention in politics (Khatteeb, 2014). 
2.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The literature shows that Al Sistani’s ideas regarding the first Iraqi election after 2003 were a 
remarkable point in Iraqi history, particularly now that the nation was rid of Saddam's 
government which had subjected the Iraqi people to oppression for decades.  
Al Sistani’s intervention in politics raises many questions because most Shia theory 
about intervention in politics states that a cleric should not participate in politics. The Sunnis 
were not convinced of the legitimacy of Al Sistani's interference in politics so they did not 
take part in the first election and considered it illegitimate.  
The principle of democracy is not familiar to most Muslim, or Muslim countries, with 
some democratic values being forbidden in these countries. These values include personal 
freedom, political freedom, equality, and Popular Sovereignty (El-Shibiny, 2010). Al Sistani 
however believes in these values and encouraged the people of Iraq to be free in choosing 
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their parliamentary representatives. Moreover, he advised the Iraqi politicians to be 
committed to the constitution. Thus it can be said that Al Sistani was influential in 
establishing the nucleus of a new democratic country in the Middle East (Rahimi, 2007). 
During the last century, the hawza (seminary) of Najaf where the prominent  Shia 
clergy lived faced difficult circumstances and challenges. Oppressive and authoritarian 
methods during Saddam's rule had limited the role of the Najaf hawza to teaching Islamic 
sciences without giving any opinion or participating in any political activity (al-Kifaee, 
2010).  
Al Sistani’s Fatwa was not against any of Iraqi sects (al-Khafaf, 2015), but it was a 
reaction against ISIS groups who committed brutal acts of murder and displacement as well 
as punishing people on the basis of their religion. Al Sistani issued instructions and 
recommendations to volunteers urging them to respect human rights and deal gently even 
with the enemy. He advised them not to undertake any reprisals which could cause hatred 
among Iraqis. Al Sistani presented his advice when politicians asked him about his opinion 
regarding the new Iraqi prime minister after the 2013 elections. He had an extensive 
knowledge of Iraqi affairs, therefore his advice was comparable to that of most Iraqi party 
members who also did not want Al Maliki to be the Prime Minister. Moreover, Al Sistani 
also understood Middle Eastern affairs and indicated his prowess by removing the sectarian 
tension among Iraq's neighbours by choosing a new prime minister. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This study uses a qualitative approach to obtain, analyse and interpret data from research 
participants regarding Al Sistani’s role in Iraq after 2003. Two different data collection 
methods are used in order to obtain direct and authentic data helpful to dealing with the 
research questions. The first method is to interview the participants. The second is to examine 
Al Sistani’s texts. The in-depth interviews focusing on the role of Al Sistani in Iraqi political 
life were conducted by means of direct and open dialogue and conversations with the 
participants within the framework of one-on-one interview sessions. Through these 
conversations their opinions, beliefs, and perspectives about Al Sistani’s role in Iraq after 
2003 were explored (as explained in further detail later in this chapter).  
This chapter provides all details of the methodology used in regard to the preparation 
and carrying out of this study, including the data collection and its analysis. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the researcher's ethical considerations and the limitations of the 
study.  
3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Although I am a citizen of Iraq, and a Shia Muslim, for the purpose of this research I am 
foremost a researcher. According to the conventions of qualitative research, I will allow the 
research and opinions of those I interview to be presented freely, and as free as possible from 
any influence and bias based on my own religious and cultural views. Doing so allows the 
reader to understand all opinions from both sides, Sunnis and Shias, and for this thesis to 
provide a clear image of how people understand Al Sistani’s role in Iraq after 2003. 
Regarding access to Al Sistani’s opinion, it should be acknowledged that he did not 
specifically address most of the questions about himself or his influence – the questions 
addressed in the interviews of others – during press interviews or through books issued by his 
office regarding Iraq's political affairs. The reasons for this are unclear. Therefore, this 
research primarily dealt with these questions and discussed them with the interviewees.   
This research investigates the attitudes and perceptions of a sample of Shia and Sunni 
participants, who volunteered to take part in the study and present their perspectives of Al 
Sistani’s intervention in political issues, and their views whether or not Iraqi people approve 
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of this intervention. Thus, this research goes some way toward exploring the extent of Al 
Sistani’s effect on Iraqi society. Many events were occurring at the time of Al Sistani’s 
interventions in politics, thus it is a complex issue to design a study to research and analyse 
these events and the Al Sistani phenomenon in order to identify whether the Iraqi people 
(Sunnis and Shia) agree with his actions or not. The researcher will use a method by which he 
gains knowledge and can plan to carry out this research.    
Qualitative research is the field of inquiry that encompasses multiple epistemological 
positions and data collection methods to provide a comprehensive understanding of social - 
political phenomena in their natural setting (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). Guest, Namey, and 
Mitchell (2012) argue that ‘the strength of qualitative research is its ability to provide 
information about the “human” side of an issue, “… that is, the often contradictory 
behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals’ (p. 3).  
In the present study, the researcher employs a qualitative design method for a number 
of reasons. First, this research is about opinions and viewpoints – thoughts that come out of 
the lived experiences of those being interviewed. In general, the Iraqis have a range of 
opinions regarding Al Sistani. Some believe he is or was the saviour of Iraq who prevented 
the country when falling into civil war – a leader perhaps of the calibre of Nelson Mandela. 
As well as this, it can be generalised that the Iraqi sects (the Sunni and the Shia) also have 
different beliefs in Al Sistani. With data of this kind being analysed, researchers such as 
Neuman (2002), for example, insist that qualitative research is most appropriate as it studies 
social structures and the relation of a society’s inhabitants to their surroundings. Secondly, as 
Hawazi (2008) suggests, another reason for choosing the qualitative method is that it is most 
suitable for addressing certain questions about culture and power. For reasons such as these I 
have chosen qualitative research as the most appropriate for studying perceptions of Al 
Sistani.   
The qualitative approach is appropriate as it allows the researcher to become integrated 
into the natural environment of the problem in order to provide fruitful explanations as well 
as comprehensive understandings. Furthermore, the use of qualitative research allows the 
researcher to use interviews and other various data collection methods to obtain a significant 
amount of data for finding comprehensive answers to the research questions. It also helps the 
researcher to compare the source of one set of data against another to ensure the validity (or 
trustworthiness) of the research. 
Bruce and Berg (2001) believe that qualitative researchers are more interested in ‘how 
humans arrange themselves and their settings and how inhabitants of these settings make 
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sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles, and so 
forth’ (p.87).  
One criticism against qualitative research is that may lack reliability and validity as 
small scale sampling makes it difficult to generalise (Golafshani, 2003). This could be for 
reasons such as the number of those surveyed. Analysis based on the small number of 
participants used in this research may not reflect the views of the wider population, or the 
views on Sunnis and Shia generally. Another point of criticism concerns ethical issues in 
qualitative inquiry, for example the dynamics of the power relations between the researcher 
and participants (Berg & Lune, 2004). One may question if the presence of the researcher – 
and his viewpoints – has an effect on the data gathered. 
In regard to possible bias on behalf of the researcher, while I am a citizen of Iraq, and a 
Shia Muslim, during the conducting of this research I constantly reminded myself of what I 
regarded as an important role of the qualitative researcher. This was to remain reflectively 
vigilant of potential personal bias and to constantly strive for an appropriate position of 
neutrality. While there is an unlikelihood of complete freedom from religious and cultural 
views, I strove to consistently monitor my subjective positioning when communicating with 
participants. I recognised that for the purpose of conducting ethical research, one should 
strive to not judge from the standpoint of one’s own beliefs and assumptions but to be 
empathetic to the religion and culture of the other. In addition, the reduction of bias was 
assisted through the strategic selection of interview questions and I sought to allow the 
opinions, responses and ‘voice’ of all participants to speak for them.  
3.3 DATA COLLECTION  
This research employs two methods of gathering data. The first method is through the use of 
semi-structured qualitative interviews. The second is through textual analysis of written data 
stemming either directly from Al Sistani, or through his organisations.  
3.3.1. Data collection methodology: the interview 
Minichiello, Aroni, and Hays (2008) define the interview as ‘a means of gaining access to 
information of different kinds by asking questions in direct face-to-face interaction’ (p.21). In 
qualitative research interviews are typically open-ended. This means that the questions asked 
require an extended answer and allow the person being interviewed to choose their own 
words, decide what their responses to the question(s) will be, and decide how extensively 
they will answer the question. It allows each participant to freely respond in their own words 
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to the open-ended questions (Tracy, 2012). Of course, the qualitative interview is more than a 
question and answer event. The interviewer also can make decisions throughout the process, 
perhaps being responsive in turn to the responses of the interviewee. 
The semi-structured qualitative interview is typically a flexible method of gathering 
data. It allows for greater spontaneity, as well as an adapting interaction between the 
researcher and the study participants in order to obtain more details (Bruce & Berg, 2001). 
Patton (2002) indicates that ‘in qualitative research, people use interviews to find information 
that usually cannot be uncovered just by observation. Furthermore, he adds that researchers 
cannot observe feelings, thoughts or even situations that preclude the presence of an 
observer’ (p.265). Therefore the interview tends to be a suitable tool in allowing researchers 
to interact freely with the interviewees to gain an in-depth understanding of their feelings, 
thoughts and perspectives (Patton, 2002, p. 265). For a subject like Al Sistani’s role in Iraq, 
the researcher needs to enable the participants to be comfortable and relaxed, in order to have 
the best opportunity of eliciting information and ideas. Thus Liamputtong (2009) argues that 
semi-structured interviews provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which people may feel 
more comfortable having a conversation as opposed to filling out a survey.  
Importantly, in this research effort was made through creating a peaceful, unhurried 
atmosphere to enable the participants to be comfortable and relaxed in order to have the best 
opportunity of eliciting information and ideas. Part of doing this involved creating a relaxed 
and congenial atmosphere using collegial dialogue and a conversational style of interaction. 
This helped the interpersonal development of meanings and ideas, a valued outcome as it was 
important that opinions, beliefs, and perspectives could be shared and explored.  
 
3.3.2. Data collection in this research  
For this research – as in all research – the data collection must be appropriate for the 
investigation, for gathering the information required to explore and discuss the research 
questions. As stated earlier, data collection in this research involved two sources.  
The first source: interviews of Iraqis in Australia 
The first method used to collect the data was interviews (discussion interviews). These 
interviews were conducted to gather information and opinions from others regarding the 
following questions relating to the research: 
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 Why did Al Sistani issue an election Fatwa in 2004 while most of the Sunni areas 
were suffering from terrorism and therefore could not participate in elections?  
 Why did Al Sistani issue a Jihad Fatwa against ISIS but not against American 
occupation forces when they invaded Iraq?  
 Does Al Sistani support democracy? 
 What is the attitude of the Iraqi diaspora in Australia to Al Sistani, and to what extent 
do they follow his leadership? 
Note, these questions were carefully shaped to achieve the aim of gathering information to 
address the three primary research questions:  
Selection of interviewees  
I conducted interviews with nine participants in Australia and five in London. These included 
Iraqi international students and some of their partners from the Sunni and  Shia sects at the 
University of Southern Queensland who had recently come to Australia (both men and 
women) as well as interviewing one Australian cleric.  
Certain criteria were used for selecting suitable participants. One of them was that the 
participants who took part in this study had to be Iraqi citizens because the subject of 
research is Iraqi affairs. They also needed to be representative of different ethnic 
backgrounds, including the two Iraqi major sects (Sunni and Shia). The cultural knowledge of 
the participants was also significant – so it was important to select participants from a wide 
range of backgrounds. This was not easy to do in London, where it turned out that all five 
participants were Shia, and either politicians or clerics. However, in Australia – where I 
found many Iraqis interested in this research by “word of mouth” – I chose participants with 
various characteristics including students and their partners, clerics, intellectuals with Islamist 
leanings or with secular leanings. I also chose a mixture of both educated and much less 
educated participants.  
The purpose of choosing participants from varying backgrounds was to get a variety of 
viewpoints. I also tried to achieve reasonable gender balance and there were 10 men and 4 
women. This was done as I wanted to hear voices of women as well as men because they 
have different roles in Arab society, and may have varying viewpoints. Although I did my 
best to choose an unbiased selection of interviewees, the selection was not random and was 
made by myself. 
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The interview questions 
In the face-to-face interviews with the Iraqis who came to Australia at the beginning of this 
study, I asked many “open-ended” questions, mainly relating to Iraq and Al Sistani’s role 
after the year 2003. The questions were prepared beforehand, and designed to obtain thoughts 
and responses relevant to the three research questions: 
1. To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? Do they approve of his approach to political intervention?  
2. Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s 
problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
3. How does Al Sistani himself see his role? 
The questions were carefully designed. Many of them are “leading” questions – they 
were designed to stir a response in the participants. It was felt that this was more likely to 
trigger a frank and open response from the participants rather than if asked a more 
generalised questions. For example, the question: “Are the Iraqi people ready to become a 
democratic country, as Al Sistani wants, after years of tyranny and injustice?” might be 
considered to be a question to cause the interviewees to think this the viewpoint of the 
researcher. However, it was felt that the question asked was more likely to trigger a reaction 
that would provide an honest answer. 
Throughout the interviews I do not believe there was any animosity felt by the 
participants – whether Sunni or Shia– toward myself, the interviewer, based on any 
perceptions of my beliefs or viewpoints. The mood of the interviews was very much a mood 
of mutual respect, where it was felt that the participants realised they could speak with 
freedom and confidentiality.  
The interview questions were numerous and changed from one participant to another. 
Sometimes certain questions were asked in a different way, sometimes they were not asked at 
all, and on other occasions totally different questions were spontaneously asked, according to 
my perceptions as the interviewer as to what questions might best obtain helpful information 
about the primary research questions and the sub-questions. 
A large number of interview questions were used. The following questions were 
considered to be the most relevant: 
The 2005 elections: 
 Was Al Sistani right when he invited Iraqis to participate in the 2005 elections? 
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 Why did Al Sistani invite people to hold an election while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by terrorists? 
 What is the difference between Al Sistani’s interventions and the doctrine of 
Wilayat al faqih [the guardianship of the jurist, as proposed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini]? 
 Do the Sunnis think that Al Sistani’s interventions in politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or Shia clerics to obtain more power? 
Regarding democracy: 
 Does Al Sistani support democracy? 
 What is the point of view of Shia clerics towards democracy? 
 Are the Iraqi people ready to become a democratic country? 
 How satisfied are the different sects (overall) with Al Sistani ? 
 
Al Sistani’s fatwa against ISIS:   
 Why did Al Sistani not issue a fatwa against the US when they occupied Iraq 
while he did issue a fatwa against ISIS? 
 Is this fatwa really against the Sunnis? 
 Does this fatwa interfere in the political affairs of Iraq? 
 Is this fatwa an agreement between Al Sistani and Iran? 
 
Al Sistani and the forming of the new Iraqi government: 
 Did Al Sistani contribute to the ousting of al-Maliki from power?  
 Were Al Sistani’s interventions in politics justified? 
Preparing for the interviews  
Before conducting interviews with the participants, I collected information about them on 
matters such as when they came to Australia, because their time of arrival was very important 
in indicating the scale and currency of the information possessed by the participants. 
Knowing if the participants are Shia or Sunnis also helped to achieve a balance between 
them. Knowledge of their cultural background – whether they have Islamic or secular 
leanings – was also very important in order to obtain diverse perspectives. Moreover, before 
conducting the interview. 
The interviews were considered ‘elite interviews’ as they were designed to collect data 
through asking different types of questions: tightly structured, semi-structured and open-
ended questions. However elite interviewers are best suited to semi-structured and open-
ended questions. Berry (2002) claim that this is: 
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Because they allow [the interviewees] to express their opinions in all their 
complexity, creating greater comfort with the subsequent ‘straightjacket’ 
closed questions which will allow for greater detail and may include time-
specific or contextual questions (p.679). 
Open-ended questions create an effective interview because a good interviewer is not 
one who writes the best questions but the one who is an excellent conversationalist (Peabody 
et al., 1990), and this is what open-ended questions do – they stimulate conversation. These 
types of interviews also require more preparation, however, making them more complex, but 
also more enjoyable and effective.  
Preparation includes writing official letters and correspondence to explain the research 
project to the respondents. It also includes providing sample questions and setting the ground 
rules for the interview, which will make the respondents feel secure, relaxed, and  
comfortable (Rivera, Kozyreva, & Sarovskii, 2002). Furthermore, open-ended questions 
provide rich data because the information they give is first-hand, authentic, directly from 
those involved – the decision makers – including Al Sistani (via intermediaries) and Iraqi 
politicians in this research – which allows a rich understanding of their actions and positions.  
Conducting the interviews  
Between the December 1, 2016 and May 10 2016 I interviewed 9 Iraqis living in Australia. 
Six of these were men, and three were women (the partners/wives of some of the men). The 
interviews occurred in the homes of the subjects in Toowoomba and Brisbane.  Details of the 
participants follow.  
At the beginning of each session I explained to the interviewee the purpose of the 
project. Then I asked for permission to record the interview, explaining that I preferred to 
record it because I wanted to be more focused during interview, without being overly 
concerned with taking written notes. 
In preparation I had prepared a list of questions. Not all questions were asked, and new 
questions were sometimes created during the course of the interview if this was found to be 
appropriate – depending on how the interviewee responded to previous questions.   
Not all those interviewed allowed the recording of the sessions. For those who didn’t, I 
kept very busytaking written notes. The length of the interviews was 45 minutes to 1 hour. 
The interviews with the five London subjects were conducted in a similar fashion, in 
London between March 17 and March 21 2015 - the coding system will be explained in part 
4.2.2 . All interviews were conducted in Arabic.  
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Profiles of the Australian interviewees  
Australian men (6 in total) 
1MSuJ is a Sunni from Mosul who emigrated to Australia via the Australian embassy in 
Jordan in 2012. He worked as a teacher and was married with three children. He left Iraq with 
his family during 2012 after receiving threats from Sunni militant groups. (Interviewed 
December 1, 2015 in Brisbane.) 
2MSuSt is a Sunni international student who came to Australia from Mosul in 2008 to study 
a PhD in Mechanical Engineering. He was keen to take part in this study because he thinks 
that the role of cleric should not be very influential in the new Iraq. (Interviewed January 19, 
2016 in Toowoomba.) 
3MShP is a Shia doctor who left Iraq initially in 1994 to go to Syria because of his 
opposition to Saddam's regime. He then migrated to Australia in 1996. He was elected as 
President of the Iraqis community in Australia on a number of occasions. He travels to Iraq 
every year to assist humanitarian organizations with charity projects. (Interviewed March 7, 
2016 in Brisbane.) 
4MShCl is a Shia cleric living in Australia. He left Iraq in 1991 then returned in 2003. He 
has been very active in the Islamic community in Australia, and in encouraging people to 
support the new Iraqi political process after 2003. (Interviewed February 6, 2016 in 
Brisbane.) 
5MKuP is a Kurd (the only one in this research) who emigrated from Iraq for Syria in 1991, 
then immigrated to Australia in 2006.  He has a Bachelor of Islamic Science from one of the 
Syrian universities. His beliefs lean towards secularism, and he did not believe in any role for 
clerics in the new Iraq. (Interviewed May 10, 2016 in Brisbane.) 
6MSuSt is a Sunni international student who came to Australia from Mosul in 2012 to study 
for a PhD in Economics. He was very happy to take part in this study because he believes that 
his sect was a victim after 2003, and because he disapproves of clerics’ interventions in 
politics.  (Interviewed December 26, 2015 in Toowoomba.) 
 
Australian women (3 in total) 
7FShT is a woman from Baghdad who worked as an oil engineer. She came to Australia in 
2012 with her husband who was international student. This woman does not believe in any 
role for clerics in the new Iraq, thus her ideas were close to secularism. (Interviewed May 5, 
2016 in Brisbane.) 
8FShSt is a single Sunni woman from Baghdad who came to Australia in 2013 as an 
international student to study for a PhD in Administration and Economics. She lived in Iraq 
during the sectarian conflict between 2005 to 2008, and was very motivated to participate in 
this research. (Interviewed December 28, 2015 in Toowoomba.) 
9FSuHw is a Sunni woman who came to Australia from Ramadi in the west of Iraq in 2012 
with her husband, who was an international student. She lived in Iraq during the sectarian 
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conflict between the Sunni and the Shia and some her family were killed by the rebels in 
those areas. (Interviewed December 24, 2015 in Toowoomba.)  
Profiles of the London interviewees  
London men (5 in total) 
10MShP is the code for, an Iraqi politician who left Iraq in 1979 because of his opposition to 
Saddam's regime. He lived few years in Iran then emigrated to Britain. When Saddam's 
regime fell, he returned to Iraq to become one of those involved in writing the Iraqi 
constitution, and he had direct contact with Al Sistani’s office to get any notes regarding this.  
He was Minister of National Reconciliation and acting Minister of Agriculture during Al 
Maliki’s first government. (Interviewed March 21, 2016 in London.) 
11MShCl is the code for Al Sistani’s brother in law and responsible of most of Al Sistani’s 
office in Europe and North America. He is also manager of the Imam Ali Foundation at Al 
Sistani’s main office in London. He has been undertaking various roles such as providing 
general Islamic guidance to the Muslim communities in the UK, Europe and North America. 
He is also responsible for informing all of these offices regarding any updates coming from 
Al Sistani’s office in Najaf. (Interviewed March 17, 2015 in London.) 
12MShCl is a representative of a famous Iraqi cleric in London and he is an important 
Islamic figure in Britain. He has had published many Islamic and political works that deal 
with Iraqi affairs. He also runs an important Islamic institution in London and has undertaken 
many activities for the Iraqi community in London. He was appreciated for his participation 
in this research because of his long experience working with the clergy as well as his 
extensive knowledge of Iraqi affairs after 2003. (Interviewed March 20, 2015 in London.) 
13MShP is an Iraqi politician who left Iraq in the 1980s and who has undertaken many 
Islamic studies. He worked as a lecturer in philosophy in various Arab countries, and he has 
been a keen follower of Iraqi Islamic affairs after 2003.  (Interviewed March 19, 2015 in 
London.) 
14MShP is an Iraqi politician who left Iraq in 1980 because of his opposition to Saddam's 
regime. He completed a PhD in social sciences from a Hungarian Universities. He came back 
to Iraq after 2003 to participate in the electoral campaigns of 2010 and 2014, but did not win. 
He is poet and an author who has written many articles regarding Iraqi affairs. He believes in 
the separation of religion from politics. (Interviewed March 18, 2015 in London.) 
The second source: Al Sistani  
The second method used to collect data for this research was planned to involve the 
collection of data from Al Sistani first-hand and then to provide an academic assessment of 
this data myself. The plan was to gather first-hand preliminary data by interviewing Al 
Sistani in person. Then I would examine and analyse this data.  
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This is not unlike undertaking a literature review, which would then be followed by a 
very thorough critical analysis. Part of this analysis would involve gathering data that I would 
use side-by-side with the interviewees’ responses to discuss the primary research questions. 
Thus, there would be two means in this research of exploring answers to the four 
questions listed: one, by interviewing others; two, by seeking primary contact with Al Sistani 
and then assessing the data gathered from this. Gathering the data by these means, I would 
have the opportunity to explore the thoughts of a small number of Iraqis – those interviewed, 
and Al Sistani himself. To gather this data, my plan was to meet personally with Al Sistani, 
and ask him the same questions I asked the subjects I interviewed. I would then examine the 
data gathered and endeavour to pass impartial judgements and insights into what I had 
uncovered. 
However, I was unable to organise a meeting with Al Sistani. Instead, I depended on 
several related sources for data collection. These were:  
1. I travelled to London to meet with one of most important representatives of Al 
Sistani in Europe – his brother-in-law, Mortada Al Kishmeri. He is manager of all 
Al Sistani’s offices in Europe and he coordinates with Al Sistani’s office in Najaf 
(Rahimi, 2007). This office in London was very helpful in pointing me in different 
directions to gather data. 
 
2. The second principal source I used to access Al Sistani is a book (in three parts) 
called Texts issued by his Eminence Al Sistani on the Iraq issue.  These books have 
been written by Hamid al-Khafaf (in 2005, 2007, and 2015) and they are 
recognized by Al Sistani office in Najaf. al-Khafaf is Al Sistani’s representative in 
Lebanon and considered to be Al Sistani’s spokesperson (Rizvi, 2010). He is also a 
brother-in-law of Al Sistani. These books contain all Fatwas and texts which Al 
Sistani issued from 2003 until 2015. They also include most of Al Sistani’s 
interviews with journalists.  
 
3. A third source used was the website of the Najaf School at http://www.najaf.org  
This is perhaps the most reliable source from which texts can be cited. Al Sistani’s 
literature is well organized (and detailed here better than anywhere else) by the 
administrators of this site. Al Sistani’s own website http://www.Al Sistani .org, is as 
reliable as www.najaf.org. However, I chose the former to use as 
http://www.najaf.org has designated a whole section for Al Sistani’s statements, 
Fatwas, answers to questions, and correspondence.  
 
4. A fourth source was a book authored by Al Sistani he called Jurisprudence for 
Diaspora. Al Sistani was very interested in the diaspora. This book explains for 
expatriates matters concerning jurisprudence and religion. As we have said, Al 
Sistani tends to taqlid theory, therefore expatriates might tend to follow everything 
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that comes from Al Sistani concerning political issues. It is important to know the 
diaspora’s opinion regarding Al Sistani’s intervention in politics. This book offers 
much information in this area. 
 
Travelling to London and seeking (and undertaking) interviews with the participants 
and others whom I met and sought out led to a ‘snowballing’ effect where I was provided 
with information that could contribute to the study, or to other participants through their 
social networks (Guest et al., 2012). This is how I met with Al Sistani’s associates, and with 
politicians, scholars and people opposing Al Sistani’s ideas. For example, when I met with 
11MShCl, he advised me to meet 13MShP, who became another very good source of data.  
Throughout Al Sistani’s years in Iraq, he did not do any TV interviews, but he did meet 
with journalists. Al Sistani’s refusal to make public appearances and/or public speeches has 
made some people, particularly Sunnis, sceptical of him. Iraqi Sunnis might think Al Sistani 
is not sincere in his calls as they observe the continuity of violence in Iraq (Fuller, 2009). 
Thus, it has been important to examine his own words through his public announcements and 
interviews.  
I critically evaluated the texts and fatwas from three perspectives. I created three 
sections in my note taking that represented three different aspects of the meanings of these 
texts and fatwas. These sections are labelled: description of the text, personal meaning, and 
textual meaning. ‘Description of the text’ explains Al Sistani’s own view. ‘Personal meaning’ 
reflects my own interpretation of Al Sistani’s writings. ‘Textual meaning’ refers to the 
meaning of the text, as perceived according to my best interpretation.  Undertaking this 
process – although such an undertaking might not be apparent in the analysis – helped 
significantly in allowing me to conduct this study with a minimum of bias, and maximum 
opportunity for uncovering data. 
3.4 DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE RESEARCHER  
Ethical approval for this project was granted by the University of Southern Queensland 
Human Research Ethics Committee (USQHREC). However, despite this, and my endeavours 
to avoid potential ethical issues, there are some limitations in my research. Many of these 
difficulties involved Al Sistani’s growing popularity. Al Sistani became a global 
phenomenon, and particularly a holy man to the Shia of Iraq. There was a reluctance to 
criticise him or accuse him regarding his political interventions in the Iraq issues.  
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3.4.1. Selection of participants 
Initially the intention was to travel to Iraq to interview Al Sistani himself, as well as Iraqi 
politicians, academics with political interests, journalists, and ‘normal’ people from the two 
major Iraqi sects (Sunni, and Shia) with the purpose being to examine Al Sistani’s role after 
2003.  
However, after 2014 when the war broke out between Iraqi forces and ISIS, for security 
reasons the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) issued warnings 
about going to Iraq. Consequently, the university informed me that I couldn’t go to Iraq to 
conduct this study.  
I also attempted to interview the Kurds, another significant Iraqi sect, but the Kurds 
refused the idea, arguing that Al Sistani did not influence their political life in Kurdistan. 
Most of them (the Kurds) consider themselves as not belonging to Iraq, and so they have paid 
minimal attention to Al Sistani and the concerns of this study. In addition, Kurds are prouder 
of their nationalism than their religion, and they have been exercising autonomy since 1991. 
3.4.2. Fear of recrimination 
Although not everyone knows a lot about Al Sistani, in the Muslim world he is well-known, 
and among Iraqis everyone knows of him and much about what he does and has done, 
especially politically. He has something like what the Western world would call a ‘cult 
following’, particularly among Shia. He has millions of followers and supporters; thus it is 
difficult to criticize him.  
No matter what one’s thoughts are, we tend to shy away from potential conflict and 
ridicule – so we often keep quiet when we perceive our opinion as being in the minority. And 
if we are part of a large majority with the same opinion, there can often be a lack of tolerance, 
and even an unwillingness to hear from those with an opposing viewpoint. There were many 
people and politicians who refused to do an interview with the researcher for this reason.  
This also meant that those who were willing to do an interview were more likely to 
support Al Sistani, and therefore not represent a cross-section of the community. This is not 
just the case in Iraq, but I had to face the possibility that it could be the same also in diaspora 
communities around the world. 
3.4.3. Interviewing Al Sistani in person 
Throughout his life Al Sistani has refused to face the media. He will not cooperate with the 
media or do any interviews with them, except for occasionally undertaking interviews with 
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independent journalists. This has meant that there are very limited media sources for gaining 
direct quotes from Al Sistani. This, and because he is so popular, means that an interview by 
someone with a low profile such as myself was unlikely (while well-known journalists are 
lining up with requests). I sought an interview but my request was declined.   
3.4.4. My response to the difficulties 
My response to the issues mentioned above was to select participants living outside of Iraq, 
within a Western environment, and within a situation where they were studying at a 
university. I felt this would minimise such potential ethical issues, as I felt they would have 
more freedom to talk frankly about Al Sistani, and most of them had recently left Iraq.  
A second group of participants was chosen from among clerics in Britain. These were 
clerics I encountered in my visit to London, at the main office of Al Sistani in London run by 
Murtadha al-Kashmiri. Some of these clerics were politicians. I hoped they could speak with 
full freedom because they were in the UK. However, I was aware that they may have a bias 
toward Al Sistani, or for other reasons – such as political reasons regarding their work which 
I knew nothing about – be unwilling to be totally trigger a frank and open response with me.  
Furthermore, I interviewed each participant separately to avoid any obligation they 
might have felt toward others, particularly in the Iraqi community to which they both belong. 
Most of them refused to mention their real names.  
Of course, throughout the analysis and discussion that follows I was ‘on guard’; ready 
to explore the responses of the interviewees in a critical light. Part of this involved a rational 
and critical response by myself, as the researcher, to their responses to the questions I asked 
during the interviews. 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS  
3.5.1 Data analysis in this research 
Steps in data analysis of interviews 
 Further notes were made immediately, then I called the participants for 
clarification several times if required within 24 hours. 
 Data was then gathered for safekeeping onto several electronic formats. 
 Translation was then undertaken, one interview at a time. Thus I began to 
immerse myself in the data. 
 After translation I analysed the data, and broke it down in relation to each 
question. Then I: 
a. Sectioned the data and labelled the data with codes for each participant.  
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b. Made brief profiles of each participant.  
c. Made longer narratives of what each participant said.  
d. Tabulated the responses of each participant to the questions. 
 Finally, I addressed the research questions in five chapters – Chapters 5-9. I did 
this by first providing more background material from my textual analyses, and 
then breaking down different sections according to the data compiled from the 
interviews.  
3.5.2 Data analysis methodology 
Thematic analysis, according to Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 9) is ‘a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.’ Thematic analysis is a type of 
qualitative analysis that is used to “analyse classifications and present themes that relate to 
the data” as well as illustrating them (data) in major detail using interpretation techniques 
(LeCompte, 2000, p. 148). Thematic analysis is widely used in qualitative research, and 
considered to be the most appropriate method for any study that aims to investigate and 
interpret qualitative data (Joffe, 2012).  
Thematic analysis allows the researcher to deduce latent meanings underpinning sets of 
manifest themes which requires interpretation (Joffe, 2012). This enhances the accuracy and 
complexity of the data as well as the understanding of the data. Alhojailan (2012, p. 40) 
claims that, ‘As qualitative research requires understanding and collecting different aspects 
and data, using thematic analysis in this study provides an opportunity to understand the 
potential of any issue more widely’. 
In this study, the use of thematic analysis allowed me to link different concepts and 
opinions of participants and compare them with data collected in different situations at 
different times during the project. Braun and Clarke (2006) observe that: 
The process of analysing data through using the thematic analysis approach 
was done through the following six phases: becoming familiar with the data, 
generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and 
naming themes, and producing the report (p.86). 
After completing data collection, I began transcribing the data into written form. “The 
process of data analysis of this study starts with reading and re-reading data in order to 
become familiar with what the data entails, paying specific attention to patterns that occur” 
(Boyatzis, 1998).  
The next step was to generate an initial list of items from the data set that have a 
reoccurring pattern (Braun & Clarke, 2006) such as if the participants considered that Al 
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Sistani’s fatwas encouraged violence or was a means of peace. This systematic way of 
organizing, and gaining meaningful parts of data as they relate to the research question is 
called coding. Guest, MacQueen, and Namey (2011, p. 11) point out that coding is about 
‘comparing theme frequencies, [and] identifying these themes co-occurrence by interpretation 
of these codes’. For example if most of the participants believe that Al Sistani’s intervention 
in politics promotes sectarian unity, which did not exist before 2003.  
After the interpretation of codes, it is important for the researcher to review themes to 
explore how they support the data and the overarching theoretical perspective. If the analysis 
seems incomplete, the researcher needs to go back and find what is missing. The researcher 
needs to define what each theme is, which aspects of data are being captured, and what is 
significant about the themes (McAdams & Losoff, 1984; Vaterlaus & Higginbotham, 2011). 
Then the researcher writes the report and must decide which themes make meaningful 
contributions to understanding what is going on within the data to answering research 
questions which should be refined later as final themes (Wood, Dendy, Dordek, Germany, & 
Varallo, 1994). 
Al Sistani has several opinions regarding all the issues addressed in the research 
questions. Hence, a comparison between how Al Sistani and the research participants 
evaluate and interact was possible with these research questions. I undertook this evaluation 
by focusing on the subjects (content and questions) through focusing on the answers of the 
Sunnis, the Shia and Al Sistani himself, and comparing the differences in the data content. 
There are many benefits in the use of the thematic analysis approach produced through 
interviews because the verbal data can be transcribed, and therefore this technique enables the 
researcher to summarise key features of that set of data. Thematic analysis is also flexible and 
productive in data interpretation, the analysis of different data stages, coding and 
categorising. (Braun & Clarke, 2006) argue that ’one of the benefits of thematic analysis is its 
flexibility‘ (p. 78). Thematic analysis allows flexibility for commencing data analysis at any 
time through the project, where there is no link between the data gathered and the result of 
the process itself (Hayes, 1997). Some of the strengths associated with thematic analysis are 
that, "it is a tool to use across various methods, it is suitable even for novice qualitative 
researchers, and it [will] supply a wide range of analytic options " (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006, pp. 81-83). 
This thematic analysis helps the researcher to study the data in depth and analyse and 
interpret the participants' disclosures accurately and successfully (Anderson & Felsenfeld, 
2003). In this study, it helped me to look behind what the participants said in order to 
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understand the political role of Al Sistani in Iraq and how the Iraqi sects have evaluated this 
role. Then, before interpreting the results, I carefully examined the data to capture all 
similarities and differences.  
This study also aimed to collect information to investigate the variables relating to the 
differences of views among Iraqis regarding role of Al Sistani and how he managed to 
convince Iraqis of his interventions in politics. 
3.6 SUMMARY   
In this chapter I have described my research journey from its beginning in terms of its 
ontological approach, epistemological assumptions, the research methodology, as well as the 
collecting and analysing of the data, explaining access and demonstrating my role as a 
researcher of Al Sistani’s role in Iraqi politics since 2003. I have outlined the ethical matters 
which I had to take into consideration whilst conducting this research. In the subsequent 
chapters the empirical research is presented with the focus being on Iraqis’ opinions (from the 
viewpoints of belonging to different sects) primarily of Al Sistani intervention in politics. 
However, before considering the collected evidence in detail, the following chapter details 
the findings of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Findings  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The data collection methods of this research are twofold: interviews conducted with the 
participants, and textual analysis of written data stemming either directly from Al Sistani, or 
through his organisations. Both are presented in this chapter. 
The interview data has been summarised and is presented below according to headings 
based on the interview questions asked. The textual analysis – a very different form of data in 
comparison to the interview data – is presented in the form of sample texts gathered during 
the process of undertaking this study. This is raw data gathered from Al Sistani in an attempt 
to let him have his say (or provide his response) to the same questions asked of the interview 
participants. Of course, as explained earlier in this research, the data gathered here is not 
taken directly from any interviews with Al Sistani, but instead taken from sources 
representing Al Sistani. These sources include interviews and official comments by himself 
and those representing him. These primarily come through his official website.  
Only a sample of relevant data from Al Sistani is provided in this chapter. More will be 
provided throughout the following analysis chapters. 
The following data from 14 interviews is summarised below. It is further detailed 
throughout the following analysis chapters. 
4.2 THE INTERVIEWS 
4.2.1 The most significant questions 
The following data from 14 interviews is summarised below. It is further detailed throughout 
the analysis chapters. The interview questions used to gather this data are: 
The 2005 elections: 
 Was Al Sistani correct when he invited Iraqis to participate in the 2005 elections? 
 Why did Al Sistani invite people to hold an election while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by terrorists? 
 What is the difference between Al Sistani’s interventions and the doctrine of 
Wilayat al Faqih [the guardianship of the jurist, as proposed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini]? 
 Do the Sunnis think that Al Sistani’s interventions in politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or Shia clerics to obtain more power? 
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Regarding democracy: 
 Does Al Sistani support democracy? 
 What is the point of view of Shia clerics towards democracy? 
 Are the Iraqi people ready to become a democratic country? 
 How satisfied are the different sects (overall) with Al Sistani? 
 
Al Sistani’s fatwa against ISIS:   
 Why did Al Sistani not issue a fatwa against the US when they occupied Iraq 
while he did issue a fatwa against ISIS? 
 Is this fatwa really against the Sunnis? 
 Does this fatwa interfere in the political affairs of Iraq? 
 Is this fatwa an agreement between Al Sistani and Iran? 
 
Al Sistani and the forming of the new Iraqi government: 
 Did Al Sistani contribute to the ousting of al-Maliki from power?  
 Were Al Sistani’s interventions in politics justified? 
4.2.2 The purpose and meaning of coding the participants’ names  
The names were coded to maintain anonymity. This is the case for all the participants, 
including the clerics and others in London. This was done for the purpose of ethical 
protection, but also to help provide useful information when presenting, summarising and 
analysing the data. The coding system used is this: 
Which group?   Australian males are 1-6.  
Australian females are 7-9.  
Londoners are 10-14. 
Which gender?    
M for males.  
F for females. 
Which sect?     
Su for Sunni. 
Sh for Shia. 
Occupation    
Cl for cleric. 
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J for jobseeker. 
St for student. 
P for politician. 
Hw for home worker (housewife). 
Eg: MSuJ means this participant is 1 of 6 Australians, male (M), Sunni (Su),  a Jobseeker (J). 
4.2.3 Tabulated answers to interview questions 
Following in Tables 4.1-4.6 are summary tables of the answers of the participants to the 14 
most significant questions. Overall, of the 14 participants there were: 
11 Men (M), 3 Women (F).  
8 Shia, 5 Sunni, 1 Kurd. 
5 Politicians, 4 Students, 3 Clerics, 1 Housewife, 1 Jobseeker. 
All those interviewed in London were Shia, and men (3 Politicians, 2 Clerics). 
Table 4-1 Interview answers (A) from the male participants interviewed in Australia. 
QUESTIONS (A) 6 MALE PARTICIPANTS FROM AUSTRALIA 
The 2005 elections: 1MSuJ 2MSuSt 3MShP 4MShCl 5MKuP 6MSuSt 
• Was Al Sistani right when 
he invited Iraqis to 
participate in the 2005 
elections? 
No No Yes Yes No No 
• Why did Al Sistani invite 
people to hold an election 
while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by 
terrorists? 
To let Shia 
get power. 
To let Shia 
control Iraq. 
Till now 
Sunni areas 
were not 
secure. 
Sunnis did 
not support 
the new 
political 
process 
from the 
beginning. 
The USA 
wanted 
more legal 
control.  
To let 
militants 
scare the  
Sunni and 
not let them 
boycott the 
election. 
• What is the difference 
between Al Sistani’s 
interventions and the 
doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih 
[the guardianship of the 
jurist, as proposed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini]? 
No 
difference.  
No 
difference. 
Yes, there is 
a difference. 
Yes, there is 
a difference. 
Yes, there is 
a difference. 
No 
difference. 
• Do the Sunnis think that Al 
Sistani’s interventions in 
politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or  Shiaclerics to 
obtain more power? 
Yes Yes No No No Yes 
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Regarding democracy  
• Does Al Sistani support 
democracy? 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
• What is the point of view of  
Shia clerics towards 
democracy? 
Not 
supportive. 
Not 
supportive. 
Support. Support. Support. Support. 
• Are the Iraqi people ready 
to become a democratic 
country? 
No No Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
• How satisfied are the 
different sects (overall) with 
Al Sistani ? 
Not 
satisfied.  
Not 
satisfied. 
Not 
satisfied. 
Not 
satisfied. 
Satisfied. Satisfied. 
Table 4.1 (above) shows a basic summary of answers to 8 of the interview 
questions. It can be seen from this table that patterns and themes can be found in 
the data. These are outlined in Tables 4.7-4.10. 
Table  0-2 Interview answers (B) from the male participants interviewed in Australia. 
QUESTIONS (B) 6 MALE PARTICIPANTS FROM AUSTRALIA 
Al Sistani’s fatwa against 
ISIS 
1MSuJ 2MSuSt 3MShP 4MShCl 5MKuP 6MSuSt 
• Why did Al Sistani not 
issue a fatwa against the 
US when they occupied 
Iraq while he did issue a 
fatwa against ISIS? 
There was 
agreement 
with THE 
USA to 
occupy Iraq. 
While ISIS 
threatened 
the future of 
the Shia.   
The USA 
army was to 
remove 
Saddam so 
Al Sistani 
distanced 
himself from 
military 
resistance 
while ISIS 
came to 
remove the 
Shia. 
Al Sistani 
issued a 
Jihad Fatwa 
because he 
wanted to 
rid Iraq of a 
tyrant. While 
ISIS came 
to remove 
the Shia. 
America had 
the military 
capability for 
massive 
destruction. 
ISIS Always 
wanted to 
remove the 
Shia.  
Al Sistani 
did not have 
enough 
strength to 
face the 
Americans 
militarily. 
 Shia not 
target 
therefore Al 
Sistani did 
not issue 
Jihad Fatwa 
against the 
USA , but 
ISIS 
targeted the 
Shia. 
• Is this fatwa really against 
the Sunnis? 
Yes Yes No No No No 
• Does this fatwa interfere in 
the political affairs of Iraq? 
      
• Is this fatwa an agreement 
between Al Sistani and 
Iran? 
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Al Sistani and the forming 
of the new Iraqi 
government: 
 
• Did Al Sistani contribute to 
the ousting of al-Maliki from 
power? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
• Were Al Sistani’s 
interventions in politics 
justified? 
No No Yes Yes Yes No 
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Table 4.2 above shows a basic summary of answers to 6 of the interview 
questions. It can be seen from this table that patterns and themes can be found in 
the data. These are outlined in Tables 4.7-4.10. 
Table  0-3 Interview answers (A) from the female participants interviewed in Australia. 
QUESTIONS (A) 3  FEMALE PARTICIPANTS FROM AUSTRALIA 
The 2005 elections: 7FSuSt 8FShSt 9FSuHw 
• Was Al Sistani right when 
he invited Iraqis to 
participate in the 2005 
elections? 
No Yes Yes 
• Why did Al Sistani invite 
people to hold an election 
while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by 
terrorists? 
To let  Shia get power. To make Iraqis be self-
governing. 
To cause the Shia of Iraq to 
gain control and govern 
Iraq. 
• What is the difference 
between Al Sistani’s 
interventions and the 
doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih 
[the guardianship of the 
jurist, as proposed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini]? 
No difference.  No opinion.  Yes, there is a difference.  
• Do the Sunnis think that Al 
Sistani’s interventions in 
politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or  Shia clerics to 
obtain more power? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Regarding democracy  
• Does Al Sistani support 
democracy? 
No No No 
• What is the point of view of 
Shia clerics towards 
democracy? 
Not Supportive.  Not Supportive. Support.  
• Are the Iraqi people ready 
to become a democratic 
country? 
No No No 
• How satisfied are the 
different sects (overall) with 
Al Sistani ? 
Not Satisfied.  Satisfied. Satisfied. 
Table 4.3 above shows a basic summary of answers to 8 of the interview 
questions. It can be seen from this table that patterns and themes can be found in 
the data. These are outlined in Tables 4.7- 4.10. 
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Table  0-4 Interview answers (B) from the female participants interviewed in Australia. 
QUESTIONS (B) 3 FEMALE PARTICIPANTS FROM AUSTRALIA 
Al Sistani’s fatwa against 
ISIS 
7FSuSt 8FShSt 9FSuHw 
• Why did Al Sistani not 
issue a fatwa against the 
US when they occupied 
Iraq while he did issue a 
fatwa against ISIS? 
Because it will be like a 
suicide action, and he 
issued it against ISIS as 
they came to remove the 
Shia. 
He wanted to rid Iraq of 
Saddam. He issued it 
against ISIS because they 
target the Shia.   
Iraqi people cannot resist 
the US while he can do it 
against ISIS. 
• Is this fatwa really against 
the Sunnis? 
No Yes No 
• Does this fatwa interfere in 
the political affairs of Iraq? 
Yes No Yes 
• Is this fatwa an agreement 
between Al Sistani and 
Iran? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Al Sistani and the forming 
of the new Iraqi 
government: 
 
• Did Al Sistani contribute to 
the ousting of al-Maliki from 
power? 
N/a Yes Yes 
• Were Al Sistani’s 
interventions in politics 
justified? 
No Yes No 
Table 4.4 above shows a basic summary of answers to 6 of the interview 
questions. It can be seen from this table that patterns and themes can be found in 
the data. These are outlined in Tables 4.7-4.10. 
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Table  0-5 Interview answers (A) from the male participants interviewed in London. 
QUESTIONS (A) 5  LONDON PARTICIPANTS 
The 2005 elections: 10MShP 11MShCl 12MShCl 13MShP 14MShP 
• Was Al Sistani right when 
he invited Iraqis to 
participate in the 2005 
elections? 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
• Why did Al Sistani invite 
people to hold an election 
while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by 
terrorists? 
Al Sistani’s 
invitation for the 
Iraqis to host 
an election was 
a reaction 
against USA 
after they 
wanted to 
impose a new 
constitution 
without an 
election. 
The security 
situation was 
good, but the 
Sunni 
boycotted it 
because the 
truth would 
finally appear 
that Iraq had a 
larger 
population of 
Shia than 
Sunnis. 
Shia areas 
were unstable 
on the day of 
the election, but 
Al Sistani 
wanted to get 
from control 
from the USA 
by election. 
The Sunni 
areas were 
secure but the 
Sunni felt that 
the  Shia would 
gain power by 
the election. 
There are two 
real reasons 
firstly: Shia 
would win. 
Secondly: Iraq 
would align with 
a different set 
of countries 
which are 
predominantly 
Shia, such as 
Iran. 
• What is the difference 
between Al Sistani’s 
interventions and the 
doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih 
[the guardianship of the 
jurist, as proposed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini]? 
Yes, there is a 
difference. 
Yes, there is a 
difference. 
Yes, there is a 
difference. 
No opinion.  Yes, there is a 
difference. 
• Do the Sunnis think that Al 
Sistani’s interventions in 
politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or  Shia clerics to 
obtain more power? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regarding democracy  
• Does Al Sistani support 
democracy? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
• What is the point of view of  
Shia clerics towards 
democracy? 
Supportive. Supportive. Supportive. Supportive. Supportive. 
• Are the Iraqi people ready 
to become a democratic 
country? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
• How satisfied are the 
different sects (overall) with 
Al Sistani ? 
Very satisfied. Very satisfied. Very satisfied. Very satisfied. Satisfied. 
Table 4.5 above shows a basic summary of answers to 8 of the interview 
questions. It can be seen from this table that patterns and themes can be found in 
the data. These are outlined in Tables 4.7-4.10. 
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Table  0-6 Interview answers (B) from the male participants interviewed in London. 
QUESTIONS (B) 5 LONDON PARTICIPANTS  
Al Sistani’s fatwa against 
ISIS 
10MShP 11MShCl 12MShCl 13MShP 14MShP 
• Why did Al Sistani not 
issue a fatwa against the 
US when they occupied 
Iraq while he did issue a 
fatwa against ISIS? 
He does not 
want to support 
the Ba'ath party 
while he did it 
against ISIS 
because ISIS 
announced that 
they came to 
remove the  
Shia from 
power. 
The US was far 
more powerful. 
The people 
were tired from  
the economic 
blockade. And r 
Saddam was a 
criminal, so why 
would Al Sistani 
support him by 
issuing a Jihad 
Fatwa. ISIS 
wanted to 
destroy all holy 
places in Iraq.   
Al Sistani saved 
Iraq when he 
did not issue a 
fatwa in 2003 
because the 
Iraqi people at 
that time were 
not able to 
resist the 
occupying 
force. While 
ISIS come to 
kill all the  Shia 
in Iraq because 
they consider 
them not to be 
real Muslims.. 
The disparity of 
power between 
the USA and 
Iraq made Al 
Sistani not 
issued a fatwa 
while he did 
that against 
ISIS because  
Shia have 
ideological, 
religious and 
political 
differences with 
ISIS. 
Al Sistani could 
not issue as 
fatwa against 
the Americans 
because the  
Shia at that 
time were 
suffering from 
the rule of 
Saddam, while 
he did it against 
ISIS because 
they came to 
remove the  
Shia from 
power. 
• Is this fatwa really against 
the Sunnis? 
No No No No No 
• Does this fatwa interfere in 
the political affairs of Iraq? 
No No No No No 
• Is this fatwa an agreement 
between Al Sistani and 
Iran? 
No No - - No 
Al Sistani and the forming 
of the new Iraqi 
government: 
 
• Did Al Sistani contribute to 
the ousting of al-Maliki from 
power? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
• Were Al Sistani’s 
interventions in politics 
justified? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.6 above shows a basic summary of answers to 6 of the interview 
questions. It can be seen from this table that patterns and themes can be found in 
the data. These are outlined in Tables 4.7-4.10. 
The next section details patterns and themes emerging from the findings of all participant 
interviews.   
4.2.4 Themes emerging from the interviews 
The following tables have been created by reading and thinking about all the answers 
summarised in Tables 4.1-4.6. There are common themes or patterns that emerge from the 
answers, as detailed below.  
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Table  0-7 The 2005 elections: Patterns and Themes, all participants. 
The 2005 elections ALL PARTICIPANTS  
• Was Al Sistani right when 
he invited Iraqis to 
participate in the 2005 
elections? 
PATTERN: All 8 Shia said yes. 4 of the 5 Sunnis said no. the 1 Kurd said no. No patterns 
with the other variables. 
THEME: The Sunnis did not agree with Al Sistani. The Shia generally agreed.  
• Why did Al Sistani invite 
people to hold an election 
while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by 
terrorists? 
PATTERN: The Sunnis all believed this was so the Shia would get more power and control. 
The Shia’s had a mix of responses ranging from Al Sistani wanting to stop the US from 
having too much control to Al Sistani wanting the Shia to have more power. 
THEME: The Sunnis did not believe Al Sistani cared for their interests. 
• What is the difference 
between Al Sistani’s 
interventions and the 
doctrine of Wilayat al faqih 
[the guardianship of the 
jurist, as proposed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini]? 
PATTERN: Of the 5 Sunnis, 4 said no difference. Everyone else said there is at least some 
difference, but what that difference is varied. 
THEME: Only Sunnis believe there is a difference between Al Sistani’s interventions and 
the doctrine of Wilayat al faqih. 
• Do the Sunnis think that Al 
Sistani’s interventions in 
politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or Shia clerics to 
obtain more power? 
PATTERN: All participants except the Kurd and 1 Shia answered yes to this. 
THEME: Most agree that the Sunni see Al Sistani and Shia clerics as being motivated by 
power.  
Table 4.7 above shows common themes emerging from the participants answers 
to the interview questions. It can be seen from this table that there is a clear 
difference between how the Sunni view Al Sistani, and how the  Shia view him. 
The Shia support him and his actions while the Sunni believe he does not care for 
their interests and is motivated by power for himself and the Shi’s clerics. 
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Table  0-8 Regarding Democracy: Patterns and Themes, all participants. 
Regarding Democracy ALL PARTICIPANTS  
• Does Al Sistani support 
democracy? 
PATTERN: All those in London said yes. The three women and 2 of the Sunni men in 
Australia said no. No clear pattern except all women said no, and a total of nine said yes. 
THEME: Most of those interviewed felt that Al Sistani supported democracy. 
• What is the point of view of  
Shia clerics towards 
democracy? 
PATTERN: Four said he was not supportive, and three of these were among the 4 Sunni. 
THEME: Sunnis do not believe (or want to believe) that the Shia clerics are supportive of 
democracy. 
• Are the Iraqi people ready 
to become a democratic 
country? 
PATTERN: Five said no, and 4 of these were the Sunni who were interviewed.  
THEME: The  Shia believe it is good for Iraq to be a democratic country.  
• How satisfied are the 
different sects (overall) with 
Al Sistani ? 
PATTERN: Three of the 4 Sunnis were not satisfied. All other participants were. 
THEME: Sunnis are not satisfied with Al Sistani. 
Table 4.8 above shows common themes emerging from the participants answers 
to the interview questions. It can be seen from this table that the Sunni do not 
support Al Sistani and see his involvement in the politics of Iraq as ‘interference’, 
and the  Shia support Iraq being a democratic country. 
Table  0-9 Al Sistani’s Fatwa against ISIS: Patterns and Themes, all participants. 
Al Sistani’s Fatwa 
against ISIS 
ALL PARTICIPANTS 
• Why did Al Sistani not 
issue a fatwa against the 
US when they occupied 
Iraq while he did issue a 
fatwa against ISIS? 
PATTERN: No real pattern, except Shia supported this action, and Sunni felt it would be 
harmful for them. 
THEME: Sunni do not trust Al Sistani. 
• Is this fatwa really against 
the Sunnis? 
PATTERN: None. 
• Does this fatwa interfere in 
the political affairs of Iraq? 
PATTERN: Generally the answer was no, but the Sunni said yes. 
THEME: The Sunni believed Al Sistani was interfering in Iraq’s political affairs. 
• Is this fatwa an agreement 
between Al Sistani and 
Iran? 
All 5 Sunnis said yes. The Kurd and one Shia also said yes. 
THEME: The Sunni do not trust Al Sistani and believe he is working with Iran.  
Table 4.9 above shows common themes emerging from the participants answers 
to the interview questions. It can be seen from this table that the responses to the 
interview questions varied significantly according to whether the participants 
were Sunni or Shia. Generally, it is the Shia who trust Al Sistani, while the Sunni 
believe Al Sistani is working on an agenda that will only benefit the Shia’s and 
Iran. 
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Table  0-10 Al Sistani and the forming of the new Iraqi government: Patterns and Themes, all 
participants. 
Al Sistani and the 
forming of the new 
Iraqi government: 
ALL PARTICIPANTS 
• Did Al Sistani contribute to 
the ousting of al-Maliki from 
power? 
PATTERN: All except for 1 participant said yes. 
THEME: Al Sistani contributed to ousting al-Maliki from power. 
• Were Al Sistani’s 
interventions in politics 
justified? 
PATTERN: 4 of the 5 Sunni’s said no. All other participants said yes. 
THEME: The Sunni do not agree with the actions of Al Sistani. The Shi’ a do. 
Table 4.10 above shows common themes emerging from the participants answers 
to the interview questions. It can be seen from this table that the Sunni 
participants do not support Sistani. 
 
4.2.5 Narrative summaries of the answers of each participant. 
(1MSuJ): This participant is a male Sunni from Mosul, in the north of Iraq. During my 
interview with this person I felt that he considered Al Sistani to be a part of Iraq’s problems, 
and that the cleric should not have anything to do with policy. He also believed there is a 
conspiracy against the Sunni and that the election is an agreement between the Americans 
and Al Sistani to remove the Sunni from governance. He said: “I reject the intervention of Al 
Sistani in politics because he is biased [toward] his sect and to some of the Shia politicians 
[and] the people around him may hide some information and may change some things 
depending on the situation”. Moreover, he thought that Al Sistani implemented Iran’s plan in 
the region and all his interventions in policy were in agreement with Iran. (I thought perhaps 
he had been influenced by the media channels, and that it is normal to find Sunni people do 
not believe in Shia clerics actions because of sectarian problems that occurred after 2003). 
(2MSuSt) This Sunni man was a PhD student who did not support most of Al Sistani 
actions. He said he participated in the Iraqi elections from Australia because he believed there 
was no chance for Iraqis to rebuild their country just through an election, so he didn’t really 
care much about the elections. He believed that if Al Sistani supported democracy in Iraq it 
was only because for the elections, and that was so that the Iraqi people would have to bear 
the responsibility if any new government should fail. He also believed that not all Iraqi are 
ready for democracy because of the hunger, deprivation and siege during Saddam’s rule. And 
most politicians knew that if they opposed the views of Al Sistani they would be moved out 
of the political process.  
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(3MShP) This man had been living out of Iraq since 1994. He supported most of Al 
Sistani’s opinions and actions. He supported Al Sistani when he issued his fatwa against ISIS 
and he did not consider it as a sectarian action. He mentioned that in 2005 the sectarian war 
in Iraq was beginning and there were many car bombs exploded in Baghdad in areas 
inhabited by the Shia. But Al Sistani did not exploit this issue by issuing a Jihad Fatwa 
against Sunnis but always called for unity.  He said the purpose of the fatwa was to protect 
Sunni areas from ISIS and so that ISIS did not reach the Shia areas. He did not think that Al 
Sistani received orders from Iran regarding the fatwa against ISIS. He said, “I do not agree 
that the fatwa was issued with Iranian cooperation but there were common interests between 
the two countries”. He also agreed with Al Sistani regarding his fatwa to invite people to go 
to election. He believed that the Shia diaspora followed Al Sistani’s fatwa for two reasons. 
The first is to give legal legitimacy to the elected government in order to claim their rights, 
and the second reason was that the diaspora wanted to return to their country in order to 
participate in building the new Iraq. 
(4MShCl) This man is a cleric who had lived in Australia since 2000. He does not 
support all Al Sistani  opinions regarding Iraq. Regarding Al Sistani’s message for Al Maliki 
to step down he believed that Al Sistani was biased against Maliki because the community 
inside and outside of Iraq was against Al Maliki having a third term in office. He said Al 
Sistani wanted a change in governance but most of the corrupt officials remained. He said 
some of the acts of sabotage were nothing but revenge, and that the whole world saw how the 
popular mobilization forces helped the families who had been besieged. He believes that Al 
Sistani’s encouragement to people to go to election was good because it did not call his 
people to control the government by force, but by democratic means. He said the fatwa was a 
true expression of a Shia cleric wanting to practice democracy. 
(5MKuP) This Kurdish man was opposed to Saddam’s regime and left Iraq in 1991. He 
studied Islamic sciences, specialising in Sunni Islamic affairs. He agrees with many of Al 
Sistani’s views, even though he follows the Sunni doctrine and his ideas are very secular. He 
believed that Al Sistani does not believe in Wilayat al-Faqih because he did not want to 
obtain an official position in Iraq. He said Al Sistani knows that Iraq has different sects, not 
just Shia thus it is hard to apply the Wilayat al-Faqih principle. He also believes that the 
clergy should not enter politics because some clerics confuse their political programs with 
their religion.  Any criticism of these political programs then becomes a political issue and in 
Arab societies this can lead to the issuance of fatwas of murder and infidelity and apostasy 
against political opponents. He said Al Sistani did not support Al Maliki for a third term in 
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office because he feared that Al Maliki would become a dictator in the new Iraq. He said this 
is why most parties did not support Al Maliki for a third term. Finally, he said Al Sistani did 
not issue a fatwa in 2003 against the US because Al Sistani felt Iraq did not have enough 
strength to face the Americans militarily, and the Americans occupied Iraq to eliminate the 
system of government run by the Sunni.  
(6MSuSt) This Sunni man was a PhD student (in Mechanical Engineering) from Mosul 
who came to Australia in 2015. He did not support most of Al Sistani’s actions. Regarding 
the elections conducted in 2005 (6MSuSt) he believed that Al Sistani intervened too many 
times in politics. He said that the Shia politicians performed poorly and that Al Sistani was 
the main reason for their presence in the political process so he was responsible. He believed 
that Al Sistani does not believe in the democracy because he guides Iraq toward Iran in the 
application of many things such as the imposition of the veil and the isolation of males and 
females. Regarding Al Sistani fatwa, he said that some members of his special forces insulted 
this fatwa and carried out acts of reprisal. 
(7FSuSt): This Sunni participant was a PhD student from Baghdad who had lived 
through the sectarian crisis from 2005 until the end of 2008. She said this was one of the most 
difficult periods in the history of Iraq, with people killing each other just because their name 
indicated they were Shia or Sunni. She said was not influenced by the media but she was just 
presenting her ideas according to the reality supported by evidence. Like most Sunnis her 
thoughts were that the Shia and Al Sistani worked together to get power after 2003. About Al 
Sistani’s fatwa, she said: ‘There were a lot of areas unsafe, so it was wrong to hold elections 
[and] the election cannot be trusted because [Iraq] was under occupation and [it was known 
in advance that the Shi’s would win]’. She agreed with Al Sistani not issuing a fatwa against 
the USA in 2003, stating: ‘I supported Al Sistani when he did not issue a Jihad in 2003 
because if he did it would be like a suicide action because of the inequality of power between 
the USA and Iraq’. On the whole, she did not support the intervention of the clerics in politics 
and she believed the clerics should stay away from politics, because if they intervene that will 
make a gap between communities. 
(8FShST) This participant was a Shia woman and she did not support all Al Sistani’s 
actions regarding Iraqi issues because she believed that the clerics should not be involved in 
politics. She believed that “the separation of religion from politics is worthwhile and prevents 
the clergy from intervening. This is important because Iraq contains several sects and this 
may cause some sensitivity among these communities.  History does not suggest that Iraq 
could be governed by clerics. Al Sistani is Iranian yet he interfered in Iraqi issues. He did not 
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have sufficient authority to do that.” She also thought that Al Sistani issued the fatwa in 
agreement with Iran because Iran wanted to stop ISIS in Iraq and prevent them from getting 
into to Iran. She supported Al Sistani in not issuing a fatwa against the USA in 2003 and 
explained that, ‘Al Sistani did not issue a Jihad Fatwa because he wanted to rid Iraq of a 
tyrant (Saddam), and also because the economic embargo imposed on Iraq did not qualify it 
to do jihad against USA’. 
(9FSuHW) This Sunni woman is from the west of Iraq. She did not agree with Al 
Sistani’s opinions or actions, or his fatwa regarding the elections. She said his invitation was 
intended so that the Shia people would gain power and that nothing would change, because 
the Shias of Iraq made their plans with Al Sistani’s help to run Iraq after 2003, and also with 
the help of their alliance with Iran. All this was done to marginalize the role of the Sunnis in 
Iraq. She said it was because of this that the Sunnis boycotted the elections. She added that 
the election of 2005 was planned in advance so that the Shia of Iraq could gain control and 
govern Iraq. She said that Al Sistani took advantage of the situation to make the Shia rule. 
She said she felt Al Sistani did not believe in democracy because the term democracy 
includes freedom of religion. She also said about Al Sistani’s fatwa that: ‘I’m not in support 
of this fatwa because many of the popular mobilization forces were undisciplined [and] there 
were a lot of acts of sabotage and revenge.  This Fatwa has led to the killing and 
displacement of people and was a blatant interference in politics. In addition, many Iranians 
have come to Iraq under the pretext of a fatwa and taken a bad role.’   
(10MShP) This man is one of the important Iraqi figures who left Iraq in 1980 because 
of his opposition to Saddam's regime. He had a doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence and had 
many publications and works, and had a lot of information about the Shia clerics and their 
role since the establishment of the Iraqi government in 1921. He was in full agreement with 
all Al Sistani's proposals regarding his role in Iraq since 2003. He thinks that Al Sistani’s role 
saved Iraq from civil war because Al Sistani always calls for wisdom and sanity in dealing 
with problems. In explaining to me the opinions of westerns communities regarding Al 
Sistani interventions in Iraqi issues he said, ‘I met with western officials who said, ‘Despite 
all that happened to the Shi'ites Al Sistani showed statesmanship’."  He said Al Sistani is a 
man of peace and was not dragged into hasty reactions.  When I asked him about whether Al 
Sistani’s Jihad Fatwa was a type of intervention in politics he answered, ‘Yes, it is considered 
interference in politics [but] because the life of people [was] threatened with danger, so Al 
Sistani must issue a fatwa to protect people’. 
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(11MShCl): This participant is related to Al Sistani and has managed of all the Al 
Sistani offices in Europe. He thus offered perspectives that were created through working 
close to hand with logistical matters related to Al Sistani’s role in Iraq after 2003. It was 
anticipated that there would be a natural bias generated through close connection and 
position. His perspectives provide interest and contrast with the other participants as he had 
been sympathetic and in agreement with all of Al Sistani’s political interventions (as might be 
expected). He had been a link between the Al Sistani office in Najaf and all the diaspora in 
Europe... A specific view expressed by him states that, ‘The Dawa party failed in the 
management of the country during the eight-year rule of Al-Maliki and therefore contributed 
to the spread of administrative and economic corruption. Al Maliki believed himself to be the 
only one capable of running the country but he had failed in that. Al Sistani … as a cleric, has 
a well-established right to express his opinion in politics and give advice on what he sees as 
Iraq and the Iraqis interests and to maintain the unity of the country and avoid civil war.’ If I 
asked him for information that he did not have, he would ask one of his aides to provide 
further research about the matter. Regarding Iran’s influence on Al Sistani, he believed that 
no one was influencing Al Sistani’s opinion, even though Iranian politicians sometimes 
sought his advice. 
(12MShCl) This participant was able to provide perspectives based on close 
understanding and relationship with the Shia religious establishment and because he belongs 
to a family of clerics and he is the representative of one of highest Shia cleric in Iraq (al 
Khoei). He agreed with all of Al Sistani’s actions and he added more sources of information 
for this project. He did, however, criticize the performance of Iraqi politicians after 2003 and 
seemed to be unconvinced by them. He added that, ‘I did not go to any elections and I did not 
elect any candidate because I do not want to give my vote to people that I do not know or 
have not heard of.’ He also believed that what was planned for Iraq from the very beginning 
of 2003 was good, especially after Al Sistani's demand to hold elections had boosted the 
chances that Iraq would become a democratic country. But he added that ambitious 
politicians and conflicts between communities and the bloc parties made it difficult for Iraq to 
achieve this. Meetings with him were informative in that he had many views, perspectives 
and stories about clerical issues in Iraq. 
(13MShP) This participant is one of the politicians who came to Iraq in 2003 to 
participate in the new political process and he was influential in this political process. He has 
held many positions including Minister for various portfolios, and he has been a 
parliamentary deputy. He seemed well informed about Al Sistani and with a range of 
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perspectives developed from close association with the political process. I gauged that his 
particular Islamic background was influential in aligning opinions with those of Al Sistani, 
and he was thus a supporter of all Al Sistani interventions in politics. He believed the country 
was not ready for the 2005 election but that there was no way to be ready except through 
practice. He saw Al Sistani’s fatwa against ISIS as ‘a good chance to make Sunni and Shia 
fight together against one enemy which is ISIS”. As a politician, this participant provided 
political views and information about Al Sistani’s role in Iraq after 2003.  
(14MShP) This Shia participant is a well-known figure. He left Iraq in 1980 believing 
that secular decisions should be left in the hands of the state, but most of his views supported 
Al Sistani’s role in Iraq after 2003. He believes Al Sistani supports democracy and stated: 
“Democracy means elections by the people, and the exchange of authority by peaceful 
means. Al Sistani is not a secular person or politician but Al Sistani has ideas close to 
democracy so he believes in pluralism and freedom for all religions including Christianity.”  
He felt that Al Sistani’s role was to let people depend on democratic means and to let the 
people decide their fate. He also supported Al Sistani decision in asking Al Maliki to step 
down mentioning that, “During the reign of Al Maliki, Iranian influence over Iraq had 
increased dramatically so Al Sistani wanted to stop this influence by replacing Al Maliki with 
a new Prime Minister acceptable to Iraqis and the international community.”   
4.3 DATA SAMPLES FROM THE MEDIA  
A range of texts have been explored and read throughout this study. Much literature on this 
and related topics were investigated. What was thought to be most relevant has been 
presented in the Literature Review in Chapter Three, as well as in various other parts of this 
thesis. In this section, further sources are presented in order to obtain different perspectives 
about Al Sistani’s views, opinions, stances and thoughts.  
The first research question is: To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as 
a cleric with political influence? Do they approve of his approach to political intervention? 
The following extracts are, quoted in detail, as they are relevant to this question. They 
indicate the kind of media texts that have expressed influential views in Iraq and are 
presented here for the purpose of later discussion and refence. 
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Teaching Iraq freedom: how Ayatollah Al Sistani 
inspired unity and nationalism   
(Shakdam, 2016)  
Plagued by the poison the Black Flag army has dispensed onto the land, Iraq 
remains a nation very much at war – fragmented in its lands, torn apart in its 
ethno-sectarian make-up, occupied still by the powers that be, that and won’t let 
go, Iraq has not yet spoken its last. 
If Iraq does not yet breathe peace and unity, it is nevertheless learning to 
think, and imagine itself the nation-state it always was, and forgot to be – all 
because one of Shiite Islam most devoted sons held vigil in Najaf. 
For those who know their history, and recognize in Najaf both the capital city 
of Islam’s First Imam, and the resting place of Islam’s greatest martyr – the very 
soul the last prophet of God raised upon his blessed shoulders so that he, Ali ibn 
Abutalib would reach to the Heavens, Najaf seems indeed an evident choice. 
If Kufa was indeed Imam Ali’s political capital, it is Najaf he chose for his 
last resting place … after murderous hands dared raised a sword against Islam’s 
Sword. 
A holy city among holy cities, a beacon of hope, salvation and true 
allegiance, Najaf has always stood an island over the tumult of worldly affairs, a 
shrine, and a protection against the pettiness of men. There, behind the walls of 
its mosques, its schools and its libraries, the greatest religious minds of our ages 
have flourished and shun forth a light, which time only elevated, never to dim. 
A jewel of Shia Islam, Najaf sits a beating spiritual light – a symbol of time 
long gone, a reminder of a leadership lost, a witness to the Words, a custodian 
still to Ahlulbayt tradition, a keeper of the oath once given. 
A city of Islam, Najaf bows to no one but God. A city of Islam, Najaf guards 
the shrine of Islam’s First Imam, he, who stands the gate to Knowledge itself.  
It is there, in Najaf, the city which witnessed the last breath of our Imam, that 
a teacher would come and forever change the fate of Iraq. Fate would have it, that 
his own mind was moulded to the teachings of yet another brilliant son of Najaf, 
Ayatollah Abul Qasim al-Khoei. 
In hindsight, it seems only natural. In hindsight it appears evident that just as 
Najaf towered over the Islamic world under the leadership of Imam Ali, for his 
faith was true, and bore no equal; that, as hordes descend onto Iraq to swallow 
Islam whole, Imam Ali’s followers would oppose a resistance, and a might only 
Najaf could inspire. 
From his religious retreat in Najaf, a quiet figure in Iraq’s broken socio-
political landscape, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani has risen as a giant among the 
people, together a guide and an inspiration for those who still hold Freedom as 
their God given right. 
But how much is actually known of the Grand Ayatollah’s role in inspiring 
Iraq back to unity? What knowledge do we truly entertain of the cleric, who 
singlehandedly demonstrated what true Resistance can achieve, when anchored in 
Islam? 
While Ayatollah Al Sistani’s character differ from that of Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, the forefather of Iran Islamic Revolution, in both those clerics it is 
Shia Islam purest voice which speaks – it is the teachings of Imam Ali, Imam al-
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Hasan, and Imam al-Husayn which echo still; each to its own particular light, but 
all from the same source. 
But how could one man imprint so much onto a country? A country at war at 
that … 
For a secular mind such a question remains impenetrable. To those who 
understand and know Islam for the wisdom it offers, the ethical model it 
champions, and the Freedom it fiercely guards, and forever strive to promote, 
Ayatollah Al Sistani’s role in pulling Iraq out of the precipice it was heading 
toward, was easily foreseeable. 
There is great power in Islam, and much of its source is rooted in the very 
Resistance which the Prophet Muhammad presented, and which his progeny then 
lived by, and for. 
A man of God whose life purpose has been to serve the divine, and the divine 
alone, Ayatollah Al Sistani has inspired generations of men, and women to reach 
further out from their station, so that they would also find purpose in their 
submission to God. There lies concept seculars and liberals fail to grasp. 
A Justice onto the world Islam offers Freedom in Submission to God. But 
there could never be real Freedom without absolute Submission, and only through 
Submission can one rise truly free. 
Freedom comes at a cost though – just as submission does, since one can only 
bow to God’s will and find Liberty in the exercise of His Commands. It is from 
this desire to serve God which resistance was first born. 
Resistance in Islam is first enounced in Muslims’ declaration of faith, when 
testament is made that there is only One God, and that Muhammad is His prophet. 
Behind those words lies a Truth which suffers no association, no challenge, no 
contention. In the service of this Truth, and this ideal, Resistance is worship … 
and worship becomes an act of Resistance. 
It is Ayatollah Al Sistani’s faith, his submission, his devotion, and his 
strengthen dedication to Islam’s purest tradition which allowed for Resistance to 
rise a rampart once more against those who seek destruction as their daily bread. 
Before the evil of Daesh, before the clamours of those new Kharijites, 
Ayatollah Al Sistani offered but the certainty of a life spent in Islam’s light. 
It was his call which millions answered as if one.  It is under his impetus that 
Iraq was pulled from the abyss. 
It is his voice, his rallying cry, and the trust he put in all Iraqis which echoed 
a fierce wind of resistance throughout the scorched nation. If Iraq fell an orphan 
to the clutch of Wahhabism, it is as a free, united nation it rose against its 
invaders. 
Beyond creeds, ethnicities and political affiliations, Iraq was forged once 
more before the shrine of its Imam. And while it was Ali’s followers again who 
answered first the call of their brethren, it is Iraq as a united, yet pluralist body 
which pledged its allegiance to the flag. 
Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani’s commands it needs to be said, came not by way of 
force, or obligation – but injunction. 
A servant of Shia Islam, it is the Grand Ayatollah’s respect of men’s innate 
freedom of choice which compelled millions. 
A leader at the service of his people … of all people, it is ultimately 
Ayatollah Al Sistani’s character which commanded respect, called for loyalty, 
and inspired true nationalism. 
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A light today has been awaken in Najaf … a light similar to that which was 
brought forth to Iran … the same light which has defined, fed, and sustained 
Islam: Justice. 
Obama Sent a Secret Letter to Iraq’s Top Shiite Cleric 
(Slavin, 2010) 
President Obama has sent a letter to Iraq’s top Shiite Muslim cleric, Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, urging him to prevail upon Iraq’s squabbling politicians 
to finally form a new government, an individual briefed by relatives of the 
reclusive religious leader said Thursday. 
The individual, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the 
topic, said the information came from members of Al Sistani’s family in the 
Iranian holy city of Qom, where Al Sistani maintains a large complex of 
seminaries, libraries, clinics, and other humanitarian organizations. 
Iraqi factions have sought in vain since the March 7 parliamentary elections 
to agree on a government to replace that of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The 
impasse is of increasing concern to the United States as it draws down its forces 
to 50,000 and relinquishes a combat role at the end of this month. There have 
been a number of violent incidents in Iraq in recent weeks including bombings 
and shootings that have raised questions about the country’s future stability. 
(Fifteen Iraqis died Thursday; 53 were killed on Wednesday, according to media 
reports.) 
In a speech Aug. 2 before disabled veterans, Obama reiterated that the U.S. 
mission in Iraq is changing "from a military effort led by our troops to a civilian 
effort led by our diplomats." In this new phase, the Iraqis are to assume overall 
responsibility for the country’s security, with U.S. intervention in limited 
circumstances to conduct counter-terrorism operations and to protect Americans. 
U.S. forces will also continue to train Iraqis and monitor Iraqi air space. 
Mike Hammer, spokesman for the White House National Security Council, 
would not confirm or deny that Obama had sent the letter to Al Sistani . 
"We do not comment on Presidential correspondence," Hammer wrote in an 
email Thursday. 
The letter was delivered to Al Sistani by a Shiite member of the Iraqi 
parliament, according to the source briefed by Al Sistani relatives. He did not 
identify the individual. 
Daniel Serwer, an Iraq expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, said that to his 
knowledge Al Sistani has never met with a sitting U.S. official — or at least not 
acknowledged doing so. 
The Al Sistani -linked source said the letter was sent shortly after Vice 
President Joseph Biden visited Baghdad over the July 4 weekend and failed to 
bring about a resolution of the dispute. Biden said at the time that he was 
"optimistic" that a new government would be formed and that the problems Iraq 
faced were "not a lot different" than that facing other countries with 
parliamentary systems. 
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The second research question is: Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special 
hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the 
rest of the world? The following extracts are samples of relevant material 
involved in the textual analysis: 
Al Sistani’s critics want greater activism in Iraqi politics 
(Mamouri, 2014c)  
Under his religious leadership, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani has 
been committed to moderation and has treated with tact and wisdom the situation 
in Iraq, which may ignite with each crisis, small or large. However, it gradually 
became apparent that Al Sistani’s behaviour does not appeal to some Islamist 
currents, because he did not succumb to their political agenda. 
Al Sistani has been heavily criticized by some Sunni and Shiite parties for not 
supporting resistance movements against the Americans when they were in Iraq 
and for not entering the sectarian conflict in favour of one side against another. 
But these criticisms were usually directed at him by Islamist parties or groups 
from outside the religious establishment. This time, however, the criticism is 
coming from within the religious establishment, and from those in the same 
Islamist trend. 
Sheikh Mohammed al-Yacoubi, the religious leader of the Al-Fadilah 
(Virtue) Party, which is part of the Iraqi government, has scathingly attacked Al 
Sistani in a series of speeches over the past month. Yacoubi considered Al Sistani 
hostile to what’s right, called him the pharaoh of the times and considered his 
positions a betrayal of the Shiites. 
The reason for all this is that Al Sistani did not cave to the demands of 
religious parties to establish a religious state applying Sharia in Iraq. Al Sistani 
had recently rejected the Jaafari personal status law because it included violations 
of human rights, rights of other sects and rights of religious minorities. 
Historically, criticisms against Al Sistani  started from the early 1990s, when 
a political current within the Najaf hawza (Shiite seminary) opposed the 
traditional approach, which was represented and led by Al Sistani . That current 
received indirect support by the former Iraqi regime because it represented an 
Arab religious reference against the traditional Shiite current, which was often of 
Iranian origins. That trend later became known as the Sadrist movement, named 
after its founder Mohammad al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father. 
The phrase “the silent hawza” was made famous by Mohammad al-Sadr as he 
criticized Al Sistani’s approach, who preferred to work in a calm way and deal 
wisely with the overall situation instead of taking revolutionary positions. In 
contrast, Sadr used the “vocal hawza” approach, which adopted a revolutionary 
discourse in leading the Shiite community. 
The conflict continued after the regime’s fall. Muqtada al-Sadr adopted his 
father’s discourse in dealing with the US occupation, as he put it. But gradually, 
and especially after the US troops left Iraq, the rift between Muqtada al-Sadr and 
Al Sistani’s followers was reduced significantly. That was helped by Al Sistani’s 
positive role in resolving the crisis that took place between Sadr’s followers and 
US forces in Najaf in 2004. 
Some groups remained separate from the main Sadrist current regarding their 
anti-Al Sistani attitudes. The most prominent of these groups is the Virtue Party, 
led by Yacoubi, one of Mohammad al-Sadr’s followers. There are also militias 
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that broke away from the Sadrist movement, joined the Iranian side and 
considered themselves not bound by Al Sistani’s orders but affiliated with the 
supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The most prominent of these 
groups is Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. 
The position of the Iranian regime has not been welcoming of Al Sistani 
since he became a religious leader until the fall of Saddam in 2003. Yet, the 
situation later changed because of the key and visible role played by Al Sistani in 
managing the situation in Iraq in general and the leadership of the Shiite 
community in particular. 
There is another extreme Shiite current known as the Shirazi current, 
which criticizes Al Sistani  because of his call for affection and closeness with the 
Sunnis and for opposing violations carried out against their sanctities by Shiite 
extremists. 
When searching for a reaction to the criticisms from within or outside the 
religious establishment, it is very difficult to find any position by Al Sistani 
himself, his office or his followers. That is because Al Sistani has followed the 
policy of silence and indifference for things that are not crucial, especially those 
that may cause strife and conflict. Al Sistani also ordered his office to not issue 
any statement or declaration in such situations, according to what a source close 
to Al Sistani told Al-Monitor. 
Al Sistani’s moderate and tolerant positions have made him a man of peace 
and a safety valve in Iraq. Yet, despite that, many fear that his discourse has 
become inaudible to the decision-makers in the country. On the other hand, many 
worry about what will happen when Al Sistani departs, as there are schemes by 
his rivals to acquire the Shiite leadership in Najaf after Al Sistani’s departure.   
 
The third research question is: How does Al Sistani himself see his role? The following 
extracts are samples of relevant material involved in the textual analysis: 
Ayatollah Sistani urges Iraq to protect Kurds amid tensions 
(T.V, 2017) 
Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani has called on the government to 
protect the Kurdish population in the north amid rising tensions between Baghdad and Iraq’s 
secessionist Kurds. 
Ayatollah Al Sistani’s call was issued at the Friday prayer in the holy city of 
Karbala by one of his representatives, Reuters reported. 
According to Iraq’s Alforat News Agency, Ayatollah Al Sistani called the 
presence of the Iraqi forces in Kirkuk a victory for all Iraqis. 
Ayatollah Al Sistani also warned against any retaliatory moves, and urged 
Kurdish leaders to cooperate with the federal government on the basis of Iraqi 
law. 
Ayatollah Al Sistani stated that the country’s Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens 
had to move shoulder to shoulder towards resolving standing problems. 
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Earlier in the day, security said Iraqi forces took control of the last district in 
the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, which was still in the hands of Kurdish 
Peshmerga militants following a three-hour battle. 
Forces partaking in the operation to recapture Altun Kupri comprised Iraqi 
Counter Terrorism Service units, Shia-dominated Popular Mobilization Unites 
and the Federal Police. 
The Peshmergas withdrew from the district after battling the advancing Iraqi 
troops with machineguns, mortars, and rocket propelled grenades, security 
sources said, according to the agency. 
The district, known as Perde in Kurdish, lies on the road between the city of 
Kirkuk, the province’s capital, which had been returned to government control on 
Monday, and Erbil, the capital of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan in the 
country’s north. 
Kurdish forces had been holding parts of Iraqi territory since 2014, when the 
Takfiri terror group of ISIS began an offensive across Iraq. The Kurds joined the 
fight and began overrunning territory in the process. 
The Baghdad government had long insisted that the Kurds pull out of the 
territories they had overrun. But the Kurdish militants had refused. 
The oil-rich Kirkuk Province, which lies only partly within Kurdistan’s 
borders, voted in a September 25 referendum on Kurdistan’s separation from 
Iraq. 
The referendum was held despite strong opposition from the central 
government in Baghdad, the international community, and Iraq’s neighbouring 
countries, especially Turkey and Iran. 
Ayatollah Al Sistani had also voiced opposition to the referendum. He had 
warned against the unfavorable repercussions of separation and division in the 
Iraqi nation, stressing that this would pave the way for foreign interference in the 
affairs of the country. 
Following the vote, Baghdad imposed a ban on direct international flights to 
the Kurdish region and called for a halt to its independent crude oil sales 
(Economist, 2017). 
 
Iraq's Most Influential Man Gets Pulled Back Into 
Politics 
(Kaplow, 2014) 
The most influential man in Iraq has been speaking up again after a period of 
relative quiet. It's not Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, or the head of the ISIS 
militants who are taking over much of the west and north of the country. It's an 
aged cleric, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, who can be compared to 
something like a pope for the country's majority Shiite Muslims. 
He stays out of the limelight, rarely meets with Westerners and doesn't do 
interviews. But he has generally been a calming influence and often helpful to 
U.S. efforts in Iraq. 
One scene I remember from covering Iraq was a large bombing at a Shiite 
shrine in Baghdad. I saw a group of angry men arguing amid the shattered glass 
and debris along the main street. They were calling out for action, presumably 
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revenge against Sunni Muslims whose partisans were responsible for the blast. 
Finally, a man at the centre of the crowd reminded them that they could not 
respond without the direction of the Shiite religious hierarchy, meaning  
Al Sistani’s , who had been consistently preaching for restraint. That 
immediately quieted the crowd. 
Sometimes, people compare Shiites to Catholics, who have the Vatican for 
guidance. 
 
A Call To Arms 
Iraqis talked about how Al Sistani lives in a simple home in a small alleyway 
in the holy city of Najaf, and talked of his supreme Islamic scholarship. You'd 
hear about them making visits to him to wish him well or seek his advice on some 
personal matter. 
Al Sistani’s influence has lessened some since, amid the chaos the country 
has experienced. But in the past two weeks, he has emerged to address the dire 
crisis facing the country amid the militant Sunni extremist surge. The Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria, the group leading the onslaught, targets Shiites directly in 
many cases. 
Through his statements and spokesmen, Al Sistani called last week for the 
formation of a new government that would unite the nation — an apparent 
reference to Maliki's failure to win the trust of Sunnis and Kurds. And the week 
before that, Al Sistani issued a call to arms — telling able-bodied men to rush to 
the aid of the failed armed forces. 
"Whoever is capable of holding a weapon and fighting the terrorists," Al 
Sistani’s statement read, "must volunteer his name in the security forces in this 
sacred goal." 
 
Influential Edicts 
Al Sistani’s website offers advice on family and social issues (for example, 
abortion is prohibited unless the mother faces grave danger or unbearable 
difficulty continuing the pregnancy). But he has also weighed in at crucial times 
since the U.S. occupation of Iraq (he spent years effectively under house arrest 
during the rule of Saddam Hussein). 
Here's some background on the man and the role Al Sistani has played. 
Al Sistani , who's 84 years old, according to his official biography, is Iranian 
born. But he does not adhere to the view of top clerics in Iran that clergy should 
also be political figures. Al Sistani’s more traditional "Quietist" strain encourages 
distance between the clergy and government. But he has spoken out when 
national unity was threatened or when it looked like long-persecuted Shiites were 
on the verge of a communal setback. 
In 2003, Al Sistani’s call for quick elections forced U.S. officials to scrap 
plans for a long period of rule by leadership in effect appointed by the U.S. It was 
a major change of course that gave Iraqis — primarily the Shiite majority — a 
voice at the ballot. Al Sistani also urged people to vote. 
Iraqi officials made frequent pilgrimages to his home in Najaf to consult on 
everything, from whether he would object to their candidacy for office to helping 
urge Iraqis to conserve electricity. As the Iraqi Shiite leadership became 
increasingly plagued by complaints of corruption and abuse, their popularity 
dropped and Al Sistani took more of a back seat. Some speculated that he felt 
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burned by his association with the leaders. He also made at least one trip to 
London for extended medical treatment. 
But he used his authority and representatives to, at times, settle rivalries 
between Shiite militias that often turned bloody and threatened to spiral. 
 
 
A Call For Unity 
Now, his statements concerning the new Sunni uprising highlight the 
country's desperate situation, one that surely distresses the elderly cleric. 
"The father should urge his son, the mother urge her son, and the wife urge 
her husband to be brave in saving this country and its people," he ordered in the 
June 13 statement. 
Then, possibly because that was seen as too sectarian, Al Sistani had more to 
say Friday. "Our call last Friday was for all Iraqi citizens, not for a particular 
sect," the edit stated. 
Then Al Sistani appeared to focus on the Shiite leadership, widely criticized 
for marginalizing the minority Sunnis. He called for the leaders to adhere to the 
schedule required in forming a new government after the April parliamentary 
elections. This government, he wrote, should "avoid past mistakes and open new 
horizons toward a better future for all Iraqis  (Kaplow, 2014)." 
 
Ayatollah Al Sistani lends a quiet guiding voice to Iraq 
(Morris, 2010) 
In the winding back streets of Najaf lives a man who with one utterance could 
make or break any candidate in tomorrow's Iraqi elections. Millions of loyal 
followers in Iraq, and Shiites across the world, look to Grand Ayatollah Ali Al 
Sistani as a marja, or reference, for guidance in every aspect of their lives. Frail 
and nearing 80, he rarely leaves his villa and never speaks to the press or in 
public, but Al Sistani remains arguably the most influential figure in Iraq. 
His announcements and fatwas have dictated the shape of Iraq's democratic 
system since the 2003 invasion, and are closely followed by most of Iraq's 15 
million Shiites, who make up about 60 per cent of the population. He has forced 
Iraq's American occupiers to abruptly change course and has forced Iraq's warring 
forces into finding compromises. However, he has steadfastly refused to give any 
backing to any candidate or party, despite many desperate attempts by Iraqi 
politicians to appear connected to him in any way. Instead, Ayatollah Al Sistani 
has served as something of a national conscience, urging Iraqis to cast their 
ballots, calling it their duty, saying that to not do so "will give others a chance to 
realise their illegitimate goals". 
There are four marjas in Najaf, but Al Sistani is the most directly involved in 
politics. His edicts, however, tend to cover the wider process rather than the 
policy of any particular party. "Sayed Al Sistani has encouraged the political 
process and elections since the first day after regime change, but he also respects 
the views and will of the Iraqi people," said Sheikh Faed Noon, president of the 
Najaf provincial council. 
All Shiites adopt a marja al taqlid, which translates to "object of emulation", a 
senior religious cleric whose rulings they follow. Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani has 
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the largest following of any marja in Iraq or the world. The power of his words 
was demonstrated when he successfully negotiated an end to the bloody clashes 
between supporters of the militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army 
and US forces in Najaf in 2004. 
However, to give an endorsement to one political party would mean the cleric 
"would be considered to belong to them, and would contradict his role as a marja 
for everyone", said Sheikh Noon. He said Ayatollah Al Sistani’s political 
statements always have the concerns of the Iraqi people at heart. When calling on 
citizens to vote, the cleric said Iraqis should pick "the best and the most 
concerned with Iraq's interests at present and in the future". 
It is discreet, indirect, political action born of the most significant ideological 
split among Shiites. Najaf scholars prefer the "quietist" view, that clerics should 
be removed from the day-to-day political scene, and rather work as observers, to 
keep responsible officials in check. This school of thought is in stark contrast to 
the theory of Waliyat al Faqih, or the guardianship of the jurisprudent, which has 
been the basis of the regime in neighbouring Iran. 
"Those that follow Waliyat al Faqih believe that a marja can take a different 
role, a direct role in the nitty-gritty of politics," said Hojjat al Islam Mohammed 
Hussein, the son and spokesman for Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sayed 
Hakeem, another of Najaf's senior religious leaders. "For us that's not 
acceptable." Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the primary proponent of Wilayat 
al Faqih, arguing that clerics must have a direct political role in the running of 
government. 
The idea has divided the Shiite scholars of Najaf and Qom, the centre for 
Shia religion in Iran. Yet despite his more removed role, Ayatollah Al Sistani has 
made his voice heard during any disputes with US policy in Iraq, and without him 
the post-invasion political history of the country would look very different. In the 
summer of 2003, Paul Bremer was planning for the Iraqi Constitution to be 
penned by US appointees, but Ayatollah Al Sistani issued a fatwa saying only an 
elected body could write the constitution, and America bent to accommodate his 
views. 
When in 2003 the US pushed for a political system based on regional 
caucuses, the cleric issued a statement saying elections would be the best way for 
a transitional government to be formed. Most recently, as parliament wrangled 
over the new election law, Ayatollah Al Sistani came out in favour of an open list 
system, where voters can cast their ballots for an individual rather than a closed 
party list, the system under which tomorrow's elections will be held. 
The pictures of the wispy bearded, black turbaned ayatollah that adorn the 
streets of Najaf show the extent of the people's reverence. At Babil University, 
30km north of Najaf, where all political posters are banned, a huge banner with 
Ayatollah Al Sistani’s call to vote still takes up a prominent space on campus. 
"It's our duty to vote, Sayed Al Sistani’s words will change the minds of any who 
doubt it," said Ibrahim Ali, a Shiite geography student.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarised the findings of this research based on interview data and has 
also presented data collected from media reports. Of course, due to the large amount of data 
uncovered in both forms of collection there is only room for a summary in this chapter. The 
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following chapters contain analyses based on all the data gathered during the interviews (of 
which the contents of this chapter is a summary), as well as more detailed textual analyses. 
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Chapter 5:  The first post war election after the 
regime and Al Sistani’s fatwa  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In analysing data related to the first research question, this chapter explores and discusses the 
2005 election where Al Sistani intervened and pronounced his well-known fatwa, telling 
Iraqis to accept this election and to vote. The question raised is – what was the reaction of the 
Iraqi people?  
This, the first of the analysis chapters, focuses on the first research question: To what 
extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political influence? (Do they 
approve of his approach to political intervention?). The analysis is based on the findings from 
interviews conducted with the participants, and analysis of written data stemming either 
directly from Al Sistani, or through his organisations.  
5.1.1 Chapter content 
This chapter provides an overview of the situation in Iraq at the time. In doing so it offers 
more background on the Sunni Iraqis, their beliefs regarding the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
The purpose is to shed light on the perceptions of both the Sunnis and the Shia. Further 
background material in this chapter also provides information on the impact on Iraq’s 
neighbours of the elections. Importantly I begin with an examination of the Sunni boycott of 
the election, providing insight on their views of Al Sistani and his actions. 
The chapter then explores and analyses Al Sistani’s motivations in discussing if the 
Shia were his only interest. The research also turns to the diaspora’s response to Al Sistani’s 
actions – in other words the views of the research participants. 
Before a discussion which brings the whole chapter together, Al Sistani’s own official 
reason for the fatwa is explained. The chapter concludes with a detailed summary in 
preparation for the following chapter, which further explores findings relevant to the first 
research question. Please note, the analysis for each section includes a textual analysis where 
relevant. 
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5.1.2 The link between this chapter and the research questions 
This chapter explores the following research question: 
Q 1: To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? Do they approve of his approach to his own political influence?  
The chapter discusses findings based on an analysis (where relevant) of interview questions 
including the following:  
 Was Al Sistani right when he invited Iraqis to participate in the 2005 elections? 
 Why did Al Sistani invite people to hold an election while Sunni provinces were 
being attacked by terrorists? 
 Do the Sunnis think that Al Sistani’s interventions in politics are an attempt by Al 
Sistani or Shia clerics to obtain more power? 
 Does Al Sistani support democracy? 
 What is the point of view of Shia clerics towards democracy? 
 Why did Al Sistani not issue a fatwa against the US when they occupied Iraq 
while he did issue a fatwa against ISIS? 
 Were Al Sistani’s interventions in politics justified? 
5.2 BACKGROUND: THE FIRST POST REGIME ELECTION OF 2005  
On the thirtieth of January 2005, millions of Iraqi citizens went to the polls to participate in 
the first democratic legislative election taking place in Iraq after the political change in 2003. 
The elections were held in an country which was suffering from acts of terrorism such as 
bombings, particularly in Iraq’s capital, Baghdad. These elections took place despite a Sunni 
boycott that was in place. The Iraqis – other than the Sunnis – considered these elections, 
which marked an important turning point in the history of Iraq, as showing the first 
democratic exercise in Iraq modern history. As mentioned in the literature review, Al Sistani 
was the first major influential Iraqi to invite the people of the nation to participate in an 
election. He made this invitation to the people of Iraq by introducing a fatwa which is 
considered an action of major significance to Muslims. It was Al Sistani’s belief that having 
an election was the beginning of Iraqis making their own decisions rather than having an 
occupying force dictate their lives. Many questions are addressed in this chapter. These 
include; 
 Why did the Sunni boycott the elections and not follow Al Sistani’s fatwa?  
 Is it because of ideological differences between the Sunni and Shia sects, or because 
of the security situation?  
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 Did the security situation in the Sunni majority areas in Iraq make it too dangerous for 
the Sunni to participate in the elections?   
 Were the Sunni people ready to partake in the elections after they lost their power 
during the 2003 Ba’ath regime fall?  
 Was the Fatwa by Al Sistani an attempt for the Shia to gain power or some other kind 
of control over Iraq as there are more Shia in the population than Sunnis?  
 Why did Iraqis living outside of Iraq follow Al Sistani’s fatwa as some of them have 
been outside the nation for decades?  
 Did the governments of Iraq’s neighbouring countries pay much attention to this 
election, particularly in regard to which sect would win and take political power?  
 Did this election affect neighbouring countries? Did the neighbouring countries raise 
any concerns that if the Shia won the election, they would form an alliance with Shia 
dominated countries particularly in Syria and Iran?  
5.2.1 Who are the Sunni Iraqis? 
This section purposefully discusses the background and beliefs of the Sunni as details about 
Shia beliefs and attitudes are presented and come to light through discussions surrounding Al 
Sistani. Importantly, Al Sistani being Shia means that the Sunni are not automatically his 
followers   
Sunni Arabs are the second largest religious sect in Iraq after the Shia. The Sunnis in 
Iraq were in power from 1921 to 2003, as a result of frequent wars and judgments, especially 
with the neighbouring countries of Iran and Kuwait. Civil and internal wars had a large part 
in the Sunni’s dominance (Uloom, 2009). After the elections of 2005, the divisions between 
the Sunnis and the Shia (or Shiites) became greater and this led to disputes between Sunni 
leaders.  Most of these growing divisions were ethnic, political and geographical and within 
the Sunni community only (Bengio & Litvak, 2014). Sunnis have variety  political goals, 
with some secular, highly nationalistic ex-Baathists in favour of restoring a strong, 
centralized state (Ze’evi, 2007). Not all Sunni Arabs support a Sunni-led insurgency, but 
some are members of the insurgency and sympathetic to the insurgents’ goals and their 
violent methods. Others are more religious, parochial, and motivated by tribal interests 
(Baram, 2010). 
Most Sunni Arabs reside in central Iraq, including the so-called Sunni Triangle, an area 
that stretches northwest of Baghdad and encompasses insurgent strongholds like Tikrit 
(Saddam’s hometown), Ramadi, Samarra, and Fallujah. At least half of Iraq’s Sunni 
community live in cities such as Baghdad or Mosul, and form the backbone of Iraq’s 
educated middle class, working as lawyers, doctors, and bureaucrats (Tripp, 2007). Because 
Saddam’s Ba’ath Party emphasized a socialist, non-religious Iraq state, most Sunnis are 
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secular. Many of these Sunnis say the constitution offers too much authority to sharia, or 
Islamic law, which is favoured by Iraq’s highly influential Shia clerics (Marr, 2009).  
Politically, Arab Sunnis in Iraq suffered from a political vacuum post 2003. Most Sunni 
leaders belong to the Iraqi army and the Baath party which was dissolved by Paul Bremer 
(US civil administrator after 2003. Following this, ‘Influential Sunni clerics branded Iraq's 
election as illegitimate’ and the Sunni clerics issued a fatwa not to participate in the elections 
of 2005 (Shukla, 2005, p. 154). This predicament was the outcome of rivalries between local 
communities (Tripp, 2007). Externally, the Sunni distrust the central government led by Shias 
and they do not believe that Baghdad represents their interests. This is why they boycotted 
the election. As well as this, the Sunni had no one significant leader to take them into the 
future, therefore their confusion became evident in the political arena (Allawi, 2008; Bremer, 
2006; Mansour, 2016).  
One participant in this study, 1MSuJ, is an Iraqi Sunni citizen who witnessed the 2005 
elections and took part in the vote. He said that, ‘We were in Mosul. We did not know most 
of the Iraqi politicians who were running for office after the 2003 fall of the Ba’ath regime, 
so it was hard for us to elect someone we had no knowledge about.’ Another participant, 
7FSuSt, stated that, ‘As women we could not take part in this election because we did not 
know the political history of those running for office so it was difficult to trust the political 
process run by people we did not know.’ 
After 2003 the Sunni Ulama’s (Sunni clerics) legal role was subsumed by the state and 
jurists became judges by political appointment (al-Kifaee, 2010). The Sunni jurist’s authority 
was derived from the state and owed little to his actual credentials as a scholar. Religion and 
politics were integrated and the line separating them blurred. It was different with the Shia. 
Their Ulama’s stood apart from a Sunni-dominated state. As a persecuted majority, the Shias 
had had no involvement in official politics and their system of jurisprudence was founded 
outside of politics. Now their existence became divided into two branches – the spiritual 
realm of their religion and the profane external environment of their daily lives (Schmidt, 
2009a). 
5.2.2 What are the Sunnis’ main political sub-groups? 
During and after Ottoman and British rule of Iraq, the Sunnis who dominant. The same was 
true after Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party took power in a military coup in 1968 (Allawi, 
2008). After the 2003 overthrowing of the Saddam regime the Sunni leadership became 
fractured (Times, 2005). Until the Sunni's clerics were instructed to boycott the parliamentary 
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elections, which only hurt their political influence even further (Ze’evi, 2007). Some Sunni 
leaders had actually been looking ahead to the parliamentary elections to re-stake their claim 
in Iraqi politics.  
Iraq’s Sunni leadership comprises a number of parties, coalitions, and other political 
associations (Times, 2005). Among them were: 
The Iraqi Islamic Party: Loosely associated with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 
the Iraqi Islamic Party was the sole Sunni group that briefly participated in the 
interim parliamentary elections. 
The Muslims Clerics Association: Formed after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003, this hard-line, influential group of Islamic clerics is composed of both 
Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds. The association, which was neither pro-
insurgency nor pro-United States, has good relations with Shia clerical leaders, 
including Muqtada al-Sadr. 
The Iraqi Council of National Dialogue: A powerful bloc of Sunni parties, the 
Iraqi Council of National Dialogue boycotted January’s parliamentary 
elections. 
The Conference of the People of Iraq: Formerly called the General conference 
for Sunnis in Iraq, this coalition of political parties is led by Adnan Dulaimi, a 
powerful Sunni leader who criticized the elections and called to boycott it. 
5.2.3 Why the US invaded Iraq  
The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, quickly defeated the Iraqi Army, and removed 
Saddam Hussein from power. The United States had three primary objectives for invading 
Iraq. First, the administration of President George W. Bush stated they were certain that Iraq 
had weapons of mass destruction, and aimed to destroy these weapons (Record, 2003). 
Second, the dissolution of Hussein’s regime would eliminate their threat to the United States 
and weaken Iraq’s ties to terrorism (Sapiro, 2003). And removal of the Hussein regime would 
enable the United States to positively influence selection of the subsequent Iraqi leadership.  
The third objective is perhaps the most pertinent, it is that the US wanted to turn Iraq 
into a democratic country (Allawi, 2008). Shukla  argues that ‘the real reason for the invasion 
of Iraq was not WMD [weapons of mass destruction], nor war against terror, nor getting rid 
of Saddam, nor grafting democracy, but about the ’hegemony of dollar’ (Shukla, 2005, p. 
148). Some commentators state that the introduction of democracy into Iraq would not only 
improve that nation, but spread a positive (and democratic) influence throughout the Middle 
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East. President Bush spoke passionately on this subject when he announced that, ‘Iraqi 
democracy will succeed and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to 
Teheran, that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at 
the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution’ 
(Bush, 2004). 
Some of these possible objectives have since been discredited, of course. Weapons of 
mass destruction were never found, although the United States continued with their objective 
of removing Saddam from power and holding free and democratic elections to choose the  
new leadership of Iraq (Allawi, 2008). One supporter was Al Sistani who by his Fatwa 
invited people to participate in these elections while the opponents were the Sunni people. 
The conflict between the two led to the destabilizing of the security and stability of Iraq.  
5.2.4 How these elections affected Iraq’s neighbours 
The Iraqi elections were important for all the Arab countries especially Iraq’s neighbours. 
Prior to 2005 the Arab leaders in various countries controlled elections and won 100 per cent 
of the votes. Mohler  (2005) mentions that Iraq held elections in 1995 and 2002, and Saddam 
Hussein won 100 per cent of the vote there.  
The Arab states observed the Iraqi elections of 2005 and were afraid of the results. 
(Makiya, 2010) suggests that even just the possibility of elections in Iraq was the first real 
opening for participatory democracy in the Arab Middle East. The Arab states knew that if 
the Iraqi elections succeeded this would create reactions throughout the Middle East because 
most Arab leaders force their people to live in tyranny and despair (Khalilzad, 2010). 
Therefore, some of these leaders supported the terrorists to destroy the Iraqi elections. Gause 
(2005) argues that US President Bush was absolutely clear that the promotion of democracy 
in the Muslim world was consistent with American values. In an address he said,  
Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the 
conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader 
Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in the cycle 
of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the 
political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop and dissent is 
driven underground and toward the extreme (p.3). 
Many of Iraq's neighbours watched the elections with fear, wondering what kind of 
government would be formed in Iraq, especially as the US announced that any permanent 
government would have a right to establish conventions (Rubin, 2006).  And then, when the 
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government was formed in Iraq after the December 15 elections, the US slowly began to 
withdraw forces from Iraq, completing the withdrawal at the end of 2011. The agreement 
between the US and Iraq made Iraq's neighbours concerned (Jawad, 2013). Countries such as 
Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were curious as to how the political vacuum would be filled 
once the U.S. withdrew after nearly a decade of occupation. 
Jordan 
Jordan is an Arab state comprised mostly of Sunnis. It is home to the second largest 
population of marginalised Iraqi refugees (after Syria). Refugees International notes that 
these Iraqi refugees live in extremely vulnerable circumstances and most have not been 
granted legal status (Sassoon, 2008).  Human Rights First – a non-profit, non-partisan human 
rights organisation – estimates that Jordan hosted 500,000 to 700,000 Iraqi refugees in spite 
of its small size and limited resources (Ferris, 2007).  
It might be considered that the success of the 2005 election – with the Iraqis succeeding 
in organizing the elections and forming government – would help the refugees to come back 
to their country. However, Jordan’s government feared that if the Shia-dominated party 
gained power in Iraq the country would be severely vulnerable to a dangerous Iranian 
influence. In addition, if the Shia majority government assumed power, the political conflict 
between Baghdad and Amman (the capital of Jordan) would likely grow (Guttieri, 2005) .  
Iraqi antipathy toward Jordan was already high because of a widespread belief that the 
Jordanian government colluded with Saddam Hussein's regime in order to receive discounted 
oil (Rubin, 2006). Therefore, if the Shia took over power in Iraq through elections and allied 
with Iran, it was thought by the Jordanians that this would change the political map of the 
region. It was the Jordanian king who coined the term “ Shia crescent”, referring to Iraq, Iran, 
Syria, and parts of Lebanon as all one day being dominated by  Shia (Valbjørn & Bank, 
2007). 
Syria 
Syria might have been affected positively or negatively by the new stability in Iraq but 
it was be in a better position than Jordan. Syria agreed with the Iraqi government politically 
that Iran was a link between these governments because it had a good relationship with both. 
As a country with hostile relations with the US, Syria, considered the election from the 
perspective of it being the beginning of an American withdrawal schedule. Therefore, 
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politically Syria supported Iraq in wanting to remove the US from the region (Rubin, 2006) 
and wanted the occupation to end as quickly as possible.  
Negatively, the government in Syria had been in power for more than 40 years and felt 
that Syrians – if they saw the Iraqi elections produce a high level of transparency – might be 
inspired to follow in Iraq’s footsteps and push for their rights (Gause III, 2014). For example, 
the Kurds in Iraq had played an active part in the elections and have had a role in the 
formation of the Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam. But in Syria the Kurds still do not 
have Syrian nationality. Thus, like Jordan, Syria feared the consequences of the outcome of 
the elections. 
Turkey  
Turkey was the focal point throughout the 1990s in the process of containment of the United 
States in Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein. Turkey led a group of unexpected events 
that launched Operation Iraqi Freedom which gave rise to some fear and concern among 
Turkish policymakers. 
There were many concerns that Turkey would face if the Iraqi elections succeeded. 
Firstly, Turkey was concerned to prevent the division of Iraq on the basis of sectarian or 
ethnic lines leading to the emergence of an independent Kurdish state or confederation (the 
capital city of the Kurdish state is Kirkuk, which is oil-rich), which  would promote 
aspirations to an entity similar to the Kurdish population of whom there were many in Turkey 
(Davutoğlu, 2008).  
The second concern was to protect the Turkmen minority who speak a Turkic language 
and live mainly in northern Iraq (Tank, 2005).  Thirdly, Turkey was concerned about the 
probable liquidation of the Party Karkerani Kurdistan PKK, a Turkish Kurdish rebel 
movement, which turned to the north of Iraq after its defeat in 1999, as Turkey wished to 
prevent the emergence of a fundamentalist and anti-democratic Iraqi state (Ertem, 2011).  
Turkey and the United States shared fundamental objectives in Iraq. Both would prefer 
to keep Iraq together and not let it disintegrate into ethnic or sectarian or state-based pockets. 
Both would like a strong central government able to restore political and economic stability, 
as well as a sufficient degree of force in the future to balance the power of Iran(Güney, 
2005). The US and Turkey did not wish to see the emergence of any form of fundamentalist 
religious state in Iraq. This could not be achieved only through free elections representing all 
Iraqis, but needed the support of Iraq's neighbouring countries too (Alessandri, 2010). 
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Kuwait  
Kuwait is an important neighbour of Iraq. Barakat (2005) mentioned that  Kuwait has always 
supported the security and stability of Iraq, and that it supported the electoral process and 
hoped it would produce a free, united Iraq. However, it demanded that that Iraq take its 
orders from patriots who are concerned with its best interests, and pull away from foreign and 
sectarian interference. The Kuwaiti government felt that national unity  would be the victor in 
the Iraqi election, and that the new government would manufacture a new political identity 
and a new and unified Iraq (Lynch, 2006).                                                                        
It was considered in Kuwait that the elections would bring about a fundamental shift, 
stemming from the Iraqi people for the first time in 35 years being eligible to vote freely 
(instead of falling victim to the oppression and tyranny of an authoritarian regime) (Feldman 
& Martinez, 2006). It was also felt that Iraq would be a good neighbour and respect the 
sovereignty of neighbouring countries, particularly Kuwait, after it had been freed from 
suffering suffered from Saddam's regime. Therefore Kuwait wanted to support Iraq in their 
elections and ensure a unified and democratic Iraq (Rubin, 2006).                                                                                              
Saudi Arabia 
After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq became a country that threatened the security of 
the Arab Gulf. This resulted in the relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia becoming 
strained (McMillan, 2006b). Due to Saudi Arabia's significant role with the Americans, after 
Saddam’s regime being removed in 2003, Saudi Arabia started looking forward to playing a 
large part in preserving regional balance (Nasr, 2006). McMillan (2006b) indicates that,  
Riyadh’s policy toward Baghdad over the next several years will probably be 
dominated by four key concerns about the future of Iraq: domestic stability, 
foreign meddling, oil production policy, and Iraq’s political evolution 
(especially the role of the Shia). Of these, far away the most important to 
Riyadh is stability (p.1).                                                      
The Iraqi elections produced an Iraqi government run by Shias. This government was 
rejected by Saudi Arabia because the Saudi government felt that the Iraqi government would 
ally itself with Iran and form a large force in the region (Jones, 2005). It was believed by 
some  Shia leaders in Iraq that Saudi Arabia viewed the Shia-led government in Iraq as a tool 
for Iran and that Saudi Arabia wanted to overthrow this new Iraqi government (Fürtig, 2007).  
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Due to the closure of a large part of the land border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the 
Saudis sent out fighter planes to Iraq, and buses through Syria after 2003 to negatively 
influence the stability of Iraq (Rubin, 2006). Saudi Arabia considered itself as a loser in the 
Iraqi elections because the new Iraqi government became the first Middle Eastern partner of 
the US, and it had a good relationship with Iran (Nasr, 2006).  
Also, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the primary country for oil production in the 
region. If Iraq could form a strong government and become stable, it would be the only 
competitor with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in oil production in the region.  This was 
unacceptable to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which had sought to make the issue of the Iraqi 
government after the elections commensurate with the policy in the region (Fawn & 
Hinnebusch, 2006).  
The Saudi view was that when and if the internal situation in Iraq returned to something 
approaching normalcy there would then be a cold war between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This 
would happen because Iraq would then take a strong position in OPEC – the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries. In this strong position, based on its power as an oil producer, 
Iraq would then be tempted to push up the oil prices in order to grow its political influence in 
the region. And this is something the Saudi government did not want (McMillan, 2006a).  
Politically, Saudi Arabia’s government feared that democratisation of Iraq may affect 
its own people and encourage them to demand greater freedoms. This freedom could affect 
many areas of society including the freedom to hold elections, or to uphold the rights of 
minorities, and to redefine the role of women, even in governance.  
Saudi Arabian King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz mentioned that democracy was not 
appropriate for the Islamic world. Hogan (2005) quotes the king as saying: 
The democratic system that is predominant in the world is not a suitable system 
for the peoples of our region. Our peoples’ makeup and unique qualities are 
different from those of the rest of the world. In my view, Western democracies 
may be suitable in their own countries but they do not suit other countries 
(p.236).  
In the past, Iraqi elections led to peaceful transfers of power. The Saudis knew this and 
were wary that they (Saudi Arabia) would lose power once more (Cooper, 2012). Hayajneh  
(2004) supports this by saying that if they want to stay in power most Arab regimes believe 
that democracy is not in their best interests. However, the Saudi Arabs also believe that they 
cannot survive without US support.  
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Iran 
The alleged Iranian role in Iraqi politics varies from one commentator to another. But a 
common theme is that there is Iranian influence and interest, and it has both negative and 
sometimes positive consequences on Iraq, and Iran. Negatively, Iran has a lot of problems 
with the international community, especially America, because of doubts about Iran's 
possession of weapons of mass destruction as well as Iran's role in the process of 
destabilizing the Iraqi security situation (Ehteshami, 2003). Iran took advantage of the U.S. 
presence in Iraq and tried to subvert the reforms that America began in Iraq in 2003, 
including elections (Taremi, 2005). Iran’s government made Iraq its first line of defence, 
while at the same time it was trying to bargain and negotiate with the Americans about the 
security situation in Iraq (Ehteshami, 2003).  
On a positive note, Takeyh (2008) mentions that after the formation of the first Iraqi 
(2005) government run by the Shia, Iranian rhetoric changed. Iran considered the 
empowerment of a more friendly  Shia regime to be an essential objective (Raphaeli, 2005). 
Raphael states:  
Iraqis took part in a general election for the first time in 50 years. The election 
was held in a healthy atmosphere, despite threats by terrorists to prevent it. The 
percentage of voters was much higher than predicted. It is evident that Iraq is 
not a totally safe place now, but it is also obvious that the rule of a minority 
over the majority in that country has ended. 
Many Iraqi politicians had been living in Iran more than 30 years, so they already had 
loyalty to Iran (Taremi, 2005). After the elections in Iraq, Iran has had a significant role in 
forming any Iraqi government. Iran has also sometimes sought to resolve problems between 
political parties (Cordesman & Burke, 2010).  
5.3 THE INTERVIEWS: WHY THE SUNNIS BOYCOTTED THE FIRST 
ELECTION 
5.3.1 The Sunni boycott of the first election 
A range of answers were given to the question of why the Sunnis boycotted the 2005 
election. Both Sunni and Shia participants in this study were asked questions such as whether 
the Sunni areas were safe in order for Sunni people to participate in the election.  
Sunni viewpoints varied. 1MSuJ stated that ‘the election took place so that America can 
justify their failure to find weapons of mass destruction, and the elections were planned by 
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the Shia, USA and Al Sistani. 7FSuSt supported this point and she added that there were 
many Sunni areas that were not secure so it was a mistake to hold elections as the Sunni votes 
could not be trusted and the country was under occupation and the results were known to 
favour the Shia. 10MShP argued that Al Sistani’s invitation for the Iraqis to host an election 
was a reaction against the USA after they wanted to impose a new constitution without an 
election, and also at that time the Sunni areas were secure.  
6MSuSt stated that the elections included the Sunnis but not all Sunnis took part in 
them because their areas were under occupational authority. This meant militants were in 
power, which led to most of the Sunnis boycotting the elections. 9FSuH/W stated that she did 
not agree with Al Sistani’s invitation to the elections because his invitation was intended so 
that the Shia people would gain power. She said nothing would change because the Shias of 
Iraq planned with Al Sistani’s help to run Iraq after 2003 with the help of their alliance with 
Iran to marginalize the role of the Sunnis in Iraq. She said it was because of this that the 
Sunnis boycotted the elections. 5MKuP mentioned that the short time taken to hold the 
elections was by US request, as the parties wanted distribution of positions of power on a 
legal basis, thus Al Sistani’s invitation was not the main reason to boycott the elections by 
Sunni. 
The Shia view 
The Shia participants in this research have a different opinion regarding why the Sunnis 
boycotted the elections. 11MShCl mentioned that in the beginning of 2004 the security 
situation was good but the Sunni people felt that if they took part in this election the truth will 
finally appear that Iraq had a larger population of Shia than Sunnis, so the Sunnis decided to 
boycott it. Moreover, 11MShCl added that,  
Al Sistani did not nominate a candidate for election neither did anyone from his 
family because he is Iranian, so he insisted that the USA let the Iraqi people 
choose the candidates to write the constitution and help form the new 
government after Saddam’s regime.  
8FShSt indicated that Al Sistani by his fatwa wanted to make Iraqis self-governing, and 
that he wanted the occupation forces to depart as soon as possible. This participant also 
believed that the election would provide global legitimacy for the Shias to obtain power. 
3MShP mentioned that the Sunnis did not acknowledge the new government from the 
beginning, therefore the Sunnis boycotted the election. 12MShCl mentioned that:  
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Shia areas were also unstable and on the day of the election there was a threat on the 
headquarters of the election by a car suicide bomb, so not only were the Sunni areas insecure 
but also Shia areas and many more areas in Iraq [were insecure].  
4MShCl said that:  
I agree that the security situation was not good but the Sunnis did not support 
the new political process from the beginning and they considered this a threat 
to their power in Iraq so they did not follow [Al Sistani ’s] Fatwa. 
14MShP suggested that there were two reasons why the Sunnis boycotted the elections. 
Firstly, many Sunnis knew that the Shia would win so they refused to lose their power and 
allow the Shia to run the new Iraqi government. Second, since establishing the Iraqi state in 
1921, Iraq had joined with the Sunni countries (in the Arab Gulf and elsewhere). Now, if the 
Shia were to win, Iraq would align with a different set of countries which are predominantly 
Shia, countries such as Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon.  
As demonstrated in the paragraphs above, the reasons for boycotting the election were 
numerous. The following section explains this more fully. 
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 Figure  0-1: Why the Sunni boycotted the first Iraqi election  
Observed from Figure 5.1, 43% of the participants in the interviews mentioned that the 
reason the Sunni boycotted the Iraqi election was the security issue, such as fear from the 
spread of insurgents in Sunni areas. And 28% of the participants said the reason was that 
the Shia wanted to gain more power through holding the elections.  Another group of 
participants (29%) mentioned other reasons, such as the Sunni did not have leaders at 
that time, or they should not participate in election under occupation forces.   
5.3.2 Why the Sunnis boycotted the first election: An analysis 
The data from interviews revealed that most of Sunni participants in this research approved of 
boycotting the elections. Figure 4.1 shows that the dominating factor was the security issue, 
with 43% of participants stating that the security situation was the main reasons for the Sunni 
to boycott the election, and that the reason for the lack of security was the emergence of 
insurgents in Sunni areas. The insurgents claimed they would “blow up polling stations”. 
Shukla (2005) supports this with: 
There were no major surprises in the much heralded Iraqi elections, because the 
absence of Sunni leaders after 2003 led to the fact that the Sunni community 
did not have a clear vision in the new Iraq. Moreover, most of these leaders 
were working with Saddam's regime. As predicted, the Shia-dominated south 
and the Kurd dominated northern areas of the country witnessed heavy polling, 
while the resistance forces and four Sunni dominated provinces in central Iraq, 
43% 
28% 
29% 
Security issue Power issue Other
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with around half the country’s population, were wracked by insurgency 
(p.150). 
The interviews results indicated in Figure 4.1 indicated that 28% of participants 
believed the election was a good opportunity for Shia to prove they are the majority 
population in Iraq according. And in doing this they hoped to get more ‘rights’ than they had 
previously, particularly the right to run Iraq. Shukla (2005) supports this, stating that:  
The election results showed that the Shia constitute about 60 per cent of the 
country’s population, the Alliance got only about 48 per cent of the vote, but 
the elections have led to the first Shia government in an Arab state in more than 
1,000 years (p.150). 
The Sunni people felt that participation in the elections was meant to prove that the 
Shia is the majority population in Iraq, and that proving this could change the equation in the 
region and in the Middle East due to the emergence of new alliances, therefore they thought it 
was essential for them to boycott it.  
In addition, 29% of participants, as shown in Figure 4.1, assume that the elections 
under the occupation was a matter of concern for the Sunni people – for safety/security 
reasons – so they refused to participate in the elections supervised by the occupying forces in 
Iraq. Whether this was a valid reason or not is unclear. Since that time there have been three 
further elections – at the end of 2005, in 2010 and in 2014. Tables 1, 2 3 and 4 in Appendix B 
show the results of these elections. These results show us that the Sunni participation in the 
elections grew after the 2005 election – perhaps the Sunnis had realised they had made a 
mistake at that first election? 
According to the data in this research, the Shia participants believed there was multiple 
evidence (including post 2005) indicating that the idea of security issues in Sunni areas was a 
valid assertion. Even at the time of this research Sunni areas are still not secure, despite the 
fact they gained important positions in the forming of the Iraqi government post 2005 
(Mamouri, 2014d).  
However, further to this, most terrorists who were killed in Iraq were found in Sunni 
areas. Since 2003 there has been a political struggle between the Shia and the Sunni and this 
problem still persists. There is a population difference between the Sunni and the Shia. It 
seems, from the observations and comments of the interview participants, that perhaps the 
reason for the Sunni boycotting the elections was not because of the USA occupation, but 
because of the fear that the  Shia would gain more control (Jawad, 2013). 
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5.3.3 Analysis: The Sunni boycott 
As mentioned in the literature review, the  Shia sect boycott of the election of 1922 led to the 
Sunnis running the Iraqi government (Bengio, 2011). When they did this, it has been claimed 
that Iraq was characterised by oppression, marginalization, displacement and executions of 
Shia. This time it seemed clear that the Sunnis were concerned that if the Shia won the 
election, this would lead to the formation of an international coalition consisting of Iraq, Iran, 
Syria and parts of Lebanon, which would make the Sunnis a victim. This was their fear, but 
Al Sistani’s fatwa and other statements might suggest that it was an unnecessary fear – Al 
Sistani said that “no certain sect can govern Iraq without participation of other sects” (al-
Khafaf, 2015). 
Al Sistani’s view was that the Iraqi people should choose their government in 
accordance with elections that are free from the control of any country (al-Khafaf, 2015). The 
other side to the debate is that Al Sistani called the election for reasons that were only good 
for the country – and for all sects in the country. For example, Al Sistani might have 
promoted the election as the beginning of the establishment of a government that has the right 
to conclude agreements and negotiate for demanding the rights of all Iraqis. He might have 
called for the election to accelerate the departure of the occupying forces, or to simply form a  
government representing all the religions, sects and nationalities of Iraqi (Uloom, 2009).  
5.4 THE INTERVIEWS: WERE THE SHIA AL SISTANI’S ONLY 
INTEREST? 
5.4.1 Were the Shia Al Sistani’s only interest?  
After the capture of Saddam Hussein, the CPA (the Coalition Provisional Authority) affirmed 
its stated ‘message of reconciliation and hope’ by meeting the demands of Iraqis for direct 
national elections. Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani insisted that the political process respected the 
dignity of Iraq's Shias and ensured their rights to proportional political representation. If 
Ayatollah Al Sistani’s demands were not met, the United States risked spoiling new-found 
goodwill and inciting a destabilizing conflict with Iraq's most respected spiritual leader 
(Allawi, 2008). Al Sistani’s election fatwa was interpreted by Sunnis as a call to Shia to get 
power over and above the Sunni people. A further suggestion was that it was to obtain an 
Iraqi alliance with their neighbouring country Iran so that Iraq becomes a new force in the 
region. And so Iran may have helped Al Sistani so that it would benefit from a new Shia 
government in Iraq that would serve Iran’s interest.  
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After the 2003 fall of the Ba’ath party, according to some of the findings from the 
participants, the Shia of Iraq saw an opportunity to gain the leadership of Iraq via legitimate 
means and not through a coup or assassination. On the other hand, the Sunni community in 
Iraq and in the wider region considered Iraq to have become prey to Iran through the 
intervention of Al Sistani in politics and his issuing of the election fatwa which was 
considered to be the beginning of Shia rule in Iraq (Davis, 2008). 
Sunni participants in this research such as 7FSuSt said that clerics should not interfere 
in politics, but that Al Sistani’s fatwa appeared to be agreement between Syria and Iran to let 
the Shia control the government in Iraq. 2MSuSt supported the suggestion that Iran 
considered it an opportunity to intervene in Iraq’s affairs by using Al Sistani, a man of Iran in 
Iraq. And 9FSuH/W argued that the election of 2005 was planned in advance so that the Shia 
of Iraq could gain control and govern Iraq. 1MSuJ mentioned that the Sunnis felt that when 
the Shia gained control of the government, they would be an ally for Iran to meet Iran’s 
special interests. Most of Shia politicians had been exiled to Iran during Saddam's rule so 
when the Shia gained control it meant Iran gained control 1MSuJ added that:  
The Sunni sect reject [the Shia Iraqi government] because Iraq had a war with 
Iran from 1980 to 1988, and they disagree with them even with religious ideas 
so we cannot accept a Shia state allied with Iran and leading Iraq.  
This was the Sunni participants’ thoughts on this topic. The Shia participants argued 
against these thoughts. 10MShP mentioned that it should be said that Iran and Iraq had 
common interests in getting rid of Saddam. He added that if the Shia of Iraq are forming 
around 60 percent of Iraq’s population then what is the problem if they get power. 10MShP 
added that:  
After the result of elections, Sunnis obtained positions in the new Iraqi 
government as well as the Shia so it is valid and possible to say Al Sistani does 
not represent any sect but instead he defends all Iraqis' interests without 
discrimination. In addition, there was no real representative for the Sunni at 
that time because most of them where with the Ba’ath party or joined with 
insurgents so they want to impose them on the new political process in Iraq. 
13MShP says that throughout history the Shia clerics of Iraq did not insist on a Shia 
president. They did not indicate they were after power or control so they did not argue when 
the king of Iraq, Faisal I, gained power from 1921 to 1933, even though although he was 
Sunni. The Shia accepted anyone to govern without objection to their religion, sect or party, 
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and only insisted that he should be a fair man (Tripp, 2007). This is a historical point which 
suggests that the Shia do not need to organize with anyone to get power. 12MShCl is in 
support of this point and says that when Abdul Salam Arif, the President of Iraq from 1963 to 
1966, was forming his government he awarded the Shia two ministries out of 22.  Shia clerics 
did not object at that time, suggesting that the problem was that the Sunnis did not want Shia 
to be their partners in the homeland as they did not believe that Shia were able to manage the 
country (Uluum, 2009). Therefore, the Sunnis stood out in opposition to any chance that 
allowed Shia to gain power. 4MShCl mentioned that Al Sistani did not call his followers to 
control the government by force, but by democratic means, and that the fatwa was a true 
expression of a Shia cleric wanting to practice democracy. 
5.5 THE INTERVIEWS: THE DIASPORA’S RESPONSE TO AL SISTANI’S 
FATWA 
5.5.1 Further background: the Diaspora’s response to Al Sistani’s Fatwa 
Political developments in Iraq influenced the political situation in the region. Saddam 
Hussain’s regime from 1979-2003 was classified as a dictatorship and considered as 
dangerous to the stability of the Middle East (Allawi, 2008). As a dictatorial regime, the 
regime of Saddam Hussain did not give the liberty for the opposition to work inside Iraq. 
Many members of the various political parties that opposed the regime were executed or 
jailed for a long time (Aimami, 2011). Due to this situation, members of the Iraqi opposition 
felt that it was not easy to live under a tyrannical regime. That situation forced large numbers 
of the population to leave Iraq and to live in exile. The reason for leaving the country varies 
from person to person as does the period of exile. Some opponents may have left because of 
being a direct target inside the country, others for feeling oppressed (Uloom, 2009).  
Before 2003, there were no elections for the Iraqi diaspora because Saddam Hussain 
considered everyone that left Iraq to be traitors so they were not allowed to participate in 
elections (Ono, 2005). Inside Iraq the elections were run by Saddam's government and 
ultimately Saddam was the winner by 99% (Segura, 2014). Post 2003 the Independent 
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) allowed all Iraqis over 18 years to participate in the 
elections. In this section we will discuss why the diaspora followed Al Sistani’s Fatwa while 
they lived out of Iraq for decades. And were they following Al Sistani’s Fatwa or was their 
national patriotic feeling make them partake in Iraq’s elections.   
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The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order no. 92 established an electoral 
commission – the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq – to be the exclusive electoral 
authority for Iraq (Bremer, 2006). The commission was structured in such a way as to ensure 
its independence (Farag, 2007). The electoral system for the National Assembly elections, of 
which Iraq is a single electoral district (with proportional representation), made it possible to 
use a single ballot paper for the out-of-country voters (Pogonyi, 2014). The suggested 
threshold for the numbers of potential voters in the diaspora of one country was 10,000. 
However, of the 14 countries the IECI named to host the out-of-country voting OCV 
program, most had over 15,000 potential voters (Long, 2010).  
The importance of a diaspora presence in an election can also serve to re-establish ties 
between them and citizens in-country, which can be very beneficial for the reconstruction 
process (Farag, 2007) . Diaspora populations have often developed financial resources and 
professional qualifications in exile that can be useful during rebuilding (Vanderbush, 2014). 
Engaging them in the political process makes more likely their return and active participation 
in reconstruction. 
5.5.2 The Diaspora’s response to Al Sistani’s Fatwa 
When I asked the Sunni diaspora participants why they participated in the election, 1MSuJ 
said, ‘I took part in the Iraqi election just one time and then left it because I felt there is plan 
for Iraq [drawn up] by the Shia and the US to let Shia control the power in Iraq so I went to 
election once because I have a national patriotic feeling towards my country’.  
2MSuSt said, ‘I participated in Iraqi elections here in Australia, because I believe there 
is no chance for Iraqis to rebuild their country just in one election, so I do not need to follow 
any one because the elections were a national feeling towards my country which was 
destroyed by wars’. 5MKuP argued that he did not take part in any election in Australia 
because, ‘I think the election was just a formality and politicians wanted to legitimize 
quotas’. 7FSuSt said that the elections were happening to give the Iraqis a national feeling of 
stabilization and the modernization of Iraq; this led the diaspora of Iraq to feel proud of Iraq 
becoming advanced like the country I am currently in, Australia. 9FSuH/W said that we as a 
diaspora thought our participation in the elections would be a good chance to elect a new 
government for us to be able to entice us to come back to our country. However, the truth was 
different. 
It seems from the data that the Shia were keen to participate in the elections because 
they were allowed to have access to power for the first time in a legal way, so they 
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collectively had a different opitualnion. 10MShP said that if we look to modern countries 
everyone has a chance to vote and at the end they accept the result no matter what. 
Al Sistani’s role was in encouraging people to go to the elections to get their rights 
through peaceful means. 11MShCl said that the diaspora went to the elections because they 
considered it the best solution for Iraq, especially because America wanted to spread 
democracy in Iraq. According to some of the participants Al Sistani thought that the elections 
would bring controversy, but in the end they would establish a stable country instead of a 
country of chaos and fighting.  
Many people in Britain went to the elections because of Al Sistani's influence and 
because of their adoption of the taqleed principle of following or conforming to the teachings 
of another. (With Muslims who follow the principle of taqleed being termed ‘muqallid’. The 
term refers to whether someone accepts another as an authority and therefore accepts that 
person’s judgements, rather than making their own judgement. 
 13MShP said that the young generation here in Britain felt a sense of duty to follow the 
taqleed principle – the principle of following a charismatic leader and trusting their decisions. 
Because of this the young people carried out what Al Sistani asked for. 8FShSt argued that, “I 
participated in the elections not as a response to Al Sistani's call, but [because of] the mere 
exercise of democracy in the new Iraq.” 4MShCl mentioned that without Al Sistani’s Fatwa 
no one would have convinced the Shia to take part in the election with such large numbers.  
I, the researcher, was a member of the IECI (Independent Electoral Commission of 
Iraq) in 2005 in Iraq, and living in Australia for the election which was conducted in 2010. In 
2010 I had the role of Deputy Manager of the Iraqi Election Centre in Brisbane, Australia. 
This role included explaining in an unbiased way to the diaspora the role of the election in   
the future of Iraq, and how this election might help rebuild Iraq. My Master’s research 
subject was “Between Reality and Ambition: The Significance and Implications of Iraqi 
Elections and ‘Democratic Change’, 2003-2010”.  
In this research I shed light on the elections staged in 2003 and 2010 and how these 
elections impacted on Iraqis, and I discussed with Iraqis the benefits of interacting in Iraq’s 
elections. The impression I received was that there was a great desire within Iraqis who were 
living in Australia to participate in the elections. The Shia considered it a religious duty 
because of Al Sistani’s Fatwa, but they also wanted to feel that their country of origin has a 
democratic election no different from Australia’s, for example.  
A noticeable event occurred when a person came to vote who was born in Australia but 
with Iraqi heritage and citizenship, and his wife was Australian and he had to present three 
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documents in order to be able to participate in the election, but he had only two. I asked him 
why he insisted on voting and he answered, “I want to prove to my wife that my country of 
origin also has a democratic election and I can chose anyone I like to elect because I have 
been granted full freedom to so such, just like here in Australia.” Many people were driven 
by national sentiment to participate in the elections in Iraq because Iraq had experienced 
decades of persecution. The expatriates felt that the elections might ‘pave the way’ for them 
returning to their home country and participating in rebuilding a new Iraq. On the other hand, 
most of the Sunnis did not participate in the election because they considered them to be a 
pretext for installing a legitimate Shia rule. 
5.5.3 Al Sistani’s reason for the fatwa  
In 2004 Al Sistani did an interview with Der Spiegel, a German news magazine, and the 
journalist asked Al Sistani why he wanted a general election while the occupation forces 
wanted to delay it and call the Transitional Council (TC) ‘unelected’ to run the country . He 
was also asked if the election would lead to control of Iraq by the Shia (al-Khafaf, 2007). 
Al Sistani’s answer was (translated from the Arabic): 
Elections are the best way to enable the Iraqi people to form a government that 
will promote their interests. In a country such as Iraq, diverse ethnic 
communities cannot overcome the ethnic and sectarian quotas in the formation 
of any government unless by carrying out elections. There must be a resolution 
of the UN Security Council to hold elections to reassure the Iraqi people that 
the elections not be delayed once again by the occupying forces. In the case of 
management of the country's non-elected government, it should not enter into 
agreements and important decisions concerning the future policy of the country 
in any areas. The new Iraqi government must not be concerned with the topic 
of a numerical majority having power. There should be representation for all, 
because Iraq contains different sects (Sunni, Shia, Kurds and others. With 
regard to Iraq's neighbouring countries, we must always prevent any other 
country from intervening with Iraq’s issues, and Iraqis must rebuild their 
country by themselves.  
5.6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The information and data contained in this chapter relates to the first research question: To 
what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political influence? (Do 
they approve of his approach to his own political influence?).  
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The overwhelming theme that has emerged is a simple one. It is not what I wanted to 
find, but it is not unexpected. What has emerged from the data is that one variable separates 
the findings – and this is whether or not they come from a Sunni participant or a Shia one.  
The Sunni interviewees were not always in agreement with each other, but they 
generally were: they did not approve of Al Sistani , his actions, his thoughts and what they 
perceived as a coalition with Iran (or even the US) and a quest for power.  
Not all Sunni agreed on every question. They seemed to think for themselves and hold 
pride in their opinions. There was no question of ‘taqleed’ – the conformity of one person to 
the teaching of another.  Yet their opinions differed. Part of this may have been because of 
reasons to do with history. 
Until the 2003 occupation of Iraq by the US and allied forces, the Sunni were in charge. 
They had been the force in Iraqi government for many years. Then all that changed. The Shia 
(whose numbers were greater than those of the Sunni) were threatening to take power. Many 
Sunnis said, ‘The Shia are going to be in power. Let’s stop them (Uloom, 2009). The Sunnis 
were used to being the powerful force in Iraq, and they struggled to see past the change that 
seemed to be coming. 
What was missing in the findings was mention of whether or not a change of power 
was a good or fair or reasonable outcome. Only one participant clearly questioned this in 
asking why it would be wrong if Shia now had the majority in government.  
Instead of the Shia arguing against the Sunni claim that Al Sistani was after power 
(either in association with the Iraqis or the Americans) perhaps they need to focus more on 
whether this would be a good or fair thing. In some ways this is what was coming out of the 
words of the interviewees in London.  
The Shia, as opposed to the Sunni, accepted Al Sistani’s fatwa. Were they muqallid 
following the principle of taqleed? If they were (and still are, of course) is that a good thing, 
or not.  
One of the questions in this thesis is whether or not the Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s 
role as a cleric with political influence. It is clear that the Sunni do not. The Shia, however, 
according to those interviewed in this thesis, do. As with the Sunni, by all this researcher 
learned in the interviews, the Shia also think for themselves. Perhaps they do hold a great 
deal of respect for Al Sistani, but those interviewed in Australia especially do not seem to be 
muqallid.  
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5.7 SUMMARY  
The Iraqi elections took place in 2005 and most Iraqi sects participated in this democratic 
practice. The lack of Sunni leaders, the existence of occupation forces and the deteriorating 
security reality led to the Sunnis boycotting these elections. The Shia were more willing to go 
to election to prove they existed after years of oppression and marginalization. And there was 
the role of religion, with Al Sistani stimulating people to go to the elections by the use of a 
fatwa. 
Al Sistani’s Fatwa had great impact in encouraging Iraqi Shia people and sects other 
than, the Sunni to vote.  
Although this chapter provides much relevant background material, it has primarily 
detailed data about: 
 Al Sistani’s 2004 fatwa calling all Iraqis to vote in the 2005 elections. 
 The Sunni boycott of that election. 
 The question of whether Al Sistani was favouring the Shia. 
 And the diaspora’s response to Al Sistani’s fatwa.  
In this chapter these topics have been described in relation to findings gathered from 
analysis of Al Sistani’s words, in previous chapters and from the answers given to interview 
questions by 14 Iraqi expatriates interviewed in Australia (6 men and 3 women) and in 
London (5 men).   
Following are four more analysis chapters, each tackling further data relevant to the 
research. The next chapter is about Al Sistani and democracy. 
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Chapter 6: Al Sistani invites Iraqis to become a 
democratic nation 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Does Al Sistani support democracy? Can an Islamic nation be a democratic nation? Are the 
Iraqi people ready to become a democratic nation? 
These are the questions dealt with in this chapter explores and discusses the relationship 
between Al Sistani and democracy. This, the second of the analysis chapters, relates to the 
second research question: Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard 
to the nation’s problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
This analysis is based on the findings from interviews conducted with the participants, 
and textual analysis of written data stemming either directly from Al Sistani, or through his 
organisations.  
6.1.1 Chapter content 
Al Sistani has helped in moving Iraq into becoming a democracy. This is a huge move for an 
Islamic nation. But is it what the people want? Can Iraq survive happily as an Islamic nation? 
If it is what the people want, then what is their attitude toward Al Sistani? Do they see Al 
Sistani as ‘holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems?’ 
These are important questions as they relate to whether the people of Iraq are behind Al 
Sistani, and it relates to how important they see him and his interventions. 
This chapter first provides a background to the connection between Islamic theology 
and the concept and practice of democracy. It then analyses the findings in relation to the 
following topics: Al Sistani’s attitude to democracy, the barriers to democracy, and whether 
or not democracy is being undermined in Iraq. 
After this, Al Sistani’s own viewpoints are given, and this leads into an analysis and 
discussion of the contents of the chapter in relation to the second research question. Please 
note, the analysis for each section includes a textual analysis where relevant. 
6.1.2 The link between this chapter and the research questions 
Why democracy? Democracy is the term we give to the system of governance of most 
Western countries, including of course Iraq. Democracy, however, is not associated with 
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Islamic countries who typically have their own form of governance. In 2003 when the US 
occupied Iraq it was a democratic government that the US wanted for the country. The US 
was prepared to put in place a governing body of its own choosing, and it was only when Al 
Sistani intervened that they agreed to an open election. The result of that election (of 2005) 
was a democratic government, of course. 
This all seemed to happen with Al Sistani’s consent. It certainly happened with his co-
operation. So the questions that arise include: Is the new democratic government what Al 
Sistani wanted? Or did he just believe that co-operating with the US was the best option for 
Iraq?  
At the least, Al Sistani co-operated with the concept of a democracy for Iraq. In doing 
so he achieved a unity and a stability which many people thought was not possible. In some 
quarters, particularly among the Shi’s, but also among the rulers and people of other nations, 
he gained much respect.  
Therefore the question arises (and this is the second research question): do Iraqis see Al 
Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems, and to how Iraq is 
viewed by the rest of the world?  
This chapter explores the second research question with an analysis of findings based 
on textual analysis (where relevant) and the findings from research questions asked of the 
interviewees including the following:  
 Does Al Sistani support democracy? 
 What is the point of view of Shia clerics towards democracy? 
 Are the Iraqi people ready to become a democratic country? 
 How satisfied are the different sects (overall) with Al Sistani? 
After Al Sistani issued his Fatwa to encourage people to participate in the elections, 
doubts were expressed about Al Sistani. Did he want to build a democratic system in Iraq, 
some wondered, or was it the Shia the majority that led him to issue the Fatwa in order to get 
more power within the country? The relationship between Islam and democracy was not clear 
so the question arose as to how Al Sistani could prove that Islam could be a democratic 
religion. The emergence, after 2003, of a Muslim cleric such as Al Sistani calling for the 
establishment of a democratic state was a milestone in the history of Iraq, but it does raise 
many questions.    
The focus of this chapter is very much about democracy, and particularly in 
understandings if democracy can legitimately emerge from Islamic theology and from Al 
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Sistani’s writings. Iraq is a multi-sectarian and religious country so the question arises as to 
whether Al Sistani as a Shia cleric is committed to the democratic government in Iraq.  
6.2 Background: Can Islamic theology be interpreted in a way that aligns it 
with democracy?  
(Esposito & Voll, 1996) define democracy as:  
“… a social and political system which assesses the relationship between 
members of the community and the state in accordance with the principles of 
equality of all citizens and free participation in the making of legislation 
regulating public life. Democracy spread out to be the dominating norm of 
political rule into some parts of the world of today …” (p.17).  
Elman (1997, p. 313) provides another definition in defining democracy as 
"government by the people in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised 
directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system”. 
The relationship between Islam and democracy is controversial among adherents of the 
Islamic religion and external commentators, and some reject the possibility that any   
relationship at all can be established between them (Esposito & Voll, 1996).  Muslims take 
their religious instructions from the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad but in a 
democracy, people refer to a human mechanism to regulate governance.Tessler (2002) gives 
another idea in mentioning that the Islamists claim that parliamentary democracy and 
representative elections are not only compatible with Islamic law, but that Islam actually 
encourages democracy. At the same time, others such as Fattah (2006) argue that the 
relationship between Islam and democracy is based on the ability of Islam to accommodate 
contemporary methods of governance and politics, with religious texts able to be interpreted 
to support this claim.  
Some Muslims among those interviewed clearly did not support any valid connection 
between Islam and democracy in this project. As such, 1MSuJ pointed to the Quran (33:36) 
as stating, ‘It is not fitting for a believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by 
God and His Messenger to have any option about their decision’ (translation of the Quran by 
Ali, 1975). This means all legislation must be supported by the teachings of Islam and the 
Quran. 9FSuH/w supported this with another verse from the Quran (5:44)  ‘Whosoever does 
not judge by what God has revealed is among the disbelievers’ (translation of Quran by (Ali, 
2011). This means that a Muslim should depend on the Quran to organise his or her life a not 
a secular democratic government. 
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2MSuSt mentioned that in the Quran  (63:8) ‘might [power] belongs to Allah and to his 
messenger and to the believers’ (translation of the Quran by Ali, 2011). Another verse 
mentioned by 5MKuP from the Quran (9:3) states that ‘Allah and his messenger are free from 
obligation to the unbelievers’ (translation of the Quran by Ali, 1975). Muhammad used this 
"revelation" to dissolve a standing treaty and chase non-Muslims from their homes if they 
would not accept Islam (Bukhari, 1987). This practice would be incompatible with 
democratic rule, in which freedom of choice and freedom of expression are seen as necessary. 
There are several hadiths (or accounts) which tell Muslims how to deal with someone 
who is not Muslim (19:4294). For example: 
‘When you meet your enemies who are polytheists invite them to three courses 
of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold 
yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they 
respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them. If 
they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizya (Islamic fine). If they 
agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay 
the tax, seek Allah's help and fight them. Non-Muslims are intended to be 
subordinate to Muslims’ (translation of the Quran by Siddiqui, 2008).   
This Hadith is not compatible with one of the commonest democratic values: which is 
freedom of religion. So according to the interpretation of Sunni participants in this study, 
some verses in the Quran show that democracy is not compatible with Islam.  
 Other Muslims interviewed in this project have a different view, however. They 
believe that Islam is compatible with democratic values via the principle of ‘shura’, which 
basically upholds all the principles of democracy about political decision-making processes. 
De Hart, Dekker, and Halman (2013, p. 276) explain that ‘Shura constitutes one of the four 
cardinal principles in the Islamic perspective on socio-political organization’. The other three 
are justice, equality, and human dignity (Al-Hibri, 1992). Some Muslims believe there is 
significant compatibility between these principles and democracy. Rahman (1984) mentions 
that Shura and democracy are two common words used frequently to describe Muslim and 
western political systems. The Quran urges Muslims to use the principle of Shura to lead and 
administer governance in order to avoid the use of an autocratic system.  
In this research project 4MShCl mentioned that the Quran in (38:42) referred to those 
‘who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation’ (translation by Ali, 2011). This verse 
means the Muslims should consult between themselves on important matters, both public and 
private.  
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10MShP also mentioned a particular verse in the Quran: supports that choice of this 
textual evidence when mentioning that the Quran said in (59:4): 
Believers, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among 
you. Should you dispute about anything refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if 
you believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and the best interpretation 
(translation by Ali, 2011).  
“Those in authority” can now be taken to mean presidents or leaders in the country.  So 
the Quran calls people to respect the ‘people's’ choice. That is what the democratic systems 
also adopt so here there are correlations between the Quran and democratic values. Following 
this possibility, 3MShP mentioned that in the Quran (38:42) it is stated: ‘.. and those who 
have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] 
consultation among themselves, and from what we have provided them, they spend’ 
translation of Quran by  (Ali, 1975). The Quran invites the Muslim to consult instead of fight 
(Bukhari, 1987) so these verses are an explicit call for Muslims to consult among themselves. 
Also, the purpose of these verses is to arrive at an agreed or accepted decision by the people. 
So they require the freedom and conviction of dialogue. Everyone who has an opinion can 
present it and submit their arguments and evidence, and has the right to discuss or oppose. 
This free dialogue leads to convergence between the different views, so that the Quran 
focusses on dialogue and rapprochement, not power and competition. 
6.3 THE INTERVIEWS: DOES AL SISTANI BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACY?  
This section looks more directly at the participants’ viewpoints on whether Al Sistani 
supports democracy. And if so, what sort of democracy?  
Al Sistani’s election Fatwa was a shock to the U.S government because they did not 
think that there was a Muslim cleric who believed in democratic values (Allawi, 2008). The 
definition of democracy means “rule by the people” and Al Sistani was able to impose this 
definition on the U.S when their occupying forces wanted to impose a new constitution after 
2003, as he issued his elections fatwa (Allawi, 2008). Al Sistani has played a role in the 
formation of the simple roots of democracy in Iraq since 2003 (Rahimi, 2007). He demanded 
direct elections for Iraq as a whole, rejecting the idea of popular local conferences and he 
wanted the writing of the constitution by an elected constituent Assembly. He therefore 
presented a model of an Islamic state consistent with the modern age (Noorbaksh, 2008).  
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The Sunni participants in this study were not convinced that Al Sistani wanted to 
establish a democratic system in Iraq. 1MSuJ believed that Al Sistani did not promote 
democracy in Iraq but that his role after 2003 allowed Militias to run the government so Iraq's 
fate was unpredictable. This participant sought to criticize the role of government in running 
the country. 7FSuSt supports this view with, ‘Al Sistani and the most of Iraqi people do not 
believe in democracy, because democracy is not just elections so there are some questions 
such as does Al Sistani believe in freedom of food, clothing and drinking?  Of course not.’ 
2MSuSt also upholds the view that Al Sistani does not believe in democratic freedom 
as a whole, but merely for elections, and that his call for elections was to let the Iraqi people 
bear the responsibility if any government should fail. In addition, he believes that not all the 
Iraqi people are ready for democracy because of hunger, deprivation and siege during 
Saddam’s rule. 6MSuSt pointed out that Al Sistani as a cleric could not advise people to do 
something against Islamic law, thus he might believe in democracy generally, but not all 
democratic values.    
Some of participants saw links between Al Sistani as cleric with authority derived from 
the holy Quran - that rule is derived from God so 5MKuP mentioned that the clerics have a 
theory which is the rule by God so Al Sistani as a cleric believes in it. He states, “Does Al 
Sistani grant the right of minorities like the Kurds when they call for secession from Iraq?  
Does Al Sistani give them this right? Of course not!  He believes in democracy where it is in 
the Shia interests to let them govern Iraq after decades of marginalization and exclusion”. 
9FSuH/W states that she does not think that Al Sistani believes in democracy because the 
term democracy includes freedom of religion. He added: “Does Al Sistani allow that there are 
people in Iraq who do not worship God?  I do not think so. I think the purpose of faith in 
democracy is only for elections.” And 8FShSt mentioned that: 
‘It is possible to consider Iraq as a democratic country when the clerics stay far 
away from politics, but that will not happen. When we find Islamic parties out 
of government and the country is managed by secular government it possible to 
say Iraq could now become a democratic country’.   
Most of the Sunni participants do not believe that Al Sistani supports a democratic 
system in Iraq. The  Shia who support Al Sistani’s ideas believe that Al Sistani wished to 
establish a wholly democratic state in Iraq (Feldman, 2005). The Iraqi Shia Muslims, because 
of the taqleed principle, always adopted Al Sistani’s edicts.. Al Sistani , as a cleric, was able 
to change the prevailing belief that many Muslims clerics do not just believe in God’s 
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teachings but they are ready to interact with the requirements of the modern age (Abd al-
Jabbar, 2003).  
10MShP confirmed that according to what Al Sistani believes from the Quran and 
hadiths (reports) of the Prophet as well as imams through history, he cannot impose anything 
on the people because he is not a Wilayat al-faqih, as in Iran, so he left the people to choose 
what they want.  
The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih forms the central axis of contemporary Shia 
political thought in Iran now. It advocates a guardianship-based political 
system, which relies upon a just and capable jurist (faqih) to assume the 
leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible imam (Amanat, 
2003).  
However, the guardianship of a high ranking religious scholar is quietists amongst all 
Shia theories of governance. Some Iraqis connect this theory with Al Sistani’s role in Iraq so 
most of the Sunnis consider Al Sistani’s intervention in politics as a part of Wilayat al-faqih 
(Rahimi, 2007), meaning he is not representing Iraqis as a theological authority, but as a 
charismatic leader. This is something they are not willing to accept.  
10MShP who was one of the committee writing the new Iraqi constitution mentioned 
that, “We were to have direct contact with Al Sistani's office to get approval of many of the 
freedoms of belief, and personal freedoms that Al Sistani had agreed on that to show up the 
constitution to a referendum by all Iraqi society”.  
The Shia of course hold different perspectives. 10MShP added that Al Sistani’s 
ideological stance on this issue, together with the unique Iraqi context, makes it possible for 
democracy to emerge and flourish. Hawazi (2008) also supports the view that the chances of 
democracy succeeding in Iraq are strong. 
11MShCl also supports this when he mentioned that Al Sistani will apply the 
instructions which come from the Quran, and the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad and the 
Imams throughout history, because most of these instructions are compatible with recent 
democratic values such as elections, freedom of expression and respect for people's choices.  
13MShP, on the other hand, mentioned that some of the clerics think that democracy is 
‘kfor’ (against God’s will), and they do not believe all its values fit with Islamic teachings, 
even though Al Sistani found there is not much difference between Islamic teachings and 
democracy.  
3MShP mentioned that Al Sistani believes in democracy but there are some issues that 
Al Sistani does not have a right to impose on the people.  Matters such as freedom to eat, 
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drink and what clothing to wear are personal choices, which Al Sistani could not intervene in. 
This participant suggests that Al Sistani believed in a democracy and his approval in holding 
the constitutional elections was evidence that he respected the choice of the people, which 
then led to the formation of a government as well as his commitment to the referendum on 
the constitution by the Iraqi people. 4MShCl refers to Al Sistani’s belief in democracy as a 
solution to the problems of Iraq and the wish of Al Sistani was to establish an Islamic state.  
However, because Iraq is a multi-religious state with diverse ethnic communities he said Al 
Sistani resorted to a democratic option. 4MShCl added that Al Sistani does not believe in 
Western democracy because some of it conflicts with the teachings of Islam but Al Sistani , 
in his opinion, found it is possible to take advantage of democracy to solve some political 
problems in Iraq. This participant tries to clarify that Al Sistani does not believe in all 
democratic values.  
According to the interviews conducted with the participants in this research it is 
possible to say that participants interviewed for this project believe that Al Sistani himself 
believes in democracy, which gives the people freedom to choose their political 
representatives. But at the same time Al Sistani did not comment on personal freedoms as he 
did not want to incite problems, as Iraq has a lot of religions, nationalities and sects.  
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Figure  0-1 Does Al Sistani believe in democracy 
As can be noticed in Figure 6.1, 64% of participants think that Al Sistani believes in 
democracy.  The motive behind this belief is based on Al Sistani’s invitations to 
elections, his encouragement for Iraqis to choose their government freely, his role in 
seeking to secure the rights of minorities (religions and other non-Shiite sects), and his 
emphasis on the constitution and its role in solving cases of disagreements. While 36% of 
the participants tend to emphasise that Al Sistani do not believe in all democratic values. 
More details are provided in the next section. 
6.4 THE INTERVIEWS: WHAT ARE THE BARRIERS TO DEMOCRACY 
IN IRAQ? 
Iraq currently has a democratic government. But not all Iraqis approve of that government, or 
believe that the current democratic government will continue to meet the long-term needs of 
the country. Iraq has been a democratic nation for only a dozen years and is still young in this 
area. There is no doubt that much has been gained by this step, but is it enough? This section 
of the thesis explores the participants’ views on the barriers to democracy in Iraq. 
Since 2005 Iraq has had three elections and one referendum on the constitution but 
doubts have begun to emerge as to whether Iraq is now a democratic country or not (Jawad, 
2013). As mentioned before, in Iraqi history since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921 
there is no mention of any peaceful exchange of power. But there were assassinations and 
military coups and most recently the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein brought 24 years of 
64% 
36% 
Agree Disagree
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oppression and injustice.  This has led to a society that is divided into sects and parties. This 
means Iraq has not had any democratic experience in the modern age – so can the Iraqi 
people look on their country as a democracy or not. 
Sunni participants such as 1MSuJ argued that there is no democracy in Iraq, but that 
Iraq is controlled by the Shia. He believes this because when Al Sistani called the Shia to 
elect a United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and to write the constitution, this led other sects to elect 
their cadres, and then Iraq became a series of conflicting sects. 7FSuSt said: 
Iraq is not qualified to be a democratic country because it needs time to install 
democracy. The Islamist party of Iraq (Da'wa) still manages the government.  
Al Sistani has control of the reins of government I do not think Iraq is a 
democratic country. 
5MKuP stated that the Iraqi people are not ready to become a democratic country for 
several reasons. First, the impact of the economic blockade was not strong enough to make 
Iraq a democratic country and second, because of the negative impact on Iraqi society of 
Saddam's rule which divided the people into private communities.  
Other participants, such as 9FSuH/W, also attempted to link the administrative chaos 
and lack of a coherent political system to being unable to be a democracy. 6MSuSt supported 
this point of view saying, “I do not think that Iraq will become a democratic country despite 
holding three elections and the peaceful rotation of power.  The presence of Islamist parties in 
government and a divided Iraqi society does not lead to real democracy.” 
Most of the Shia participants, however, believed that Al Sistani could make Iraq a 
democratic country because they have faith in him and they believe in the compatibility of 
Islam with democracy. 10MShP mentioned that Al Sistani wanted to delay democratic 
elections in Iraq until they could be carried out by the Iraqi people, and that Al Sistani's 
intervention was in a difficult time when Iraq was occupied and there were many conflicting 
religious sects. He wanted democracy to be the nucleus of democratic state-building, ‘as 
happened in Europe after long conflicts and wars so as a first stage it was good.’  
11MShCl mentioned that since 2003 the Iraqi state became one of the most important 
democratic countries in the region because there was a peaceful transfer of power. There was 
complete freedom of the media, in addition to the involvement of many of the components of 
Iraqi society in public life, so it is possible to say that Iraq was at the beginning of the road to 
forming a democratic country.  
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13MShP raised a different perspective; he said that the strongest evidence that Iraq has 
become a democratic country is the participation of Sunni politicians in governance.  All 
Saddam's actions had been against Shia’s, from killing, to displacement and persecution. But 
despite this many of the Shia have accepted the Sunnis to be a partner in the country and in 
the democratic direction it was heading in. 12MShCl mentioned that what was planned for 
Iraq from the very beginning of 2003 was good, especially after Al Sistani’s demand to hold 
elections had boosted the chances that Iraq would become a democratic country. But 
ambitious politicians and conflicts between communities and the bloc parties made it difficult 
for Iraq to achieve this. 
14MShP mentioned that Iraq became democratic in the event of a change in the ruling 
elite because these people were now leading Iraq into the unknown. He said there were no 
qualified ruling parties running the country and the security situation was deteriorating. 
14MShP added that there are some achievements on the level of building democracy, but 
they do not meet with our hopes. 8FShSt added that the Iraq state should establish new 
institutions (instead of clergy) to help people to understand the meaning of democracy. 
3MShP indicated that the Iraqi community needed someone to guide them because the 
community was still suffering from ignorance and backward thinking, thus the cleric’s role as 
a guide to consolidate democracy in Iraq was very useful in building the new democratic 
country. 2MSuSt mentioned that the clerics are trying to help people to make Iraq 
democratic, and that providing guidance and issuing fatwas is part of a step by step process 
for doing this.  
After 2003 when President George W. Bush declared that ‘all Iraqis must have a voice 
in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected’ (Haass, 2003, p. 
141) some Iraqi politicians exploited Iraq's transfer to democracy. This led to conflict among 
the politicians. Some commentators such as Khalaji suggested that the Iraqi politicians want 
to win enough votes to control the government long term because they wanted power for their 
own party or sect, but that this would not happen because Iraq contains too many different 
sects so no one would be able to do that (Khalaji, 2006).  
After 2003 the nature of Iraqi society emerged as a problem in achieving democracy. 
Because the society is divided along ethnic and religious lines, some believe that if any one 
group achieves a majority by being the largest ethnic group they may never lose power if an 
election is held (1MSuJ). ‘The biggest problem is the numerically larger group's use of 
elections and other legitimate democratic forms to ensure its dominance, a tyranny of the 
majority, particularly a government run by an Islamic party like the Daw’a Party’ 9FSuH/W. 
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6MSuSt – a Sunni – stated that when the Shia politicians encouraged their people to vote for 
them this allowed them to be the largest ethnic group and because of this they might never 
lose power, because ethnic group members usually vote for their own. He said the Sunni and 
Kurds will be victims of the new democracy in Iraq (6MSuSt).  
5MKuP supported this way of thinking and extended on it in mentioning that the 
democracy in Iraq is at risk of being a tyranny of the majority. He said Iraq's Shia 
community, which comprises more than 60 percent of the total population, might use ‘free’ 
elections to transform its current exclusion from power to one of total dominance over Sunni 
Arabs, and perhaps Iraqi Kurds. He said, ‘The Sunni and Kurdish fears from Shia Islam 
reflect similar Shia doubts about Sunnis and Kurds. While Shia’s voted for Shia groups in the 
2005 elections, Sunnis voted for Sunni groups and Kurds voted for Kurdish groups’ 
(2MSuSt). 
 The only difference that makes the Shia case more significant is the weight that the 
Shia have in Iraq. With about 60 percent of the Iraqi population, Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds think 
the  Shia ability to drag the country back toward an Islamic state is strong (Conetta, 2005). 
Many Shia believe that because they are the majority in Iraq, they therefore have a right to 
manage the state the way that they want.  
However there is another side to this “tyranny of the majority” claim. Exemplifying this 
view 10MShP said ‘what is wrong if Shia run the government in Iraq, because they are the 
majority.  They distributed the positions … for all. The president of Iraq is Kurdish, and the 
president of the parliament is Sunni, so how can it be said the Shia have total dominance 
[over] the government.’ Similarly, 13MShP mentioned that since 1921 the Sunni people 
managed the Iraqi government so it is hard for them to cope with the Shia having power, so 
their claim that the Shia want to dominate is because they feel they are out of power in Iraq, 
and they want to return to power at any cost.  
3MShP agrees that the Shia do not have an absolute majority in parliament and many of 
the decisions cannot be passed except by agreement with the other sects (particularly the 
Sunnis and Kurds) so there is no dominance of the Shia, and this constitutes a real 
democracy.  
4MShCl  says that the Shia have been subjected to persecution by Sunni governments 
since 1921 so there is not a lot of confidence among other Iraqi sects in their fairness, but that 
Al Sistani’s new guardian position as a guarantee for the new democracy could boost trust 
between these sects. 11MShCl mentioned that Al Sistani did not endorse or support any Shia 
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list in the elections, but he invited all Iraqi people to take part in the writing of the 
constitution. This was a remarkable happening in Iraq. 
That all Iraqi sects shared in the writing of the constitution and referendum is evidence 
that the  Shias did not dominate the Iraqi decisions after 2003 (Deeks & Burton, 2007). 
8FShSt felt that it was possible for the Shia to ally with a minority in Iraq to form a 
parliamentary majority to run the country, but felt that this parliament should include all 
communities in the management of the country. He said that would truly make Iraq a strong 
country in the region and free of conflicts. 
6.5 AL SISTANI’S WORDS  
Extremist Muslims such as ISIS groups, as mentioned before, do not believe in democracy, 
and did not support Al Sistani in leading the Iraqis in choosing their government through the 
electoral process. The moderate view is that Al Sistani guided Iraqis to choose their 
government according to democratic means (Conetta, 2005). In addition Al Sistani believes 
that because Iraq contains many sects and religions therefore an Islamic government is not 
suitable for this country (Feldman, 2005). Al Sistani was asked by a journalist from 
Associated Press about what type of government he wanted in Iraq after Saddam’s regime. Al 
Sistani answered:  
The Iraqi people are the ones who determine the form of government through 
elections and we do not call for the establishment of a religious government in 
Iraq, but will respect the religious constants for Iraqis based on pluralism, 
equality and justice  (al-Khafaf, 2007). 
The Polish press asked Al Sistani if he sought a system of a democracy for Iraq, or 
something different. He answered, ‘I prefer any system which depends on [the] Shura 
principle. Pluralism and respect for the rights of all Iraqi citizens’ (al-Khafaf, 2007).  
6.6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION    
The question of whether Islam and democracy are compatible is a difficult one. To some, 
even raising this question may come as a shock as they may believe there is a huge difference 
between a democratic nation and one where religion appears as a state religion.  
As seen in the sections above, there are differences of opinion about whether the Quran 
and hadiths (other documents or reports) allow a compatibility with democratic values. 
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Some Sunni Muslims I interviewed viewed democracy as dissimilar to Islam and 
people from various sects seemed to interpret Islamic verses from the Quran as they wanted 
to understand them. At the same time, it is important to note there are verses in the Quran 
which seem to promote democratic values (as detailed earlier in this chapter). Also, the 
cultural background of the community reflected on the Muslims’ way of thinking, as 
explained by Huntington (2000). According to the answers the Sunni participants gave, it was 
observed that some of them refuse any connection between Islam and democracy, based on 
verses from the Quran. But others do connect democracy and the worship of God but at the 
same time consider that western democracy may encourage moral deviation among Muslims.   
Many verses in the Quran are interpretable, meaning it is possible to see them as 
applicable in different cases and context and at different times. Moreover, some verses have 
been updated in the Quran (Jansen, 1980). This means more information has been added to 
some verses to make them more relevant to today, particularly in areas like relating to non-
Muslims or believing in some democratic values (Esposito & Voll, 2001) therefore the use of 
verses from the Quran becomes even more complicated, particularly when referring to any 
connection between Islam and democracy.  
Thus 36% of participants in this study shown indicated that Al Sistani does not really 
believe in democracy. They disregard the evolution of life in the existence of political systems 
that depend on democracy in the management of its affairs. It is apparent that there is a 
segment of society that may rely on verses that would cause the international isolation of 
these communities. The importance of this study clarifies how some Muslims use the texts of 
the Quran to either accept others, or to refute them.  
Byman (2003) claims that some Islamists believe that democracy is a foreign concept 
that has been imposed by Westerners and secular reformers upon Muslim societies. He added 
‘some of these Islamists often argue that the concept of popular sovereignty denies the 
fundamental Islamic affirmation of the sovereignty of God and is, therefore, a form of 
idolatry’ (p.68). 
In the Quran there are many human values like justice, equality, human dignity, respect 
for the views of others, and following the principle of Shura in the management of the state 
(Kamali, 1991). All of these values are compatible with democracy, and similar to the values 
that democracy promotes. Esposito and Voll (2001) mention that: 
… if by democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the 
west, a system under which the people freely choose their representatives and 
leaders, in which there is an alternation of power, as well as all freedoms and 
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human rights for the people, then Muslims will find nothing in their religion to 
oppose democracy (p.74). 
The Islamic tradition contains a number of key concepts that are presented by Muslims 
as the key to “Islamic democracy"; these concepts are taken from the Quran, thus the Quran 
does not reject current democracy, even though some Muslims refuse it for political reasons 
(Esposito & Voll, 2001). Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami announced that:  
The existing democracies do not necessarily follow one formula or aspect. It is 
possible that a democracy may lead to a liberal system. It is possible that 
democracy may lead to a socialist system. Or it may be a democracy with the 
inclusion of religious norms in the government. We have accepted the third 
option (Esposito & Voll, 1996). 
Nearly 60% of the participants in this research believed that Al Sistani supported the 
establishment of a democratic regime in Iraq, and that he himself believed in democracy. 
Many of the participants argued that Al Sistani wanted to send a message to the world that 
not all clerics reject democratic values. Currently some clerics consider that democracy is 
kofr (against the will of God) and is not mentioned in the Quran. In addition they consider it 
an invitation to moral decay and immorality. This accounts for why some extremist groups 
have threatened to kill anyone who goes to elections in Iraq. Although the Shia Muslims 
constitute 60% of the Iraqi population, Al Sistani called to all Iraqi people to take part in the 
new political system. Doing this was a landmark in the history of Muslims and it attracted the 
world to a new clerical stance modelled by Al Sistani.  
According to the research data, questions were raised about whether or not Al Sistani 
believed in all democratic values, or just in the 2005 elections. The participants wondered 
also if Al Sistani would go on to prevent personal freedoms.  
When questioned by a journalist from the Associated Press Al Sistani said he did not 
want to impose Islamic government on Iraqis, and that he believed it is not his business to 
prevent these things. And Al Sistani did not issue a Fatwa regarding personal issues because 
he knows that Iraq contains different sects and religions. He did not force women to wear the 
veil; therefore he gained their respect. 
However the Sunni did not believe in Al Sistani’s apparent adoption of democracy. One 
reason for this was the belief that Iraq being ruled by would create a negative effect on Arab 
Gulf countries, because leaders of other states would ally with Iran and Syria.      
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The Shia who follow the teachings of Imam Ali as well as the teachings of the Quran 
are more liberal in general in areas of governance. Perhaps they are more open to democratic 
governance in political arenas, and Islamic governance in the religious lives of the Muslims 
of Iraq. The Sunni, on the other hand, are more likely to be strict in adhering to old ways and 
less likely to embrace new ones, such as a democratic Iraqi government. 
When it comes to interpreting verses in the Quran, perhaps it is fair to say that 
interpretations are just that. In applying any verse to a setting it was not originally referring to 
in detail leaves room for interpretation. It is understandable that different Muslims make 
different interpretations of Quranic teachings in relation to democracy. Perhaps there will 
never be agreement in these areas. 
What is important is that Iraq currently has a democratic government and is managing 
relatively peacefully on the surface. This might be evidence that it the Islamic population as a 
whole is able to embrace democracy, and that it is ready to and able to remain a democratic 
nation. 
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Regarding the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter, yes, Al Sistani clearly 
supports democracy – as evidenced by his support of the US plans for the country from 2005. 
However, how much Al Sistani believes in democracy is contentious, as he clearly prefers to 
keep these beliefs to himself. By his comments, he esteems Islam as a rule for Muslims, but 
obviously to some extent sees compatibility between Islam and democracy when it comes to 
government. 
Can an Islamic nation be a democratic nation? The evidence is there for us – it has 
happened in Iraq and does not look like changing. Are the Iraqi people ready to fully become 
a democratic nation? Of course not if this means forsaking Islamic beliefs. But in reference to 
government only, from the results of the interviews in this research it seems that Iraqis may 
be behind Al Sistani and what he has done, and this probably means most Iraqi people are 
ready to embrace democracy in government. 
A belief in democracy seems to depend on cultural background – primarily whether one 
is Shia or Sunni. This background also seems to affect one’s interpretation of verses in the 
Quran. In this age there are many Muslims extremists who consider democracy is Kofr. But 
Al Sistani during his role since 2003 has sought to prove that not all Muslim clerics consider 
that democracy is kofr. 
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There is no evidence that Al Sistani ever influenced voting for any particular 
candidates, but he let the Iraqi people choose freely. Al Sistani tried to apply the principle of 
the peaceful transfer of power by urging Iraqi society to adopt the practice of democracy as 
an alternative option to the dictatorship that had prevailed in Iraq for years.  
This chapter has provided much analysis – both from texts and the participant 
interviews – about the relationship between democracy and Al Sistani, as well as in regard to 
the readiness of Iraqis to embrace democracy. The following chapters will continue the 
analysis of the data, and the discussion of its relevance to the research questions. 
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Chapter 7: Intervention in politics  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In analysing data related to the first research question, this chapter explores and discusses the 
concept of intervention in politics by Shia clerics. Al Sistani, of course, as a Shi’s cleric, has 
intervened in politics, particularly when he pronounced his well-known fatwa, telling Iraqis 
to accept the 2005 election and to vote. The question raised is – what was the reaction of the 
Iraqi people? This echoes the first research question in this thesis: 
To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? (Do they approve of his approach to political intervention?) 
This analysis is based on the findings from interviews conducted with the participants, 
and textual analysis of written data stemming either directly from Al Sistani or through his 
organisations.  
7.1.1 Chapter content  
This chapter provides an overview of theories of political intervention by Shia clerics, and 
then a discussion related to these theories based on the opinions of the interview participants 
as well as the opinions and words of Al Sistani himself.  
The content of this chapter will analyse the approach taken by Al Sistani in political 
intervention, and then explore the extent to which Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a 
cleric with political influence? 
7.1.2 The link between this chapter and the research questions 
This chapter explores the following research question: 
Q 1: To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? Do they approve of his approach to his own political influence?  
This question is explored with an analysis of findings based on textual analysis (where 
relevant) and from interview questions including the following:  
 What is the difference between Al Sistani’s interventions and the doctrine of 
Wilayat al Faqih [the guardianship of the jurist, as proposed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini]? 
 What is the point of view of Shia clerics towards democracy? 
 Were Al Sistani’s interventions in politics justified? 
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Al Sistani’s interventions in the politics of Iraq were not a normal thing for a Muslim 
cleric. The following section provides content on Iraqi attitudes to such intervention. 
7.2 BACKGROUND: SHIA THEORIES REGARDING POLITICAL 
INTERVENTION BY CLERICS  
After 2003 dispute arose about Shia theories on intervention in politics. The Iraqi Shia clerics 
had not had this opportunity to have a role in politics before, at least not since the 
establishment of the modern Iraqi state in 1921. There had been no real participation of Shia 
clerics in politics, so that by 2005 the subject of Shia clergy in politics was unclear.  
This section explores different ideas about the intervention of Iraqi clerics such as Al 
Sistani in politics. Two such ideas are presented, including the Wilayat al-faqih system, 
which currently applies in Iran, and then a third, is introduced – a way of intervention in Iraqi 
politics which is perhaps unique to Al Sistani.  
This chapter will attempt to clarify the Shia cleric’s theories regarding their role in 
politics and will shed light on the Iraqis opinion on this role, and whether they consider it as 
part of a desirable peace process, or as something more complex.  
There are many definitions of ‘politics’. Forty years ago E. M. Wood (1978) recalled 
Socrates’ definition of politics as being ‘the art of governance, and the politician is one who 
knows political statecraft’. Barker (2012) pointed out that Plato defined it as “the art of the 
rule of individuals in a common collective life, the affairs of people or the art of the rule of 
consenting individuals care, and the politician is one who knows this art’. Pocock (2009) 
mentions that Machiavelli defined politics as ‘the art of retaining power, and standardization 
in the grip of the ruling, regardless of the means to achieve this’ (p. 44).  
An Islamic definition of politics by Ayubi (2003)  follows:  
[Politics is] humans living according to the rules of ethics based on the 
foundations of Islamic law, whether relating to public affairs or a special focus 
on the spiritual aspect as the most important aspect of the Islamic religion, 
considering that the rules of Islam are orders from God followed by reward and 
punishment (p.95).   
After 1917 when the British invaded Baghdad the Shia’s clerics felt the need to review 
their theories regarding their role in politics. As mentioned before the clerics in Najaf (the 
main city where Imams live and study) since that date have faced neglect, persecution and 
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forced deportation because of their political views. It is in response to this that felt the need to 
create a theory to assist them in dealing with these political issues (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003).  
7.2.2 Theory One: the clerics should have a role in politics 
Stemming from the above, some believe that clerics should have a role in politics in order to 
defend the rights of the people. This was a particularly strong viewpoint when Iraq faced the 
invading British forces in 1914 (Halm & Brown, 1997). At that time, however, liberal 
politicians argued that the clerics had only a spiritual status so they should not be profaned by 
policy. They were also accused of being ignorant as well as inexperienced when it came to 
policy (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003).   
The first Iraqi government was formed without a Shia representative (Aimami, 2011).  
After 1921 the Shia lost all participation in the establishment of the first Iraqi government in 
the modern age. This began a new era of conflict between politicians (all Sunni at this time 
and the Shia clergy (Vinogradov, 1972). As stated, the Shia clerics did believe they should 
(or could) have a role in politics to care for the rights of the people. So they began to incite 
the people to resist the occupying forces (the British). As a result of their endeavours, the 
Sunni politicians persecuted the Shia clerics and kept them away from politics under the 
pretext that their role ended after the formation of the first Iraqi government (Aimami, 2011).  
The Shia clerics began to advise the people to stand against this policy which was 
marginalizing the role of Shia clerics. Aimami (2011) mentioned that the first Iraqi 
government banished some clerics such as Abu al-Hasan Isfahani, Hussein Naini and 
Ziauddin al Iraqi to Iran because they were becoming involved in politics. This was after the 
government tried to pry the clerics away from politics and limit their role to that of religious 
scholars where all they could do was offer religious advice and guidance (F. R. A. al-Kifaee, 
2010). However, while this was the role they were being pushed into, the Shia clerics, on the 
other hand, adopted the idea that their role should not be to just explaining the teachings of 
the Islamic religion, but they also needed to advise and guide the people of Iraq regarding 
issues and events in Iraq and the region – even if this led to their detention, forced 
displacement, and even exile.  
 
Most Shia are fundamentalists (from the Usuli school of thought) and adhere to the 
basic principles of Islam, with a reliance on ‘taqleed’ in doctrinal matters (Walbridge, 2001). 
With taqleed, the sources of teaching and authority in religious matters are fourfold: The 
Quran, the Sunnah (verbally transmitted teachings), consensus, and the mind. Most 
149 
 
important, however, is their dependence on the Quran and their stories about the history of 
the Imams that convey historical events (Dekmejian, 1995). 
The Shia clerics adhere to the principle of ‘taqleed’ as mentioned in the literature 
review, and promote this principle. Thus Shia accepts the authority of the taqleed. The 
clerics, in promoting the taqleed, lead the people, and place them in a position of trust and of 
providing guidance. If there was to be any political conflict with the clerics, this would 
automatically mean conflict with their millions of followers. So it is that among the Shia the 
clerics maintain authority and control through the fatwas or instructions by them to the 
people. All of these of course are based on the taqleed. Contrary to this, the Sunni clerics do 
not promote or have this principle of taqleed, so this explains why the Shia clerics have been 
and more active in politics after 2003 than Sunni clerics. 
7.2.3 Theory Two: Wilayat al Faqih  
Not all Shia support this interventionist view of Shia clerics in politics. In fact most do not. 
There is, however, a second view. 
Wilayat al-Faqih is the name given to a second theory of political intervention for Shia 
clerics (as explained in Chapter Six). This theory currently forms a central part of 
contemporary Shia political thought in Iran, and advocates a “guardianship-based political 
system”. This is the system which relies upon “a just and capable jurist (faqih) to assume the 
leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible Imam” (Amanat, 2003).  
An ‘infallible Imam’ is a rare person. The prophet Muhammed is one, and perhaps a 
descendant of his would be another. Muslims have been waiting for an infallible Imam for a 
long, long time (Maynard, 2005). It would be an infallible Imam who would have supreme 
authority and be able to be involved in politics, as well as every other aspect of Islamic life 
and culture, as well as religious beliefs. The infallible Imam is perhaps similar to the 
Christian concept of a ‘saviour’. 
In the absence of an infallible Imam only a faqih can assume political leadership. 
Wilayat al-Faqih is basically a belief system which allows Shia clergy to hold political power 
– but only a faqih – who is equivalent to being the religious leader of the nation.   
Most Sunnis see Al Sistani’s intervention in politics as a part of Wilayat al-Faqih 
(Rahimi, 2007). Al Sistani, on the other hand, disapproves of the use of Wilayat al-Faqih 
(Blanchard, 2005). Following is an outline of the participants views on whether Al Sistani 
used political power as part of his role as a Wilayat al-Faqih. 
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7.3 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS   
One of those interviewed, a Sunni, said: that1MSuJ mentioned that: 
Al Sistani believes in the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih but not openly. If we 
investigate all Al Sistani’s interventions from 2003 till now we will find that he 
has a major and important role in politics therefore, it is possible to say Wilayat 
al-Faqih [applies to him] (1MSuJ).  
Another, a Shia, argues that: 
The separation of religion from politics is worthwhile and prevents the clergy 
from intervening. This is important because Iraq contains several sects and this 
may cause some sensitivity among these communities. History does not 
suggest that Iraq could be governed by clerics. Al Sistani is Iranian yet he 
interfered in Iraqi issues. He did not have sufficient authority to do that 
(8FShSt).  
7FSuSt states that the weakness of the state led to the clergy intervening in politics and 
Al Sistani wants to use Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq to form a new force in the region. She added 
that because Iraq is a country with a Shia majority, Shia there have the faith that the policy of 
Wilayat al-Faqih will succeed, and believe all Al Sistani’s interventions are proof of that.  
2MSuSt (also a Sunni) also supports this comment, stating that since Al Sistani has 
millions of followers and could change the political equation in Iraq, it means he practiced 
Wilayat al-Faqih. This participant believes that all Al Sistani’s interventions in Iraq were a 
type of clerical rule, and that most politicians knew that if they opposed Al Sistani views they 
would be removed from the political process.  
6MsuSt mentioned that there is a large consensus in political attitudes between Al 
Sistani’s and Iran’s, and so it is possible to say that Al Sistani wanted to clone the Iranian 
experience in Iraq which is the Wilayat al-Faqih but he did not declare that.  
5MKuP argued that Al Sistani does not believe in Wilayat al-Faqih because he did not 
want to officially have the same position in Iraq that Ali Khamenei Al Wali al Faqih has in 
Iran. Moreover, Al Sistani knows that Iraq have different sects, not just Shia, thus it is hard 
for Iraq to be the same as Iran, which is almost all Shia, and apply the Wilayat al-Faqih 
principle. 9FSuH/W supported this in saying ‘it is hard to apply the principle of Wilayat al-
Faqih in Iraq because of the sectarian, ethnic and religious diversity in Iraq, so I do not think 
Al Sistani believes in the Wilayat al-Faqih’.  
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The Shia participants in this research did not support the idea that Al Sistani practiced 
Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq. 10MShP mentioned that it is wrong to draw a link between the 
Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran and the role of Al Sistani in Iraq because any government in Iran 
should have the approval of Ali Khamenei Al Wali al Faqih (the Iranian leader under their 
Wilayat al Faqih system) and he has a right to support any candidate as part of his duty to 
control the political system in the country. Moreover, Ali Khamenei Al Wali al Faqih has the 
army (Revolutionary Guards) under his authority and he has the final word in all political 
matters and crucial decisions, but the same is not true of Al Sistani in Iraq. 11MShCl 
mentioned that everything that comes from the Ali Khamenei Al Wali al Faqih in Iran must 
be applied to all, while this cannot be so in Iraq because Iraq is a ‘multi-confessional’ country 
(Sunna, Shia, and Kurds) so Wilayat al- Faqih cannot be applied.  
Most of the decisions issued by Al Sistani have been in agreement with the other 
leaders of all the Iraqi communities, and so that is why some Iraqis interpreted it as the 
Wilayat al-Faqih. 3MShP also argues that the principle of Wilayat al Faqih in Iran is a 
religious and political authority in one, while Al Sistani depends on the Iraqi people when he 
wants to issue any Fatwa. He knows how people have responded previously as the Shia 
believe in the traditional principles of (taqleed). So we can say Al Sistani does not have any 
type of authority except from the Iraqi people. 12MShCl supported that when he mentioned 
that Ali Khamenei Al Wali must be acquainted with political matters if he is to impose his 
opinion and his authority over the people of Iran as all the state is linked to him.  Al Sistani 
believes in “Wlait aluma al Nfseha” which means the people have the right to decide by 
themselves, such as in elections, who is to represent them and also in crucial issues, whether 
they are political or social matters to ask the cleric to intervene.  Therefore, Al Sistani derives 
his strength from the people, not from the authority of the state.  
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Figure  0-1 Does Al Sistani believe in the Wilayat al Faqih principle? 
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, 64% of participants support the view that Al Sistani does 
not practicing Wilayat al Faqih theory in Iraq. They think that Al Sistani does not have 
the official position or the strength of the army to do so, and that he believes that people 
must decide their fate through elections. The figure also shows that 29% of participants 
considered Al Sistani’s interventions in politics to be a part of Wilayat al Faqih theory in 
Iraq, particularly his role in removing Al-Maliki from being Prime Minister (Al Maliki).  
The following section provides further insight into Al Sistani’s views. 
7.4  THE THIRD THEORY OF POLITICAL INTERVENTION – AL 
SISTANI’S MODEL 
The third theory, which Al Sistani seems to have adopted, is that the role of clerics is to 
explain the teaching of Islam and explain what God wants from believers and Islam itself. 
This in turn urges people to follow verses of the Quran, and leaves the politics to the 
politicians (S. V. R. Nasr, 2007). In this model, the clergy try to influence the political nature 
of their country, but from outside of politics. 
1MSuJ mentioned that when clerics intervene in politics the matter is seen as ‘holy’, 
therefore most of the people would be thinking that any opposition to the proposals of the 
cleric will be regarded as opposing God. Thus the clerics should leave politics to the 
politicians, to ensure that they do not unduly influence the people.  
29% 
64% 
7% 
Agree Disagree NA
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6MSuSt believes that if a cleric dabbles in politics and support a party in the political 
process, the cleric cannot be asked by his opponents, for example, not to critique a political 
speech, which covers the religious character – therefore those clerics who work in politics 
and preach for and against political parties and raise religious texts cannot be immune to 
criticism by their opponents. 
5MKuP supports the view that the clergy should not enter politics because some clerics 
confuse their political programs with their religion.  9FSuH/W mentioned that what we are 
witnessing today in the Arab world of exclusion and making wars in the name of religion is 
because the clergy engage in politics. The clerics have portrayed people who disagree with 
them on political issues as infidels and secular and following a western agenda. 
7FSuSt mentioned that involving religion in politics has led to further fragmentation 
and division on religious grounds. Doctrine perpetrated in the name of religion claims to 
represent true Islam so it is a better idea to keep religion out of politics. 
8FShSt mentioned that no one has a right to use religious discourse to influence an 
audience of people in political life by supporting any individual or party or organization. 
Political participation is the duty of politicians and it is the duty of every citizen to see that 
the minority does not impose on the silent majority. 2MSuSt mentioned that the religious 
speech which has been used by clerics is used to override the freedom and rights of the 
people and is recognized by others, accusing them of blasphemy. Equal opportunity is 
lacking among the contenders in the political field, as long as one of them has a religious 
monopoly. If he claims divine support this is a lie, because God Almighty did not come down 
and salute support of a particular person or entity to govern the people. 
 In this research the lack of support from the participants regarding the intervention of 
the clergy in politics was very clear. Was the role of the clergy who were interfering in 
politics closer to the Wilayat al-Faqih. Many participants agreed that Al Sistani did not 
support the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih and he has a different idea regarding interventions 
in politics. Al Sistani’s model was closer to the secular. 10MShP mentioned: 
I noticed all the interventions when Al Sistani appeared to take a civil role in 
state institutions and not the role of a cleric. The Iranian government has tried 
several times to make Al Sistani follow it politically. He is an Iranian national 
but each time he has proved independent and leaves the choice for the Iraqi 
people.  
11MShCl argues that Al Sistani differs to the other clerics with regard to interference in 
politics.  Al Sistani was interested in the timing of intervention because Iraq was often 
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suffering from the oppression of the rulers.  When he decided to intervene he was recognizing 
Iraqi reality and taking into account all the communities. He was not emotional in his 
decisions therefore he was different to other clerics. 13MShP states that he has met with 
western officials who said “Despite all that happened to the [Shia] Al Sistani showed 
statesmanship.”  For example, during the bombing of Samara he had not issue any order in 
reaction to the incidents of violence. He is a man of peace and was not dragged into hasty 
reactions. 
14MShP agrees that Al Sistani is a cleric who believes in the separation of powers, 
democracy and public freedoms, and that he should have the role of advice and guidance, not 
direct intervention, therefore he is different from the other clerics. 
3MShP believes that Al Sistani proved to the world that Islam is a religion of love and 
peace and that he does not believe in violence: that the events in Syria and other countries are 
due to the wrong understanding of Islam; and that Al Sistani has lead by example in every 
area.   
The Americans occupying Iraq looked with great respect on Al Sistani because they 
knew he represented a new model of religious scholars who believe in dialogue and wisdom 
and patience in dealing with problems (A. Allawi, 2008). All of Al Sistani’s statements 
issued since 2003 are in the interest of the Iraqi people and in most cases leave the option for 
Iraqi people to make their own choice, especially in sensitive matters. Al Sistani believes that 
the people should make the decision (Braam et al., 2010). 
7.5   AL SISTANI’S OPINION ON POLITICAL INTERVENTION 
Al Sistani knows that Iraqi society is different from other countries in the region, primarily 
because of the multiplicity of sects and religions (Uloom, 2009). And he did not impose a 
theory but left the choice to the Iraqi people through the elections to choose the form of 
government they wanted 
Many interviews have been conducted with Al Sistani after 2003 to ask him about 
government.  Al Sistani’s once answered:  
The formation of a government on the basis of the idea of Wilayat al-Faqih is 
out of the question, but presumably the new governance respects the Islamic 
religion, which is the religion of the majority of the Iraqi people and would not 
legislate any laws that contradict the teachings of Islam (al-Khafaf, 2007).    
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Al Sistani’s has also been questioned regarding the political role of the Shia clergy in 
Iraq (al-Khafaf, 2007). He responded: 
The Shia wants nothing different from what I want. The Iraqi people, just need 
to fulfil their rights, so regarding the form of a new government it should be 
determined by the Iraqi people through free elections involving all Iraqi sects 
and religions (al-Khafaf, 2007).   
Regarding the rights of minorities Al Sistani was asked about the principles on which 
Iraq's future must be based (al-Khafaf, 2007).  Al Sistani’s answer was:  
The principle of justice and equality is strong among Iraqis. They value 
pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power. The Muslims will certainly 
choose a system that respects the Islamic principles while protecting the rights 
of religious minorities (al-Khafaf, 2007). 
Al Sistani believes in “Wlait Aluma al Nfseha” which means the people have the right 
to decide in elections who is to represent them and also in crucial issues, whether they are 
political or social matters. Therefore, Al Sistani derives his strength from the people, not 
from the authority of the state (al-Khafaf, 2007).  
7.6   ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The question driving this chapter is to what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as 
a cleric with political influence? (Do they approve of his approach to political intervention?) 
Three Shia theories regarding political intervention have been presented. These theories are: 
1. Clerics should have a role in politics. 
2. Only a faqih (the religious leader of a nation) can assume political leadership. 
(Wilayat al Faqih.) 
3. A religious leader (and clerics in general) can offer Islamic thought and 
teaching in regard to politics – but they cannot step into politics and be actively 
involved by taking positions in a government. 
The different participants had different views, with the Sunni leaning toward Al Sistani 
being a religious leader assuming the political role of Wilayat al Faqih. However, as 
explained in the preceding pages, this role is only assumed when the religious leader is a 
political leader (as in Iran) not in Al Sistani’s case where he advised and made requests from 
the role of a cleric. 
In regard to whether or not Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence – they generally do, particularly the Shia. The reasons for the Sunni often rejecting 
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the concept of Al Sistani having political influence vary, but are much the same as presented 
in previous chapters. Basically the Sunni are wary of Shia dominance in politics and suspect 
that the Shia (through Al Sistani) might abuse this dominance. 
Al Sistani did not want to place the spotlight on himself. He is happy to offer advice 
and guidance, but not give orders. He has the moral authority. He sees his role as “directive” 
(Milani, 2010). The approach taken by Al Sistani is moderation, which naturally does not 
interfere in political conflicts, and he does not like himself intervening in politics, thus his 
example is able to change the idea that all clerics are extremist or inclined to violence or to 
direct intervention (J. R. Cole, 2006). 
In the past, most Shia clerics considered that there were no a links between politics and 
the teachings of Islam (Kadhim, 2012) that religion is the spiritual link between God and 
people, while politics involves only the interests of people Vaezi, 2014. Therefore, the role of  
Shia clerics in the founding of the Iraqi state was ineffective was ineffective as their concern 
was not the political system of the state.  They pushed for armed resistance when the British 
occupied Iraq in 1914, however, because they were unsure, and lacked the knowledge of how 
to deal with the new events. Historically, these interventions occurred as an act of standing up 
for the rights of the people. The people were urged to resist but the clerics did not have a 
group of representatives who could negotiate with the invading forces to obtain their rights. 
This explains why the first Iraqi governments were formed by the Sunnis of Iraq as  Shia 
clerics did not have a clear theory of intervention in politics, and they did not know what they 
wanted. 
The principle of “taqleed” which was founded by Shaykh Murtada Al Ansari (1214 
AH-1281 AH) was intended to deal with legal and political provisions (Al'Alwani, 1991).  
Shia clerics began to organize themselves by depending on this principle.  At the beginning 
the purpose of it was religious but then it began to be exploited by clerics to bring people 
closer to them and then some clerics began to raise political ideas (Abd al-Jabbar, 2003). This 
explains how after 2003 the  Shia were more organized than the Sunni and explains how the  
Shia were able to govern after Al Sistani recommended the  Shia to participate actively in the 
elections.  
Regarding Al Sistani’s role in politics, because the majority of the Iraqi people are 
Muslims he confirmed Iraq has an Islamic identity. But he also indicated that Islam respects 
other groups and believes in providing rights for minority groups also (al-Khafaf, 2015). 
Therefore he asked those who wrote the constitution to emphasize that, and not to contradict 
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any provision of the constitution with the teachings of Islam and at the same time to respect 
the right of minorities (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007). 
64% of participants in this study (Figure 6.1) believed that Al Sistani during the period 
from 2003 till now did not intervene in politics except when it was strictly necessary, with no 
other solution in sight.  
Some examples have been mentioned in this thesis which confirm this: his message to 
choose a Prime Minister after Iraq was without a government for eight months, and his Fatwa 
for jihad when the Iraqi army collapsed, are examples of times when his directives (after 
there was no other solution) contributed to saving Iraq. By convincing the Iraqi people to 
choose the option of democracy and to depend on elections to choose and to form a 
government, he dealt wisely with all events after 2003 and earned the respect of all. Thus it is 
possible to say his interventions in Iraq were for Iraq’s interests overall (Uloom, 2009) and 
not because of self-interest or the interests of Shia or clerics. 
29% of the participants in this study considered that Al Sistani applied the principle of 
Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq through his interventions in politics. If compared to the authority of 
Wali al faqih in Iran. It can be said that Al Sistani had lived in Iraq for a long time and he 
knew the composition of the Iraqi people of different races and sects. However Al Sistani did 
not (and does not) have any authority over the Iraqi army or the appointment of the judiciary 
and he has no official position. But the Iraqi people granted Al Sistani confidence to express 
his opinion because they felt that he was the best one for defending their rights.  
So Al Sistani gave his directives, or views, or guidance – whatever some may call it – 
and in all the years of his presence in Iraq he kept away from any relationship with Iran's 
successive governments, thus confirming he was not applying the principle of Wilayat al-
Faqih.  
7.7 SUMMARY  
4MShCl mentioned that the role of Al Sistani is as an advisor, not a ruler. This has been 
defended by all Iraqi communities. One can say that Al Sistani does not have formal powers, 
while Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran is different. In Iran Ali Khamenei Al Wali has the powers of 
the Head of State. Therefore it seems inappropriate to say that Al Sistani has practiced 
Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq.  
The Shia theories regarding intervention in politics was very clear after 2003 because of 
Al Sistani. He was able to present a new model of intervention to attract the world’s attention. 
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All his interventions came in time to maintain the cohesion and unity of Iraq and assist the 
nation in avoiding civil war.  
Al Sistani did not adopt the Wilayat al-faqih because the authority and functions of the 
Wilayat al faqih in Iran is quite different from the role of Al Sistani in Iraq. Al Sistani does 
not have any official position in Iraq and instead derives his strength and influence from the 
Iraqi people. Most of his interventions were critical, and may influence the Iraqi’s into 
believing that he is a man of wisdom whose presence in Iraq is very important.  
The following two chapters provide further analysis of the interview participants’ 
opinions in relation to the research questions.  
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Chapter 8: Intervention in choosing a Prime 
Minister – the 2014 elections  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In analysing data related to the first research question, this chapter explores and discusses the 
2014 election where Al Sistani intervened in the choosing of the next Iraqi prime Minister.  
The question is asked yet again: To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role 
as a cleric with political influence? (Do they approve of his approach to political 
intervention?) 
This analysis is based on the findings from interviews conducted with the participants, 
and textual analysis of written data stemming either directly from Al Sistani, or through his 
organisations.  
8.1.1 Chapter content  
This chapter provides an overview of the background of the 2014 elections, including the 
parties and the attitudes of international communities. It details message which influenced 
Al-Maliki’s withdrawal from the elections, and then explores the research participants’ views 
on the matter before analysing then summarising Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence in regard to the elections? 
8.1.2 The link between this chapter and the research questions 
This chapter explores the following research question: 
To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political influence? 
(Do they approve of his approach to political intervention?)  
Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems, 
and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
How does Al Sistani himself see his role? 
It includes an analysis of findings based on textual analysis (where relevant) and from 
interview questions including the following:  
 Did Al Sistani contribute to the ousting of al-Maliki from power?  
 Were Al Sistani’s interventions in politics justified? 
160 
 
8.2 BACKGROUND  
8.2.1 Introduction 
In the April 2014 elections Al-Maliki received 105 of a possible 328 votes which made him 
the winner and entitled him to form a coalition government. However Al Maliki continued in 
vain for five months to try to form this government. He faced objections from other parties to 
get what would have been a third term as prime Minister. During this time the deteriorating 
security situation and the entry of ISIS fighters to some Iraqi provinces brought Iraq to the 
edge of civil war. International attitudes varied as the USA’s position was to dismiss al-
Maliki's mandate for a third term. This was in spite of the Iranians being in favour of Al 
Maliki being prime minister for a third term.   
This chapter will shed light on what Al Sistani’s role was in forming the Iraqi 
government in 2014 and will also illustrate the extent to which Al Sistani intervened in 
politics at the time, based upon his actions during and after this election. This chapter will 
discuss the extent to which Al Sistani contributed to Al Maliki stepping down in 2014 when 
Iraq was in a sensitive situation and there was international conflict about Al Maliki 
remaining in his position.  
The chapter also will focus on the reasons behind Al Sistani refusing Al Maliki a third 
term, and will examine how members of the Iraqi sects (Sunni and Shia) interpreted this 
action. It is important to investigate whether they consider Al Sistani was biased in helping 
other parties to depose Al Maliki or if he was just doing what he felt was best for Iraq. 
Through this process the text of Al Sistani’s message for politicians and why they 
followed it will be considered, especially as some politicians left Al-Maliki’s since some who 
left Al Maliki’s list and followed Al Sistani’s advice to prevent Al Maliki getting a third 
term.  
8.2.2 The Iraqi parties and international community rejected Al Maliki  
Most Iraqi parties, and even some politicians on Al Maliki’s list, did not want Al Maliki to 
get a third term as Prime Minister of Iraq, therefore most of them argued among themselves 
because of his refusal to form a coalition (Kenneth Katzman et al., 2014).  
The Sadrist, an Iraqi party headed by Muqtada al-Sadr, had entered into army conflicts 
with Al Maliki’s government during his first and second terms as prime minister because of 
differing political views toward some issues (Al-Qarawee, 2014). So, because Al Maliki had 
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many Sadrist prisoners and refused to release them, the Sadrists in general were opposed to 
him having a third term (Plebani, 2014).  
The Kurdish parties considered Kirkuk a Kurdish city while the Arabs rejected this 
idea. When Al Maliki was the Prime Minister he did not acknowledge Kirkuk as a Kurdish 
city, and because of his attitudes the Kurdish parties rejected al-Maliki as Prime Minister for 
a third time (Kenneth Katzman et al., 2014).  
The Supreme Islamic Council, one of the  Shia parties; explicitly refused to give al-
Maliki a third term because they thought it would create a new dictatorship in Iraq, instead of 
turning the nation into a modern democratic state, so they too refused the third term to him 
(Al-Qarawee, 2014).  
The Sunni parties demanded a Prime Minister acceptable to the other blocs and the 
development of a program to resolve the crisis which was not limited to security aspects, but 
which also addressed its sectarian dimensions (Mansour, 2016). The Sunnis also considered 
that Al Maliki was a dictator so they refused him as Prime Minister (Benraad, 2014a).  
The State of Law list which belonged to Al Maliki’s party  argued that if al Maliki got 
the number of votes required, then this would qualify him for a third term in office (Kenneth 
Katzman et al., 2014). To ignore this and ‘change of commander’ in the midst of the battle 
would have serious consequences which could lead to the collapse of the Iraqi army. Al 
Maliki was a commander of the armed forces and the next difficult stage needed a leader like 
him. 
International observers and the leaders of other states had a range of views on the 
election outcome. Kenneth Katzman et al (2014) mentioned that, “President Obama and other 
U.S. officials attributed the June Iraqi Security Forces ISF collapse largely to the failure of 
Iraqi leaders, particularly Al Maliki, to build an inclusive government that could hold the 
allegiance of Sunni citizens or Sunni ISF personnel” (p.4). It is also Obama's administration 
which disagreed with Al Maliki having a third term because he would not sign the Status of 
Forces Agreement in 2011. As well as this, his refusal to grant immunity to the tens of 
thousands of troops the administration wanted to leave in Iraq following the formal 
withdrawal angered Washington (Whitney, 2014). 
Iran had played a key role in Al Maliki's rise to power in 2006, and senior Iranian 
officials had defended his rule, so the Iranian government supported Al Maliki for a third 
term. Kenneth Katzman et al. (2014) mentioned that Iran’s government was, however, 
concerned about support Al Maliki for a third term, worrying that this lead to losing Al 
Sistani’s support, when in fact they wanted the opposite. Benrad (2014b) states that, ‘Al 
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Sistani had noticeably distanced himself from the political process, essentially in reaction to 
what he deemed poor government performance and political corruption’. 
Al Sistani did not intervene when the Iraqi parties failed to choose a new Prime 
Minister for Iraq and this situation remained the same for eight months without a solution in 
sight. 
8.3 AL SISTANI’S MESSAGE   
Some of the members of the State of Law lists which belonged to Al Maliki’s party suggested 
sending a message to Al Sistani to get his advice with regard to the crisis because the 
situation had reached an impasse. Part of this letter stated, ‘We look forward to your guidance 
and promise you that we are under your command. We trust your honesty, vision and the 
depth of your awareness in all issues’ (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
They asked Al Sistani’s advice on how to solve the crisis of not being able to agree on a 
new Prime Minister. The message was not published in the media. Members of the State of 
Law list did not want to create problems within their party so they the message secret 
(Morris, 2014). 
Al Sistani had remained neutral in the recent parliamentary elections and had said he 
would not support any party at the expense of another, and that it was up to the will of the 
citizens to choose those they wanted from the candidates on the electoral lists (Hadad, 2016). 
After delivering this message Al Sistani gave his opinion as to who was the top  Shia 
cleric in Iraq. Al Sistani’s answer was:  
I see the need to speed up the selection of a new Prime Minister acceptable to 
the majority and able to work together with the political leaders of the rest with 
the ability to save the country from the dangers of terrorism, sectarian war and 
division (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
According to this message new alliances were created and Al-Malaki stepped down, 
knowing he did not have Al Sistani’s support, and Haider al-Abadi was chosen in 2014 as the 
New Prime Minister of Iraq.  
8.4 WHY DID AL-MALAKI STEP DOWN? (THE PARTICIPANTS’ 
VIEWS)  
The Sunnis and Shia interviewed in this research had opposing opinions about the situation of 
Al-Malaki stepping down. 1MSuJ mentioned that it was his belief that the change of Prime 
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Minister was under orders from the US and Al Sistani was a tool used by the United States to 
implement its agenda in Iraq. I asked this participant if he had any evidence for his opinion, 
and he could not provide any.  
7FSuSt argued that there were orders from Iran to depose Al-Maliki and she questioned 
the benefit of elections if, as she believed, Al Sistani was the one who removed and appointed 
the Iraqi Prime Minister. Here this participant was thinking that there were orders from Iran 
or the USA for Al Sistani to issue his to not vote for Al-Malaki. The importance of this 
comment is that it makes a connection between Al Sistani and Iran, a connection made quite 
possibly just because Al Sistani is originally from Iranian, but also because of the permanent 
conflict in the Middle East region, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and how this 
reflects on Iraqi sects.  
2MSuSt believed that the message from Al Sistani was correct (meaning it was a 
sensible message to Iraqi’s) but he questioned why Al Sistani did not to intervene sooner 
when he already knew that Al-Maliki had committed crimes and his past performance had 
been inadequate.  
2MSuSt believes that Al Sistani’s did not have an independent opinion, and that he may 
even have feared for his life. According to him, Al-Maliki had committed crimes. I suggested 
to him that there was not enough evidence presented by participants to prove that, and again 
he raised the question regarding the speed of Al Sistani’s intervention in solving the 
problems. 5MKuP stated that Al Sistani feared that Al-Maliki would become a dictator in the 
new Iraq. He said this is why most parties did not support Al-Maliki for a third term, and this 
is why Al Sistani advised them to choose a new Prime Minister. This comment shows us that 
some Sunnis participants had a different view of Al Sistani than others. Some understood that 
his role took into consideration their interests, and not the opposite. Al-Maliki is also known 
to be Shia, but Al Sistani’s advice was to replace him because he felt his continuation meant 
more problems and divisions and this indicates that Al Sistani was not sectarian in his view. 
9FSuH/W agreed with Al Sistani’s message to remove al-Maliki because it led to the 
rescue of the Sunnis from the influence of al-Maliki. This comment was again possible 
evidence that Al Sistani's advice to change Al Maliki may be in the interests of all sects of the 
Iraqi people, not just Shia.  
110MShP mentioned that Al-Maliki was rejected by most of the Shia parties so Al 
Sistani was in harmony with these parties when he supported the removal of Al-Maliki, and 
that not all Sunnis agreed with this action but some of them supported it because they 
considered it as a good solution at a sensitive time.  
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6MSuSt mentioned that Al Sistani had been a supporter of the views and ideas of most 
of the Iraqi parties which were involved in the formation of the Iraqi government. Therefore 
6MSuSt considers that Al Sistani’s opinion was compatible with most of the Iraqi parties. 
Secondly 6MSuSt indicated that the timing of the intervention of Al Sistani in the political 
process was very good, and that it is important that the Sunnis know that the intervention of 
Al Sistani is not every time, but only in the case of extreme necessity.   
Some Shia people took Al Sistani’s message of a new Prime Minister as an important 
action in helping Iraqis to form a new government. 10MShP mentioned that most Iraqi sects 
(Sunni, Shia and Kurds in particular) did not support Al Maliki for a third term. 10MShP also 
said that it was some members from Al Maliki’s list who agreed to send a message to Al 
Sistani to know his opinion. And of course it was Al Sistani’s duty as a cleric to answer all 
political and non-political questions, so he gave them his opinion and they were free to follow 
it or not. 
11MShCl mentioned that the Dawa party failed in the management of the country 
during the eight-year rule of Al-Maliki and therefore contributed to the spread of 
administrative and economic corruption. 11MShCl added that: 
Maliki believed himself to be the only one capable of running the country but 
he had failed in that Al Sistani , as a cleric, has a well-established right to 
express his opinion in politics and give advice on what he sees as Iraq and the 
Iraqis interests and to maintain the unity of the country and avoid civil war. 
He said that was particularly important since most of the political parties did not want 
to extend Al Maliki for a third term.  
13MShP mentioned that one of duties of a cleric is to give his opinion, especially in 
sensitive times, therefore when Al Maliki insisted on a third term and most of the Iraqi parties 
disagreed, Al Sistani’s message helped to avoid civil war and maintained the unity of Iraq.  
8FShSt also suggests that the intervention of Al Sistani was intended to resolve the 
problem and avoid new disasters. Moreover, in view of 8FShSt Al Sistani's message as the 
main Shia cleric was to save Iraq from domestic war. 8FShSt added that:  
Al Sistani was a good observer of events in Iraq and the region, so his advice 
was close to reality in avoiding international conflicts especially as Al Maliki 
staying in office was rejected by many countries.  
The significance of this comment is that some of the Sunni participants realised that Al 
Sistani was looking to events not just in Iraq but he was also considering the problems 
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throughout the region. It is interesting to note that most of the research participants saw this 
and agreed with his opinions.  
3MShP stated that Al Sistani did not intervene in politics without good reason, and 
stressed yet again that in the case of Al-Malaki it was the politicians who had asked him his 
opinion about Al Maliki. He said that Al Sistani was following the political situation in the 
region more carefully than the politicians were. Therefore his intervention was appropriate 
when he saw that Al-Maliki was being rejected by so many. 2MShP said Al-Maliki wanted to 
establish close relations with Iran, and that tensions in the region between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and with Iran on the other, led to his advice to the 
politicians to no longer accept Al-Malaki as prime Minister. 
4MShCl argued that Al Sistani was biased against Al-Maliki, and that the change that 
happened was a partial change of a person (Al Maliki) and not all the members of the Al-
Maliki government so the change did not include corrupt politicians who remained in office.  
14MShP mentioned that during the reign of al-Maliki, Iranian influence over Iraq had 
increased dramatically so Al Sistani wanted to stop this influence by replacing Al Maliki with 
a new Prime Minister acceptable to Iraqis and the international community.   
Overall, most of the participants in this research agreed that Al Sistani did something 
good for Iraq and the region when advising some members of the State of Law to choose a 
new prime minister instead of al Maliki. As mentioned in the literature review, some Iraqis 
suspect there is an Iranian political influence in Iraqi political processes, and Al-Malaki is 
‘friends’ with Iran. Therefore this comment suggests that while Al Sistani is Iranian he is not 
following Iran’s interest in Iraq and instead advocating for removing Al-Maliki. At the end, 
Maliki was left with only one major backer: Al-Qarawee (2016) mention that  
Despite Iran’s backing, however, the party could not ignore Al Sistani’s will. 
Al Sistani’s position and the United States’ desire to see a new prime minister 
put enough pressure on Iran so that it withdrew its support for Maliki (p.3).  
The Iranian government tried to help Al Maliki get a third term in office as Prime 
Minister, but in the end, when they found strong opposition from Al Sistani they agree with 
his replacement.    
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Figure  0-1 Why a new Iraqi Prime Minister was chosen? 
Figure 8.1 indicates that 86% of the research participants believed that it is Al Sistani's 
message that has replaced the Prime Minister, not the USA. Only 7% of participants 
think that the USA was behind the removal of Al Maliki in its role as a significant player 
in Middle East politics.  
8.5 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The research participants thought there were valid reasons behind Al Sistani’s issuing of his 
message to not vote for Al-Malaki. These reasons included what seemed to be an 
international consensus for rejection of Maliki's stay in office, a national rejection by most of 
the Iraqi parties, and Maliki’s failure to effectively manage the nation to the satisfaction of 
most Iraqis. In support of Al Sistani, overall (as seen in Figure 8.1) 86% of the participants of 
this research (representing the two main Iraqi sects – the Sunni and the Shia) supported Al 
Sistani’s action (his message).  
As recorded in the data, 7% of participants in this study believe that the USA removed 
Al Maliki from his position as prime minister. It is difficult to find evidence for this. There is 
no sign of any agreement between Al Sistani and the USA to depose Al Maliki, or for any 
reason, and it seems evident that at least from 2003 Al Sistani had no relations with the USA 
and did not meet with any of USA government officials. The USA attempted to influence his 
opinion on many subjects but they could not. Many times Paul Bremer complained to the US 
86% 
7% 
7% 
BY Sistani By USA OtherBy ista i  
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administration about Al Sistani’s objections to him when he was US Ambassador in Iraq 
(Bremer, 2006).  
It is possible to say that both of them (Al Sistani, and USA) had interest in changing Al 
Maliki, and because of that some Sunni participants felt there was an agreement between Al 
Sistani and the US. This suggestion of there being agreement between Al Sistani and USA to 
remove Al-Maliki was usually the belief of the Sunni in this research. (A further reason for 
suspecting a link between the US and Al Sistani is that Al Sistani did not issue a Jihad Fatwa 
against the USA when invaded Iraq at 2003. However, as explained in previous chapters, 
there are other reasons for this). 
Iran’s government may have wished for Al Maliki to stay for a third term because they 
shared the same political agenda,  and it was not in Iran’s interest to remove Al-Maliki 
because there were matching ideas between Iran and Al-Maliki in all regional issues, such as 
the USA-Russian-Iranian conflict in Syria, and the Iranian-Saudi Arabia conflict (al-
Qarawee, 2017). 
According to Figure 8.1 86% of the participants believed that it was Al Sistani’s 
message that led to the choosing of a new prime minister. Yet Al Sistani waited and waited. 
He allowed time for the politicians to try to resolve the matter (although some turn this 
against him and say he was slow to intervene). 
From the data gathered from the research participants it seems apparent to me that there 
was nothing that could sway or bias Al Sistani’s opinion that his actions were only in the best 
interests of the Iraqi people as a whole.  
Some of Al Maliki’s behaviours led Al Sistani to frankly express his opinion towards 
him. According to Al Sistani, Al Maliki’s government was not serious in the fight against 
unprecedented rampant corruption at the highest levels in the various state departments. He 
was a major obstacle in any real progress being made in important areas such as security, 
services and economic development. In this study, some Shia participants attributed the 
responsibility for flaws in the management of the security portfolio and the economy to al-
Maliki, flaws which led to Al Sistani’s call for citizens to volunteer (Al Sistani’s Fatwa) in 
the ranks of the armed forces in order to avoid a complete collapse. Maliki was responsible 
for the security portfolio, He only appointed leaders who were his relatives and who 
prevented officials from any role in it (Benraad, 2014) so he was responsible for the great 
failure in this portfolio, as al-Khafaf (2015)  stated:. 
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Al Sistani was convinced that the significant deterioration in Iraq's political life 
among the sons of one’s homeland on the one hand and between Iraq and its 
Arab and Muslim allies on the other hand, made the need for change urgent 
(p.227). 
A change in vision was necessary if the Iraqis wanted to ward off the dangers of 
terrorism, sectarian war and division that had intensified in the recent period, particularly 
after the fall of Mosul by ISIS (Hadad, 2016). 
8.6 SUMMARY  
Yes, Al Sistani did intervene in choosing a prime minister. He did so after waiting many 
months, and only after allowing time for matters to be resolved without his intervention. Al 
Sistani fits the profile of being a religious leader who will offer advice on all aspects of the 
lives and the world of his people – Iraqi’s.  If this means intervening in politics as an outsider 
with great influence, then he will do so. The Iraqis whom I have interviewed, both Sunni and 
Shia, who supported Al Sistani’s action to change prime minister, believed that he is not 
interested in supporting any one group, therefore they believed that his intervention was only 
in Iraq best interests. 
Al Sistani did not have any power to force others to carry out his advice but he 
expressed his opinion and left others to choose. (Although it seems obvious he knew his 
opinion held much weight).  
In the political or any other arena Al Sistani did not ask for any position for himself or 
for any member of his family (Aimami, 2011). And he does not have the military power to 
force others to listen to his opinion. Yet he does have a following. Many politicians know that 
the Iraqi Shia community listens to Al Sistani’s advice. Most of the people appear to believe 
that what he says is in the interest of the people. 
In summary:  
 Did Al Sistani contribute to the ousting of al-Maliki from power?  
 Were Al Sistani’s interventions in politics justified? 
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Chapter 9: Al Sistani’s jihad Fatwa 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this, the last of the analysis chapters, this research explores further questions which will 
shed insight on Al Sistani in regard to his political influence, and to whether the people of 
Iraq hold a great deal of hope in Al Sistani . It will be seen that the people of Iraq do hold 
much hope in Al Sistani. Among the Shia this is especially the case, but much less so among 
the Sunni.  
9.1.1 Chapter content 
This chapter provides background information in the form of an overview of the situation in 
which Al Sistani announced a jihad fatwa against ISIS. In this overview ISIS is explained, as 
well as what a jihad is, and the history of jihads in Iraq. Also explained is the concept of a 
jihad kefaya, and detailed is the text of Al Sistani’s fatwa. 
Following this is discussion of the research participants’ views in relation to: 
 Did Al Sistani save Iraq in 2003 when he did not issue a fatwa against US 
forces? 
 Was Al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa against ISIS, or was it for sectarian purposes?  
 Was Al Sistani’s fatwa decided on in agreement with Iran?  
 What was the impact of Al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa on Iraqi communities? 
At this point the chapter moves into an analysis and discussion of the data, and then a chapter 
summary.  
9.1.2 The link between this chapter and the research questions 
This chapter explores the following research questions: 
Q 1: To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? Do they approve of his approach to his own political influence?  
Q 2: Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s 
problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
It includes an analysis of findings based on textual analysis (where relevant) and from 
interview questions including the following:  
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 Why did Al Sistani not issue a fatwa against the US when they occupied Iraq 
while he did issue a fatwa against ISIS? 
 Is this fatwa really against the Sunnis? 
 Does this fatwa interfere in the political affairs of Iraq? 
 Is this fatwa an agreement between Al Sistani and Iran? 
9.2 BACKGROUND  
‘Jihad’ and ‘fatwa’ are two words often seen together. A fatwa is a religious decision made 
by a high-ranking Islamic scholar that must be followed by the Muslims it is given to. A jihad 
is the means of following the decision.  
On the 13th of June in 2014 Al Sistani issued a jihad fatwa against the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the Levant group (ISIL) at a time when these groups occupied parts 
of Iraq. In his fatwa, Al Sistani called the volunteers to bear weapons and come and resist the 
enemy and fight for their country. The response was overwhelming. 
(It should be noted here that ISIS and ISIL are much the same, and usually known 
under the banner of ‘ISIS’. Technically, however, although these two co-ordinated groups 
fight for the same cause, they often fight in different areas). 
In the views of some such as Jensen (2016) this fatwa contributed greatly to avoiding 
disaster in Iraq and the region in general, when it prevented the fall of Baghdad, the capital of 
Iraq. It was a time when ISIS had made rapid progress in the five northern, western and 
eastern provinces. While security authorities were still investigating to determine the 
circumstances of ISIL’s advance, the army created by the fatwa stopped ISIL’s progress on 
the outskirts of Baghdad.  
Al Sistani’s action was almost unprecedented. A religious leader in Iraq had not issued 
a fatwa for decades, but there was a quick response from the various central and southern 
provinces populated by Shia, in response to Al Sistani’s fatwa which has experienced both 
criticism and praise by Iraqis.  
The importance of this chapter is to discuss the impact of the fatwa on two major Iraqi 
sects, the Sunnis, and Shia, and the attitudes of these two sects to the fatwa. One important 
question in this chapter is why Al Sistani issued the fatwa against ISIS in 2014 but did not 
issue a fatwa against the USA in 2003, even though both forces occupied Iraq.  
This chapter will also examine whether the fatwa was against or for the Sunni people in 
Iraq, because the fighting was in their areas. This chapter also clarifies the role of this fatwa 
in contributing to sectarian violence, as the Sunnis’ clerics went as far as calling it a 
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declaration of war against the Sunnis (Linge, 2016) or if on the contrary the fatwa promoted 
national unity among Iraqis.  
9.2.1 Who is ISIS?  
ISIS refers to the ‘Islamic State’ of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS is often referred to as ISIL 
means the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (‘Levant’ is a more historical name for 
Syria). There is another name that the group rejects, but which many officials use: this name 
is Daesh. ‘Daesh’ stems from an Arabic acronym that means the same thing as ISIL, but 
sounds like an Arabic word meaning “stomp on” (Gambhir, 2014).  
ISIS sees itself as an Islamic caliphate, which is a state under the leadership of a caliph, 
someone seen as a successor to the prophet Muhammad and a leader of all Muslims. 
Although they call themselves ‘Islamic State’ no government in the world recognizes them as 
a state, and many Muslims are appalled by their definition of Islam (Phillips, 2014). Various 
commentators describe ISIS in different ways which are all similar. Laub and Masters define 
ISIS as “a predominantly Sunni jihadist group seeks to sow civil unrest in Iraq and the Levant 
with the aim of establishing a caliphate, a single, transnational Islamic state based on sharia” 
(Laub & Masters, 2014, p. 1).  
The group became known as ISIS or ISIL in 2013 and then ‘Islamic State’ after it 
launched a major offensive in northern Iraq and claimed to have established a caliphate 
across Iraq and Syria in June 2014 (Zelin, 2014) when it captured Mosul. Al-Qaida is a 
predecessor of ISIS, otherwise its origins are mixed among various other groups. 
The group claims to be the sole representative of true followers of Islam and has 
executed large numbers of Muslims whose understanding of the Quran differs from its own 
narrow interpretation (G. Wood, 2015). These groups refuse other opinions and other sects 
and their ideology is limited to establishing a "caliphate", a country ruled by one political and 
religious leader and according to Islamic law (Cockburn, 2014). Moreover, the members of 
ISIS are jihadists who belong to an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam and consider 
themselves the only rightful believers and they say that the rest of the world is made up of 
infidels who are seeking to destroy Islam in order to justify attacks against other Muslims and 
non-Muslims (Al-Tamimi, 2014).  
Intentionally these teams or groups  justify judgments of conviction and the 
criminalization and apostasy on the basis of the conduct of  war  and the use of 
armed force in the belief that what you are doing as close as possible to the 
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jihad waged by the early Muslims in the era of the Islamic conquests (Pelham, 
2015b).  
They also believe they must kill every Muslim who believes in democracy – and this 
means killing tens of millions of Muslims (G. Wood, 2015). They believe democracy is leads 
to the non-application of the law of God (Gambhir, 2014).   
These groups depend financially on money from oil smuggling in Syria, 
racketeering and kidnappings, as well as donations from private jihadi 
networks in the Gulf. Later, it captured some of Syria and Iraq’s most-lucrative 
oil fields (Wood, 2015).  
Al Sistani obviously knew the dangers of ISIS so his fatwa was like a pre-emptive war 
against this ideology which wants to kill Muslims or anyone else who opposes them. 
9.2.2 The Meaning of ‘jihad’  
The word “jihad” holds different meanings for Muslims and non-Muslims. Some non-
Muslims understand a jihad as being like a “holy war”. Knapp (2003) mentioned that the 
Arabic term jihad is usually translated into European languages as holy war, on the basis of 
the use of this word in the Islamic world where it often refers to ‘holy war’. Yet it has a 
significantly different meaning in the Quran and Hadith, where it primarily means a 
“struggle” or “exertion”. Basically, “Fatwa” is like the instruction while “jihad” is the order 
to carry out the instruction. 
Heck (2004) mentions that the word jihad has appeared widely in the Western news 
media following the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon, but the true meaning of this term in the Islamic world (it is sometimes called 
the “sixth pillar” of the faith) is still not well understood by non-Muslims. 
In the Quran “jihad” is used in different ways and with different meanings (Knapp, 
2003). Nasr also states that there are various elements to the meaning of “jihad” and that the 
first of these is that, ‘It can refer to internal as well as external efforts to be a good Muslim or 
believer, as well as working to inform people about the faith of Islam’ (Nasr, 1999, p. 3). 
Bukhari supports this in stating that ‘jihad’, ‘means inner conflict between the human and his 
intention to refuse any evil actions from the whispers of Shaitan (satan) and to accept the 
good’ (Bukhari, 1987, p. 115). This element of jihad is a clear invitation that Islam calls 
people to achieve internal peace and to forego hatred and anger (Heck, 2004), and that the 
focus of a jihad is not violence.   
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A second element is Jihad by the tongue, which means defending Islam by publishing 
teachings of Islam, participating in interviews, and generally just presenting Islam clearly and 
accurately (Khan, 1979). The third element of jihad is ‘Jihad by “the pen/knowledge” which 
involves research, writing articles and assisting in the “defence of Islam and writ[ing] books 
which help to understand the real nature of Islam’ (Bukhari, 1987). 
There is more. A fourth type of jihad is “Jihad by the hand” which is a jihad of action 
rather than words, so it refers to when a Muslim is ‘helping others by actions such as zakart 
(charity) and hajj (pilgrimage)’ (Khan, 1979).  
A fifth type is the “fard ayn” jihad which is jihad by prayer and ritual, by good habits 
and practices (Sahara, 2015) while a six jihad is jihad by the sword (known also as a jihad 
kefaya or jihad fard ayn) (Bukhari, 1987). ‘Jihad by the sword could be simply a group of 
freedom fighters or an organised campaign of an army’ (Khan, 1979), but usually it refers to 
the use of modern weapons in defending one’s country (Litvak, 2010). It is not misuse of 
arms to create violence.  
There are only two situations were Jihad by the sword is allowed to be undertaken 
(Ilesanmi, 2000). ‘The first one is for self-defence when someone attacks you or when your 
nation has been attacked’ (Khan, 1979). The second one is fighting against evil and injustice. 
It is also a sin if a Muslim sees injustice being done when he/she is capable of stopping it, yet 
does nothing about it. This can include wars on drugs, child labour, and on terror (Cook, 
2015; Gerges, 2009; Mohammad, 1985).   
9.2.3 Jihads in Iraqi history 
Some clerics have insisted on trying to use force to sway people to do what they believe is 
right, but this has typically failed because there was no coordination between politicians and 
clerics (Hegghammer, 2006). The first Jihad Fatwa in Iraqi in modern times was issued in 
1914 by the top Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Kathem al-Yazdi at the time when British forces 
invaded the south of Iraq in Basra (Simon & Tejirian, 2004). Grand Ayatollah Kathem al-
Yazdi ordered the Southern Iraqi tribespeople to defend Basra.  
He spoke from the podium of the Imam Ali shrine, ‘To defend the Islamic territories 
and mandating that those unable to participate in fighting should provide money to contribute 
financially to enable those who are physically able to participate’ (Kadhim, 2012b; 
Vinogradov, 1972). Iraq was under Ottoman occupation at that time but the  Shiatreated the 
Ottomans as though they were Muslims, even though the Ottoman treatment of the  Shiawas 
harsh which led to deteriorating health and economic conditions of the  Shia(Abd al-Jabbar, 
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2003). After three years, in 1917 British forces invaded Baghdad. This was after strong 
military resistance by the Iraqi tribes under the guidance of clerics in Najaf (Simon & 
Tejirian, 2004). Aimami (2011) mentions that the relation between invasion forces and  
Shiaclerics was non-confrontational. The practices of the British forces and lack of 
understanding of Iraqi culture strained this relationship led to the revolution of 1920, which 
had the approval of clerics in Najaf (F. R. A. al-Kifaee, 2010; Kadhim, 2012b; Vinogradov, 
1972).  
One might say that the role of the clergy helped to preserve the unity of Iraq, which is 
necessary in preserving the rights of all Iraqis (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
There have only been two jihad fatwas in Iraqi history, in 1914 and in 2014.  
9.2.4 Al Sistani’s Fatwa for a jihad kefaya  
The 9th of June in 2014 was one of the saddest days in Iraq’s history. On this day ISIS 
invaded the three Iraqi provinces of Mosul, Tikrit and Ramadi, as well as parts of Karkuk 
(Lewis, 2014).  
The conventional viewpoint of the Iraqi authorities was that Iraq had two options to 
guarantee security when faced with challenges above the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF): Iraq could call for help from the United States, or it could call for help from Iran (Laub 
& Masters, 2015). At that time, however, President Obama and the US administration was 
reluctant to support the Al-Maliki government, thus leaving the door open for Iranian military 
intervention (Laub & Masters, 2015). And while the US would not provide any help (not 
without political conditions involving Al-Maliki) Iran was waiting for a suitable time to offer 
assistance (G. Wood, 2015).  
Al Sistani’s intervention with his jihad fatwa came at a most suitable time. He issued a 
religious edict – a jihad kefaya fatwa – calling on Iraqi citizens ‘to defend the country, its 
people, the honour of its citizens, and its sacred places’ (quoted in Pelham, 2015a – on the 
web). A jihad kefaya fatwa (sometimes called a jihad kefaya farn fatwa) is not obligatory for 
every Muslim, but only a group of them (Al Libi, 2010), typically those who are more able. 
In 1914 when Kathem al-Yazdi issued a Fatwa where each one must take up arms to defend 
his country, that was called a jihad fard ayn fatwa (Vinogradov, 1972). 
On the 13th of June during Friday prayers Sheikh Abdul Mahdi Karbalai, the official 
spokesman for Al Sistani, announced Al Sistani’s jihad kefaya fatwa, calling for Muslims to 
fight on the behalf of others in the defence of their country as part of the new Popular 
Mobilisation Forces (PMF) (al-Khafaf, 2015).  
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9.2.5 The text of Al Sistani’s fatwa 
Following is a translation this researcher made of the Arabic original of Sheik Karbalai’s 
announcement, as given to him by Al Sistani. 
The situation that Iraq is going through is a very dangerous one. All Iraqi 
citizens must be aware of our situation and our deep responsibility. This is a 
legitimate responsibility, and a patriotic one.  
Iraq and the people of Iraq are facing a great and dangerous challenge. The 
terrorists are not only targeting the control of some provinces such as Mosul 
and Salahuddin, but they have stated that they are targeting all provinces, 
including the cities of Baghdad and Karbala and Najaf. Understand that the 
terrorists are targeting all Iraqis in every area.  
The responsibility to address them and fight them is everyone's responsibility. 
We all need to respect each other regardless of party or sect. The challenge is a 
significant one for the Iraqi people, who are known for their courage and for 
assuming national responsibility and legitimacy in the most difficult of 
circumstances and challenges. Our responsibility at the moment is to save our 
country Iraq and its people from these attackers, and to make sacrifices for the 
sake of preserving the unity of our country and our dignity, and to protect our 
holy places.  
We want to all of Iraqi citizens to be patient, courageous and have fortitude in 
such circumstances as facing fear and an aggressive enemy. This war must be 
an incentive for us to further to keep our country, our people and our holy 
places safe.   
The following day Al Sistani’s website issued a clarification of this fatwa which 
explained how to apply it. He made three important points.  
First, this fatwa was an invitation to all Iraqis, not just for the Shia, and the objective of 
this Fatwa is to prepare to fight groups of ISIS (al-Khafaf, 2015). These groups (ISIS) have 
openly declared they are targeting all the holy places of Muslims and Christians (Pelham, 
2015b). ISIS is targeting everyone whose opinion is different to their own, whether they are 
Sunni or Shia, therefore all Iraqis should face this group (Laub & Masters, 2015).  
This Fatwa was not a sectarian action. Throughout recent decades religious authorities 
have demonstrated even in the toughest of events that policies are far from sectarian 
practices, with no fatwa ever directed against any one of Iraq's communities (Laub & 
Masters, 2015).  
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Second, the clarification issued from Al Sistani’s website stated that the fatwa was an 
invitation to volunteer fighters to join with the Iraqi army and other formal forces. The 
volunteering was meticulously governed to avoid chaos and illegal acts, such as granting 
militias a role. Al Sistani did not support any particular group or sect and called on the Iraqi 
government to organize the volunteer process (al-Khafaf, 2015). A lack of organization in the 
volunteer centres may lead to the occurrence of terrorist acts.   
Third, the current situation should be seen as an opportunity for Iraqis to demonstrate 
greater solidarity. We must help all displaced persons and provide all necessary assistance to 
them. No food retailers are to increase prices in this difficult situation, nor are they to put 
away stock that is needed by the people of Iraq (al-Khafaf, 2015). Monopolising resources is 
contrary to the teachings of God.  
Some claimed this clarification (above) paved the way for those who wanted to exploit 
this fatwa, to carry out agendas to disperse Iraqis and establish a base for sectarian war 
(Khosrokhavar, 2016). However, the fatwa was heeded by millions of Iraqis, who considered 
Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani to be a spiritual leader and above reproach (Pelham, 2015b).  
Large numbers who committed themselves to the jihad were more than enough to turn 
the disastrous collapse of morale into a moment of unshaken confidence. There were already 
tens of thousands serving in the Iraqi military and police who often showed questionable 
commitment to the defence of their country because of their mixed ethnic and sectarian 
loyalties and poor preparation (G. Wood, 2015), but now Al Sistani made it possible to form 
a truly committed second army with a clearly defined doctrine (al-Khafaf, 2015). A 
significant question in this thesis, however, is why Al Sistani did not issue a Fatwa in 2003 
against US forces. 
9.3 DISCUSSION OF THE PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS (SUNNI AND SHIA) 
9.3.1 Did Al Sistani save Iraq in 2003 when he did not issue a fatwa against US forces? 
The Shia and the Sunni shared differing viewpoints about Al Sistani not issuing a fatwa 
against the US in 2003. 
 1MSuJ, a Sunni, mentioned that if Al Sistani had issued a jihad Fatwa in 2003 against 
the US and encouraged the formation of the PMF (Popular Mobilisation Forces) as he did in 
2014, the US would not be able to stay in Iraq for even another six months. He said, however, 
that Al Sistani was sectarian when leaving just the Sunni people resisting the invasion forces. 
7FSuSt, another Sunni, argued that he supported Al Sistani when he did not issue a Jihad in 
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2003 because if he did it will be like a suicide action because of the inequality of power 
between the US and Iraq.  
2MSuSt, also a Sunni, argues that when US invaded Iraq their mission was to remove 
Saddam from power and it this was not a threat to the Shi, therefore Al Sistani did not issue a 
jihad Fatwa against them. 2MSuSt, thought the same. 5MKuP, a Kurd, said something similar 
in adding that Al Sistani did not have enough strength to face the Americans militarily and 
the Americans occupied Iraq to eliminate the system of government run by the Sunni 
therefore Al Sistani did not issue a Fatwa for jihad against the Americans. He also added that 
Al Sistani obviously approved of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-led regime. 
9FSuH/W supported the argument that Al Sistani considered the occupation a good 
chance to get rid of Saddam's regime, which was tough on the Shia. She said the time was not 
appropriate for the jihad fatwa because the Iraqis had faced three devastating wars and had no 
possibility of resistance, and the Shia were waiting for a new role after the removal of 
Saddam. 
 Among the Shia interviewed, 6MSuSt mentioned that when US invaded Iraq they did 
not target Shia therefore Al Sistani did not issue a jihad fatwa. He added that there was an 
expectation among Shia that the state would be managed by them therefore Al Sistani did not 
issue a Jihad Fatwa.  
All the Shia participants in this study who support Al Sistani’s action have opinions 
about why Al Sistani did not issue any jihad fatwa in 2003. 10MShP said that Al Sistani did 
not issue a jihad fatwa because he did not want to support the Ba'ath party. 10MShP added:  
The Shia were not ready because they had been under the control of the Baath 
Party for decades and there was not sufficient strength for a jihad.  At the same 
time although Al Sistani did not support the invasion of the Americans he 
encouraged everyone who worked with them to encourage them to leave as 
soon as possible.  
11MShCl supported this when he mentioned that there was no suitable ground for this 
fatwa. The Iraqi people were unarmed, the US was far more powerful and the people were 
fatigued by the economic blockade. In addition, Saddam was a criminal so why would Al 
Sistani support him by issuing a jihad fatwa.  
 4MShCl believed that Iraq had been suffering from a repressive dictatorship so the 
Americans were entering as liberators, not conquerors. He said Al Sistani was looking at 
reality. If the people came out to resist the US the result would be a disaster because America 
had the military capability for massive destruction. While 14MShP stated that Al Sistani 
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could not issue a fatwa against the Americans because the Shia at that time were suffering 
from the rule of Saddam.  
Overall, the participants indicated that Al Sistani did the right thing in not issuing the 
fatwa when the us took occupation of Iraq in 2003, as shown in the table below. 
 
 
Figure  0-1 Did Al Sistani saves Iraq in 2003 when he did not issue a fatwa against US forces? 
Figure 9.1 indicates that 79% of participants supported Al Sistani in not issuing a fatwa 
in 2003 against US forces. Perhaps the main reason for this is that the US removed the 
Saddam regime had led Iraq to two devastating wars and the persecution of the Iraqi 
people for more than 25 years.  
9.3.2 Was Al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa against ISIS, or was it for sectarian purposes?  
1MSuJ mentioned that Al Sistani’s Fatwa against ISIS was an explicit call to kill Sunnis who 
might have been supporting ISIS. 7FSuSt argued that Al Sistani’s Fatwa against ISIS was 
only to rid the Sunni of ISIS, stating that Al Sistani asked people in Shia areas to shelter and 
protect Sunnis and give aid to them which was provided from his own office.  
2MSuSt also argued: 
I did support the fatwa because it would lead to murders and to the formation 
of gangs. The solution should have been to engage people in the army, and to 
announce this to the public. Iran's intervention in Iraq was because of this fatwa 
79% 
7% 
14% 
Agree Disagree Na
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… This Fatwa should have been controlled through the United Nations, not in 
this way …   
5MKuP mentioned that the invasion of three Iraqi Sunni provinces by ISIS was a 
warning to Shia because ISIS could not to do that without help of Sunni people. However he 
said Al Sistani’s fatwa was to protect Sunni areas as well as the Shia government. 
9FSuH/W/W argued:  
6MsuSt argued that Al Sistani’s fatwa was issued to save Sunnis from ISIS, stating that 
many Sunni moved to Shia areas when ISIS attacked. 
8FShSt argued:  
I do not endorse this fatwa because there were popular mobilization forces 
which offended the values of this fatwa and they took reprisals on civilians. 
The ISIS invasion of some Iraqi provinces was with Iran's cooperation because 
without this fatwa, Shia militia would have failed to reach the Sunni areas. 
Because of this fatwa they arrived and were given official status to enter these 
areas. The fatwa was to protect Shia more than Sunni because ISIS was close to 
Baghdad.  
10MShP mentioned:  
‘I cannot consider this Fatwa as being against Sunni because there were many 
Sunni fighters who took part with the popular mobilization forces to defend 
their areas and considered this fatwa as a good chance to make Sunni and  Shia 
fight together against one enemy which is ISIS. As for the presence of 
undisciplined soldiers, this is normal in every regular army, especially popular 
mobilization forces.’  
 11MShCl stated that the jihad Fatwa was against ISIS because they believe it is 
permissible to kill all who thought differently to them and also they declared openly that they 
wanted to demolish and destroy all the holy places in Iraq. 11MShCl added that: 
ISIS is not just against Shia, they also killed many Sunni people who did not 
agree with their ideas. ISIS’ plans are not just for Iraq but their expansionist 
goals may reach to other countries, so I can say that Al Sistani’s fatwa saved 
the whole world from the danger of ISIS. 
13MShP, another Shia, agrees that Al Sistani’s Fatwa was not to kill Sunni people but 
to protect them. If Al Sistani wanted to kill them there was a good chance in 2005 when some 
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Sunnis blew up the holy shrines in Samarra. However he dealt wisely with that event and 
prevented the country from a civil war which may have continued for years.  
3MShP supported the above statement in mentioning that in 2005 the sectarian war in 
Iraq was beginning and there were many car bombs exploded in Baghdad in areas inhabited 
by the Shia. But Al Sistani did not exploit this issue by issuing a jihad fatwa against Sunnis, 
instead he always called for unity. 3MShP added that the purpose of the 2014 fatwa was to 
protect Sunni areas from ISIS so they would not then be able to reach the Shia areas.   
4MShCl mentioned that the whole world saw how the popular mobilization forces 
helped the families who had been besieged. 14MShP states that ISIS came to Iraq to kill Shia 
while Americans did not came to Iraq to annihilate the Shia, Sunnis or Kurds, they came for 
the formation of a democratic system. 14MShP added that ISIS has the aim of genocide at a 
level considered the largest in Iraqi history, which is why Al Sistani issued a Jihad Fatwa.  
Again, from the information provided by the participants, there was overwhelming 
support for Al Sistani’s actions and very little criticism or suggestion that it may have been 
for political or sectarian purposes.  
 
Figure  0-2 Was Al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa against ISIS, or was it for sectarian purposes? 
Figure 9.2 shows that 71% of participants support the concept that Al Sistani's fatwa in 
2014 against ISIS was for genuine reasons for the benefit of all Iraqi’s. 29% of 
participants believe this fatwa was given for sectarian purposes because of PMF reprisals 
that harmed Sunni people. 
71% 
29% 
Against ISIS Sectarian
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9.3.3 Was Al Sistani’s fatwa decided on in agreement with Iran?  
As previously said, as Al Sistani is an Iranian citizen there is a theory that because of the 
conflicts in the region between Iran and the US, some Sunnis think that there is an agreement 
between Al Sistani and Iran to stop ISIS at Iraq. This is because if ISIS became strong in Iraq, 
the US would bring many fighters to fight against Iran, as has happened recently in Syria 
(Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2015).  This fatwa prevented full-scale war in the region. At the 
same time it is possible to say that the jihad fatwa was to protect Iran and the Iraq. Some 
Sunnis argued that this was the purpose of this fatwa (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2015). The 
Sunni participants in this research supported this belief. 1MSuJ mentioned that “there is much 
evidence for this”. 5MKuP argued, however, that he did not think that a person such as Al 
Sistani would make an agreement with Iran about this fatwa, but there might be some 
common interests between the two countries. 
8FShSt supports this when he mentioned that the fatwa was issued by agreement with 
Iran because Iran wanted to stop ISIS at Iraq’s border. 7FSuSt mentioned that all events after 
2003 prove that Al Sistani was implementing Iran's interests in the region and that the Jihad 
fatwa was one of them. 2MSuSt mentioned that the political situation in the region was very 
dangerous and as ISIS occupied zones in Iraq it could quickly lead to a collapse in security in 
Iraq up to the borders of Iran, so it was a fatwa with pressure and interference from Iran. 
9FSuH /W stated that Iran’s presence in Iraq was under the pretext of the security situation in 
the region, and that without this fatwa the Iranians could not come to Iraq. 
6MSuSt mentioned that the fatwa was with the complete agreement of Iran so no 
political decision in Iraq is issued without referring to Iran. He also said many of Al Sistani's 
decisions are received from Iran, and that Iran had a role in ISIS entering Iraq. However, 
10ShP also believes that Al Sistani would not make any decision just because Iran wants it. 
Many Shia participants in this research argue that they believe that there are common 
interests between Iran and Iraq in terms of security, but that the Fatwa was not part of these 
interests. 10MShP mentioned that, ‘Yes, the first beneficiaries of the fatwa are Iran and Iraq 
because of the security conditions in the region’. 11MShCl, however, suggested that Al 
Sistani did not consult with Iran or anyone on the decision to issue of a Fatwa, but that the 
fatwa was “divine inspiration”, that God granted Al Sistani wisdom, inspiration and 
knowledge, because he is a keen observer and reader of Arab and international political 
events. (13MShP agreed with this.) 
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3MShP also stated that that, “I do not agree that the fatwa was issued with Iranian 
cooperation but there were common interests between the two countries”. 4MShCl stated that 
there was a high probability that the fatwa was agreement with Iran, especially since the 
development of the area was at risk and the risk was caused by ISIS. If it reached the border 
of Iran it would a disaster. He added that Al Sistani opened the gate to Iran’s intervention. 
12MShCl argued that Al Sistani’s fatwa was issued without agreement with Iran 
because the events after 2003 proved that Al Sistani is an independent figure but might make 
decisions which also favour Iran, and that this is normal in politics.  
In summary, there was a great deal of support among the participants that the influence 
Al Sistani has displayed in Iraqi politics – particularly in regard to the 2014 fatwa against 
ISIS – was in Iran’s interests. However, it was also noted that this was because of common 
interests in the region. There was no mention that Al Sistani would favour Iran over Iraq. 
9.3.4  The impact of the 2014 fatwa on Iraqi communities? 
The fatwa which issued by Al Sistani was designed to protect Iraq's Shia from the extremist 
ISIS, but not just the Shia–all Iraqis. However, some of the participants in this study felt that 
the fatwa could have ignited a sectarian war in Iraq.  
 10MShP mentioned that after the fatwa and what followed, however, the sectarian war 
did not happen and Al Sistani stressed the need for the Iraqi government and the rest of the 
political leadership to unify their rhetoric and join efforts to face the terrorists and protect the 
citizens from their evil acts. 
 11MShCl stated that issued by Al Sistani’s office was a statement asking:  
… all citizens, especially in the mixed areas where Sunnis and Shia exist 
together, to exercise the highest degree of restraint and work on strengthening 
the bonds of love between each other, and to avoid any kind of sectarian 
behaviour that may affect the unity of the Iraqi nation and to avoid all kinds of 
armed manifestations outside of the official Iraqi army. 
13MShP mentioned that some of Al Sistani’s actions were for the purpose of uniting 
Iraq, with Al Sistani’s office officially asking the TV channels to remove his photo from their 
programs and to show the map and flag of Iraq in its place in order to remind people of the 
unity of Iraq. 
3MShP believe that some Sunni clerics supported Al Sistani’s fatwa because they felt 
that it would save Iraq from a sectarian war. Sunni cleric Sheikh Ahmed Kabisi issued a 
Fatwa on 10th of June in the same year calling for mobilization against all terrorist groups 
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taking control of a number of Iraqi regions, and granting the status of martyr to whomever 
dies confronting them. This was clearly support for Al Sistani’s Fatwa. 12MShCl mentioned 
that Shia volunteers liberated some Sunni areas, while many Sunnis from Salahuddin 
province joined the popular mobilization forces, including tribes, mainly the Sunni al-Jabour 
tribe, indicating this fatwa was a good chance for Iraqis to unite.  
6FShSt mentioned that Al Sistani ordered all its offices in Iraq to receive refugees from 
the liberated areas and provide housing and food for them as well as sending aid to areas 
affected by the war. This appears to be evidence that Al Sistani cared about all of Iraq's 
communities without discrimination. 
14MShP mentioned that there were many battles in which the popular mobilization 
forces and Sunni troops participated together to free some of the areas dominated by ISIS. 
This strengthened the national unity between Sunnis and the Shia. 5MKuP mentioned that 
there were Christian forces also participating with the popular mobilization forces because 
their target was to protect Iraq from ISIS and preserve Iraq, united with all its religions and 
sects.  All this happened only because of Al Sistani’s Fatwa which made Iraqis unite under 
flag of Iraq.  
9.4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The current study shown in figure 9.1 find out that 79% of participants in this study believe 
that Al Sistani did not issue any Fatwa in 2003 when Iraq was invaded by the US was save 
Iraq, and for this action Al Sistani has been criticized because when a comparison is made 
between jihad Fatwa in 1914 and why not issued in 2003 and issued against ISIS 2014 an 
analysis must be made as to what is different between the three eras of Iraqi history.  
As mentioned in literature review, in 1914 Kathem al-Yazdi did not realise the military 
capabilities of the invading British forces. At that time the British force was one of the 
strongest armies in the world.  Kathem al-Yazdi did not have a political vision at the time of 
the 1914 revolution, therefore when British forces wanted to negotiate with the rebels, 
Kathem al-Yazdi did not have the vision to negotiate to shape the results of the revolution to 
be in his favour. As a result, the revolution was lost and the British forces installed Faisal I 
King in Iraq. 
The policies were not present at that time for religious scholars to show a path of 
resistance from the salvation of the occupying forces. So attempted failed because they 
lacked political knowledge (Kadhim, 2012). Vinogradov (1972) mentioned that after the 
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1920 revolution when British forces wanted to form a government for Iraq they met with the 
rebels to ask them what sort of government they wanted for Iraq. At that time they had 
different answers so they went to Kathem al-Yazdi to get advice on the same question. The 
answer was “I am a man, I do not know politics, but I know this is Halal and this is haram” 
halal means permitted as prescribed by Muslim law and the opposite of it is haram. The 
attendees were shocked by this answer, therefore a group of religious scholars were soon 
established ("the Islamic Renaissance Society in Najaf”) to be the political forefront of 
Shi'ism (Simon & Tejirian, 2004).  
According to opinion of the interviewees of this research, Al Sistani knew very well 
that the Iraqi people were not able to resist the US in 2003 because they had fought three 
devastating wars– the Iraq-Iran war, the first Gulf War and the economic war (economic 
blockade) – which severely affected Iraqi life. Therefore Al Sistani realized that the Iraqi 
people were not ready to take up arms to fight, and that the Shia especially would welcome 
any invasion forces that would help them to get rid of Saddam. The Sunni participants in this 
research thought that Saddam’s government represented them and they wanted to stay forever 
in that position. Therefore, they wanted a Fatwa from Al Sistani, while some of them 
realistically knew that if Al Sistani issued the fatwa then a humanitarian disaster would 
follow. 
Al Sistani chose political resistance to deal with the US which was more useful than 
military resistance. Events that since 2004 prove that Al Sistani’s decisions were politically 
based, such as his insistence on holding elections and writing a constitution by Iraqi hands 
and the formation of a recognized Iraqi government. Additionally, he also negotiated a 
security agreement with the US which led to US troops being pulled out of Iraq. All these 
events prove that he refused occupation, but by peaceful means, not violence.  
Regarding to Al Sistani’s fatwa in 2014, some of participants in this study consider it 
against ISIS while others believe, it was a sectarian retaliation against the Sunnis. When Al 
Sistani issued this fatwa, Al Sistani used a jihad kefaya fatwa, not a jihad fard ayn fatwa for 
particular reasons.  In the case of a jihad fard ayn fatwa there would be much more violence 
and loss of life – as this kind of a jihad requires everyone to carry weapons to defend 
themselves and their areas, with the penalty for disobedience being loss of money, resources 
and homeland (Kovács, 2015). Also, in the case of a jihad fard ayn every  ShiaMuslim in 
other countries would come to Iraq to take part in response to Al Sistani's fatwa, and that will 
cause conflict in the Middle East between  Shia and Sunni communities and countries. Some 
countries would have considered this fatwa as causing a sectarian war that would give them a 
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right to intervene in Iraqi issues. For example, Saudi Arabia might have sent an army with the 
excuse that there are Sunni people being persecuted. However, Al Sistani did not issue a jihad 
fard ayn, and so was able to contain the conflict in Iraq in order to avoid chaos in region.    
Referring back to Al Sistani’s recommendations, he made an inspiring speech to the 
People’s Liberation Movement in reminding them of the words of the Prophet Muhammad to 
the Mujahedeen. He said, ‘Don’t be extreme don’t be treacherous. Don’t kill an old man, or a 
boy, or a woman. Don’t cut a tree unless you have to’ (al-Khafaf, 2015). Al Sistani’s 
recommendations and inspiration had a major impact on the PMF in respect of human rights 
and non-reprisals, and reduce the sectarian tension among Iraqis. 
The Shia Muslims think that the leading cleric in their age is the representative of the 
‘hidden Imam’. Therefore any orders coming from the leading cleric (Al Sistani ) come from 
the hidden imam. Many Iraqi Shia saw Al Sistani as the leading cleric, which could explain 
why Shia Muslims responded so enthusiastically to his fatwa. So when Al Sistani’s 
representative issued the fatwa at Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala he mentioned many verses 
and Hadiths of the prophet Mohammed to confirm this battle is sacred.  
Al Sistani’s jihad fatwa in 2014 was against ISIS. ISIS is a terrorist group which does 
not subject itself to authorities such as the United Nations or global organizations. ISIS 
announced it wanted to apply Islamic law in Iraq, but this cannot be applied because Iraq is a 
group of religions and sects and it is difficult to impose a particular religion on the people. 
ISIS also announced it came to kill Shia and Sunnis if they oppose, and that they would 
destroy holy shrines in Karbala, Najaf and Baghdad. Al Sistani realized the gravity of the 
situation and the need for the issuance of a fatwa. Murders, other crimes and horrific scenes 
which ISIS had already committed in Sunni areas had an important role in making Al Sistani 
issue this fatwa.  
As well as this, the collapse of Iraq’s fragile army, and the ineffective response from 
local police in Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq, led Al Sistani to take action to save Iraq from 
ISIS.  The international refusal to recognize ISIS made the US acknowledge the effectiveness 
of the PMF as a key factor in facing ISIS. Thus the international community also backed Al 
Sistani’s fatwa, as demonstrated during the visit of the United Nations’ Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon to Najaf. The fatwa was not considered sectarian because many of sects and 
tribal forces participated in it, including different Sunni and Christian groups.  
Confusing similar interests with Iran as working together with Iran and putting their 
interests first.  
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Regarding the idea that there is an agreement between Al Sistani and Iran to issue the 
jihad fatwa on 2014, approximately half of the participants disagreed with this idea. From the 
participants’ information and the researcher’s own textual analysis, it appears apparent that 
no one could impose their will on Al Sistani regarding important actions such as the jihad 
fatwa. The USA representative in Iraq, Paul Bremer, tried many times from 2003 to 2006 to 
convince Al Sistani to be involved in direct dialogues, and his failure to do this reinforces the 
belief held by many that it was hard to impact decisions on Al Sistani .  
However, almost half of the participants supported the idea that Al Sistani might have 
consulted Iran before issuing the fatwa, or that Iran was in agreement with Al Sistani in 
regard to the fatwa. Some people, although not the participants of this research, might think 
that being in agreement means consorting with Iran and accepting Iran’s will. However, there 
was no indication that and participant in this research gave much consideration to this idea. 
Instead it must be said that half the participants believed that Al Sistani (representing Iraq) 
had similar interests to the interests of Iran. 
9.5 SUMMARY 
Finally, it is worth noting that Al Sistani has rejected many calls in February 2006 to issue a 
Fatwa for Jihad after the bombing of the Samara Holy Shrines, a sacred mausoleum of Shia 
Imams.  
Muslim belief states that a fatwa is not about revenge or attack, but about the need to 
defend religious freedoms, sacred places, and people’s lands from those who aim to remove 
peaceful Muslims’ freedoms to believe in Islam as they currently do (Khosrokhavar, 2016). 
This aggressive ideology and behaviour of ISIS is unfortunately far too common in the Arab 
world now and far removed from what mainstream Islam believes and teaches (Wood, 2015).  
From the research in this study Al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa may have come from some 
consultation with other countries, and if so, that country appears to be Iran. But although 
there may have been consultation, or simply opinions passed, it seems clear that Al Sistani 
did not make any agreement with any other country, or any organisation. 
The research participants believed that Al Sistani always refused intervention by any 
country in Iraqi, and if this wasn’t the case there would be a backlash from other countries.  
This chapter explored the following research question: 
Q 1: To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political 
influence? Do they approve of his approach to his own political influence?  
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Q 2: Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s 
problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
In regard to the first question, based on the participants interviewed, most Shia people 
accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political influence, and they do approve of his 
approach to his own political influence? Sunni generally disagree, although most seem to at 
least respect Al Sistani and his political influence, without any serious doubts about his 
motivations.  
In regard to the second research question, yes, a significant number of Iraqi’s do see in 
Al Sistani a special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems, and to how Iraq is 
viewed by the rest of the world? 
The following chapter provides conclusions to this research, as well as 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion and Recommendations 
10.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In relating back to the research questions, the concluding chapter of this research summarises 
the major findings. This is done in relation to the three research questions outlined in Chapter 
One. 
10.2 INTRODUCTION 
The Sunnis did not follow Al Sistani’s fatwa and did not participate in the elections held in 
2005 for several reasons – the areas of Iraq in which they lived were not secure, and they 
were worried about a change in power. They refused the new political process which they 
saw as being run by the Shia in the hope of stopping the political process. They already know 
that the population of the Shia was greater than the Sunni, so if they participated in the 
elections it would provide legitimacy for the new ‘Iraqi’ government. 
The Sunni were thinking that the political process would stop because of their boycott, 
but what happened turned out to be the opposite. The political process is still continuing. Iraq 
has become a democracy, and the Sunni have paid a high price in their lack of participation in 
forming the first government and writing the new constitute for Iraq. 
This study clarifies the importance of the invitation which was issued from Al Sistani to 
the Shia and the Sunni to vote in the 2005 election. The invitation to the election by Al 
Sistani gave it a great importance of religious and social impact particularly after it is 
considered a religious duty. It appears to be inaccurate to say that Al Sistani had a personal 
interest in gaining power through the elections or in gaining inappropriate influence. Instead 
it has seemed – through the views of the research participants and the textual analysis of the 
literature – that Al Sistani was trying to assist in the forming of a new Iraq for everyone, that 
the elections were not an invitation from Al Sistani to for the Shia to dominate the political 
system, but they were an explicit call for the exercise of democracy through elections shared 
by everyone, without exception, and this included the Iraqi diaspora throughout the rest of the 
world.  
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10.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on textual analyses and the responses of the research participants, the following are the 
responses to the research questions that have motivated this thesis.  
The Shia and the Sunni are very much divided on the role of clerics in politics. The  
Shia believe that the Muslims clerics should follow Al Sistani’s lead and have an important 
role in expanding awareness and advising Muslims that democratic principles can be applied 
in Muslim countries.   
10.3.1 Research Question One: approval of Al Sistani  
To what extent do Iraqi people accept Al Sistani’s role as a cleric with political influence? Do 
they approve of his approach to his own political influence? 
As detailed in Chapter Five, generally most Sunni appear not to accept Al Sistani’s role 
as a cleric with political influence, although some do, or at least they express respect for him. 
The Shia, however, overwhelmingly accept his influence. There is much confusion about the 
relationship between clerics and politics, from the response Al Sistani’s fatwas, Al Sistani is 
clearly in a very powerful position from the respect he has gained by his decisions, and by his 
‘fairness’ to Shia, Sunni, and other sects and groups in Iraq. 
It is also clear, as detailed in Chapter Seven, that Iraqis see Al Sistani more as an 
advisor, and not as a ruler. In Chapter Eight the analysis reveals that he made many wise 
decisions – in the case of Al Maliki, for example – and that when the reasoning of Al Sistani 
was understood is was accepted and appreciated, even by many Sunni. 
10.3.2 Research Question Two 
Do Iraqis see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems, 
and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest of the world?  
Chapter Six, and again the overwhelming positive response of the Iraqi people as a 
whole, indicates they do see Al Sistani as holding special hope for Iraq. But how Iraq is 
viewed by the rest of the world is a different question. Iraq is certainly viewed with respect, 
but further research could shed more insight on this question. 
As detailed in Chapter Nine, yes, a significant number of Iraqi’s do see in Al Sistani a 
special hope for Iraq in regard to the nation’s problems, and to how Iraq is viewed by the rest 
of the world? 
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10.3.3 Research Question Three 
How does Al Sistani see his role? This question was dealt with primarily through textual 
analysis. In reading and studying the words of Al Sistani in books, interviews, and on various 
publications on his website, Al Sistani either pretends very well to be a reasonable, wise, 
caring, and ethical and Godly (or Holy) person, cleric and advisor – or else he is not 
pretending and this is who he really is. Very little serious criticism of Al Sistani can be found 
anywhere. 
Al Sistani takes his role seriously, of course, but the research opinions and the literature 
indicates he is reticent (slow to take action) but when he does it is always well thought out 
and as an advisor, although as an advisor who is very well respected and listened to. This is 
his way – not direct involvement in politics. 
10.4 FURTHER THOUGHTS: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
This study sought and contained knowledge about the relationship between Islam and 
democracy. It found that Shia typically accepted that an Islamic country could be democratic, 
although matters of culture and religion should be left out of politics. This is a half-way 
measure that seems to be working now that the democratic government of 2014 is still 
working. But it raises problems. For example, can a democratic government allow or 
encourage the prevailing religion to dominate social customs? The Sunni, however, as 
indicate din the research of this thesis, were far less supportive of the concept of a democratic 
government. 
The contentiousness of the issue of the compatibility between democracy and Islam lies 
in an understanding of the Quran. Some (predominantly the Shia) find that their interpretation 
of the Quran allows for a democratic government. The Sunni, however, interpret the Quran 
differently and find that there is no any compatibility between Islam and democracy. 
However, it has been noted that the Quran, in many verses, always motivates Muslims to 
consult each other in all issues any decisions instead of fighting. 
10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
But diasporic identities and activities tend to have differential implications for homelands and 
host countries. This is one area that may be of interest in further r research. 
Even though they reside outside of their or their parents' home countries' borders, many 
people no longer living in Iraq regard themselves as legitimate members of its collective 
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identity and socio-political order. The diaspora was keen to participate in these elections. 
Even though they have been living outside of Iraq for decades they still considered this 
election to be a first step to returning to their homeland. 
This research uncovered a significant amount of data, but the findings are not 
conclusive. Only fourteen people were interviewed, and none of these Iraqi’s were living in 
Iraq at the time. Do these research participants represent Iraqi’s as a whole? This is 
inconclusive but offers much for discussion and further reflection. Future research would 
certainly do well to interview Iraqi’s living in Iraq. It may also be helpful to interview 
subjects from a wide geographical area. 
There is much more that can be studied and researched. For example, this researcher 
recommends investigating what the role of the PMF will be after finishing the war with ISIS 
– will these forces be equal to the army? Who will have control over them? Will it be Al 
Sistani ? Is he able to control the PMF and is he able to disband it? 
Further research could also deal solely with the opinions of Shia clerics in Iraq and Iran 
about Al Sistani’s interventions in politics and to which extend they support this action. 
Further research focusing entirely on clerics as the subjects could perhaps also shed light on 
the ideological differences between the Qom and Najaf hawzas.       
10.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The influence of neighbouring countries in Iraqi affairs was clear from the outset. Many of 
those interviewed – both Sunni and Shia– were apprehensive of the elections which took 
place in 2005 for many reasons, which included claims of Al Sistani working in co-operation 
with Iran. I believe the findings of this research indicate this need not be of concern.  
Perhaps Al Sistani’s role post 2003 was able to show a different face of Islam to the rest 
of the world. One cannot say this is the true face of Islam, but perhaps it is the prevailing face 
– and a face which indicates a good future for Iraq. For the findings of this study indicate Al 
invites people to do practice democracy instead of violence. He also encourages people to 
abide by the constitution and the law in solving problems. Al Sistani faced a lot of criticisms 
because of his attempt to enshrine democracy in Iraq but he clearly believed that there is no 
solution for Iraq except for democracy.   
This study explains and clarifies a new theory of the involvement of clerics in politics. 
This researcher calls this ‘Al Sistani’s theory of political intervention by clerics’. In this 
theory clerics do not sit back and do nothing, say nothing. They do not become actively 
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involved in politics, such as through the concept of Wilayat al faqih. Instead they sit 
somewhere in between, where they do not become actively involved, but they voice their 
opinion in an authoritative way. 
Al Sistani’s interventions in Iraqi issues post 2003 were all crucial, therefore he has 
been considered as a main player in the new political process in Iraq. Al Sistani’s role in 
influencing the Iraqi people is compatible with a model of government which allows a 
Muslim nation to have a democratic political system. Most of his interventions were critical, 
and may influence the Iraqi’s into believing that he is a man of wisdom whose presence in 
Iraq is very important.   
10.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is about Al Sistani. It may be unusual, perhaps, for a PhD thesis to investigate the 
influence of just one person, but this is an indication of the importance of this person. Al 
Sistani has had a major role in the shaping of Iraq after 2003, when Saddam Hussein and his 
regime were removed from the country.  
From 2003 to 2014 Al Sistani’s role involved influencing the country politically from 
his position as Grand Ayatollah. He convinced the US to hold elections and then choose a 
committee to write a constitution for the Iraqis (Allawi, 2008). In these 2005 elections he 
issued a fatwa for the Iraqis to vote and support the elections. Then ten years later in 2014 he 
issued a Jihad Kefaya Fatwa against ISIS and contributed to removing Al Maliki from the 
front running to be the new Iraqi Prime Minister. And the nation has in many ways been 
divided over Al Sistani. This has been particularly in regard to someone in his position as a 
member of the clergy having a political influence.  
All these matters are important. Iraq has its place and its influence in Middle Eastern 
politics, and becoming a democratic nation as it did has set a precedent that the world has 
now been watching for more than a dozen years. In other words, what has happened in Iraqi 
is very significant in world affairs. It is also very significant for the country itself. Will it last? 
Can a Muslim country truly embrace democracy and pave the way for other Muslim countries 
to do the same? Will it remain a democratic nation? 
Iraq is, of course, still struggling. There is much sectarian conflict and ISIS is still very 
active. And of course the Sunni and the Shia are lacking agreement in so many areas.  
This thesis and its accompanying research rose in response to all these factors, and the 
results have been illuminating. 
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Appendix 1 
Table (1) shows the results of the first provisional elections for the assembly January 2005 
(Anderson & Stansfield, 2005b). 
  
Table (2) shows the results of the first national elections in December 2005 
(Aljabiri, 2015). 
Name of the electoral bloc Seats won out of 275 Affiliation 
United Iraqi Alliance  128 Shi’i alliance including SCIRI, 
Da’awa, Sadrists and Fadhila 
Kurdistan Alliance  53 KDP and PUK 
Twafiq  44 Secular alliance including Allawi’s 
INA 
Iraqi National List  25 Secular list including INA 
Hiwar  11 Sunni Arab list, ostensibly 
nonsectarian 
Others  14 Kurdish Islamist; Independent 
Sadrist; Turkmen; and Christian 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of the electoral bloc Seats won out of 275 Affiliation 
United Iraqi Alliance 140 Shi’i alliance including SCIRI, 
Da’awa, Sadrists and Fadhila 
Kurdistan Alliance 75 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 
the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) 
Iraqiyah 40 Secular alliance including Allawi’s 
INA 
others  20 Sunni tribal party, Independent 
Sadrist; Communist, Secular, 
Christian; Shi’i candidates 
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Table (3) shows the results of the second elections in March 2010  
(Dawisha, 2010). 
Name of the electoral 
bloc 
Seats won out of 325 Affiliation 
raqi National Movement 
(alIraqiyya) 
91 A coalition of Shia, Sunni, secular 
and non-sectarian 
State of Law Coalition 89 Predominantly Shia 
National Iraqi Alliance 70 Shiite religious group that includes 
ISCI; Sadrists, breakaway Dawa 
party; the Islamic Virtue Party 
(Fadhilah), the  ShiaTurkmen 
Movement, and other parties6 
Kurdistan Alliance  43 Consisted of PUK and KDP 
Others  32  
 
 
Table (4) shows the results of the third elections in April 2014 for 328 seats in Parliament 
(O’Driscoll, 2014). 
Name of the electoral 
bloc 
Seats won out of 328 Affiliation 
State of Law  92 Dawa Party led by the previous prime 
minster al-Maliki 
Sadrist Movement  34  
Kurdish Parties  62 (combined) KDP, PUK and Gorran 
Al-Ahrar  28 Sadrist and other  Shiagroups 
Muwatin (Citizen Bloc)  29  ISCI list. including other  Shiapoliticians 
Mutahidoun Bloc  23  Sunni Arab Speaker of Parliament, Osama 
al-Nujaifi, 
Wataniya list  21  Mixed list of secular and Sunni groups and 
individuals 
Al-Arabiya list  9  Sunni groups and individuals 
Fadilah Party  Unavailable  
Da’wa (Jaafari) (205)  Unavailable  
